

MEMORANDUM FROM THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT FOR MEETING WITH THE HOME
SECRETARY ON 13TH OCTOBER 1982

INTRODUCTION

It is now over two decades since the Sharpeville massacre and the subsequent banning of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, which led to the departure from South Africa and Namibia of many opponents of the apartheid regime and the development of a worldwide anti-apartheid movement. Throughout this period there have been numerous reports of illegal, clandestine and subversive activities aimed against opponents of the apartheid regime and their sympathisers. The only logical explanation of nearly all these events was that they were carried out by the South African authorities, or agents acting on their behalf. In many cases, direct South African responsibility has been established, or even admitted by Pretoria.

The most serious acts of terrorism, assassinations, abductions and kidnappings have taken place in independent African states neighbouring South Africa and Namibia. Some of these have been documented in the pamphlet South Africa's Record of International Terrorism. The purpose of this memorandum however is to focus attention on such activities in the United Kingdom, and the response of the British Government.

The Escalating Pattern of South African Subversion in Britain

Since the early 1960s there have been numerous reports of activities of an illegal, clandestine or subversive character which have been aimed against opponents of the apartheid regime in Britain. These initially appear to have taken the form of surveillance of such opponenets, break-ins of offices of organisations associated with anti-apartheid activities and the secret financing of pro-South African propaganda. Each of these has been well-documented, and where appropriate, reported to the police and the Home Office. In 1975 the International Defence and Aid Fund, in its publication BOSS: the First Five Years, gave a brief resume of such reports. There were further such reports in the mid 1970s. Some examples are given in Appendix 1.

There is growing evidence, however, that in response to the growing political crisis in Southern Africa, the apartheid regime is using the United Kingdom as a base for even more serious and disturbing operations. These include:

- (a) the use of physical violence against anti-apartheid organisations in Britain;
- (b) the surveillance of and gathering information about opponents of apartheid in Britain, with the objective of planning assassinations;
- (c) the systematic break-ins and harassment of anti-apartheid organisations in Britain;
- (d) the use of Britain as a base for planning operations against the Governments of independent African states and Southern African liberation movements.

There is now a genuine feeling of insecurity and fear for their own safety amongst opponents of apartheid in Britain, as well as for the safety of the families of South African and Namibian exiles living in Britain.

Examples of South African Operations

It is not possible to itemise in this memorandum all the examples and evidence of South African operations in the United Kingdom: Appendix 1 serves as a brief survey based on press reports. Some examples are set out here in order to indicate the different character of such operations.

- 1) In August 1980 the New Statesman published a report of a self-confessed South African spy, Ivan Himmelhoch, who gave details of the activities of accredited diplomats at the South African Embassy here in London who were in-fact operatives of the South African National Intelligence Service (NIS). It named the head of NIS operations as B.M. van der Khashorst and the previous heads as J.J. Kemp and J. Fourie. He also named a R. Shardlow as his contact. This report revealed that officials of the Embassy were organising an information-gathering system in Britain, including compiling of files on individuals and infiltrating anti-apartheid organisations. The report revealed, for example, that a "bulging file" had been compiled on Ruth First whilst she was living in Britain. (Ms First, a British subject, was assassinated in Maputo, Mozambique, on August 17th 1982.)
- 2) There is the well publicised case of Craig Williamson, a Captain in the South African Security Police, who infiltrated the International University Exchange Fund, an international humanitarian organisation which was in receipt of funds from a number of Governments, including the British Government. At the same time his wife infiltrated the WHO, to spy on its anti-apartheid activities. During his period with the IUEF, Craig Williamson made frequent, and often unexplained visits to Britain. The Sunday Times, London, reported in February 1981 that Brigadier Coetzee, head of the South African Security Police, visited Britain on several occasions apparently to contact Williamson, and of the existence of a 'safe house' for Williamson in London. Williamson, after his exposure, returned to South Africa through London. There is prima facie evidence that Williamson's activities in Britain contributed to the arrest and subsequent imprisonment of an Oxford research student, Dr Renfrew Christie.
- 3) There is the self-documented case of the South African agent, Gordon Winter, who wrote Inside Boss, published in 1981. Although there is a characteristic confusion of fact and fantasy, it cannot be disputed that Gordon Winter was based in Britain and operated for the apartheid regime. He named Embassy officials for whom he was working, and gave details of visits of senior South African operatives to the UK.
- 4) Considerable information about BOSS activities in Britain were published in the Observer in 1979 and 1980, based on the statements of a self-confessed BOSS agent, Arthur McGiven. The paper published a list of BOSS 'targets' headed by senior officials of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. The articles also named Ruth First as one of the people about whom information was being gathered.
- 5) There are extensively documented activities of the former South African Department of Information which were exposed as a result of the so-called Muldergate Scandal. These cases involved the secret funding of pro-South African propaganda and included clandestine activities such as a fake petition aimed against our Movement, organised by the Department of Information at South Africa House in the spring of 1977. The D.P.P. decided not to prosecute, we were advised, on the grounds that there was only an attempt to deceive, not to defraud.
- 6) However, it is recent developments which are the most disturbing. On March 14th, 1982, a 101b bomb exploded at the back of the African National Congress offices in London, causing extensive damage. Miraculously, there was no loss of life or serious injury. Subsequently there were two break-ins at the offices of the ANC and SWAPO and there have been a number of other related unexplained burglaries. Currently one person is in custody, awaiting trial on conspiracy charges relating to the break-ins at SWAPO and the ANC. It has been established that he is an employer of an anonymous Pretoria-based organisation

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On September 23rd, a South African attorney, Mr Hendrik Goosen, who until March this year served in the South African Police, and is the son of a senior officer in the Security Police, Deputy Commissioner Goosen, visited London on behalf of his anonymous Pretoria-based organisation, in an unsuccessful attempt to secure bail for the accused man held in custody.

7) Finally, there is mounting evidence that London is being used as a centre for planning subversive activities against independent African states. On 14th August 1982, the Portuguese paper Expresso published an extensive article concerning the preparations for "Operation Kubango", which was a 5 million dollar operation to overthrow the Angolan Government. According to Expresso, the agreement to set up "Operation Kubango" was made at a meeting in London on 15th April, which was attended by two South African operatives, Gary van Dyke and Johannes Jacobs Kemp. Kemp, using a pseudonym, Jack Rollins, according to Expresso was also in London on 20th May 1982. Kemp is a very senior official in the South African National Intelligence Service. He was formerly head of BOSS in the Western Cape, and, prior to that appointment, was First Secretary at South Africa House, London. The Expresso article, which was supplied to the Foreign Office on 17th September, gives details of the entire operation.

There have also been reports that officials of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement visited Britain, as well as other European countries, in September in order to secure arms for their operations against the Mozambique Government.

Britain as the Centre for South Africa's International Conspiracy

It is not surprising that London is used as a base for such extensive South African operations. Britain is one of only 6 countries outside Africa which permit free entry without visas to South African nationals. The 6 are Lichtenstein, Ireland, Greece, Switzerland, West Germany and Britain. South African operatives can enter the UK at will and there is absolutely no control over their activities here.

The South African authorities must surely be encouraged to use London as a base because, despite numerous activities which have been identified above and in Appendix 1, no action has been taken vis-avis the South African authorities.

For example, despite the well publicised revelations that Mr van der Klashorst, a First Secretary of the South African Embassy was head of NIS operations in London, (New Statesman, August 1980), no action was taken to secure his withdrawal from the UK, although he was involved in activities totally unacceptable for a member of the Diplomatic Corps. Moreover, Mr van der Klashorst and his associates were apparently involved in compiling information on British subjects, which, in one case at least, Ruth First, must have contributed towards her becoming a target for assassination.

The Chairman of the AAM wrote to the Foreign Secretary seeking an investigation into the reports, and the Home Secretary seeking an assurance that there was no co-operation with South Africa in the security field, immediately following publication of the article. Richard Luce, then Minister of State at the Foreign

Office, replied on 31st October, stating that "I am satisfied that no purpose would be served by an investigation of the kind you suggest". The Private Secretary of the Home Secretary declined to give the assurance sought. It has been subsequently confirmed that Mr van der Klashorst was a senior official of the South African Security Police prior to his appointment as First Secretary at South Africa House. In view of the New Statesman allegation it is inconceivable that this information would not have been ascertained by the Government at the time, yet in November 1980, in response to a Parliamentary question, Sir Ian Gilmour said that the Embassy could "freely appoint" its diplomats. Mr van der Klashorst returned to South Africa two weeks after the first Court hearings relating to the ANC and SWAPO break-ins.

Equally disturbing is the Government's behaviour towards Mr Kemp. Even if the British Government was unaware - and this is difficult to believe - that Mr Kemp was head of BOSS operations in the UK whilst serving as First Secretary at South Africa House, it must have been aware of Mr Kemp's subsequent public role in BOSS and in NIS (BOSS's successor) which was reported in the South African press. Yet Mr Kemp could apparently visit the UK and take part in a clandestine meeting at which agreement was reached to organise the overthrow of the Government of Angola, which is a member state of the UN and OAU, and with which Britain has diplomatic and extensive economic relations.

Furthermore, when a person is arrested and charged with carrying out break-ins at the offices of SWAPO and the ANC, he is released on bail and has since disappeared.

The evidence, accumulated over more than ten years, that South African security agents, including very senior officials, using diplomatic protection, are operating out of the South African Embassy, is overwhelming. We also understand that it has been confirmed in relation to the current case. Yet no action has ever been taken.

At the same time the no-visa arrangement allows for even the most senior of South African security and intelligence officials to enter the UK, both to organise operations related to the UK, and internationally. There is only the most marginal attention paid to such visits, if any.

Conclusion

The Anti-Apartheid Movement is convinced that a fundamental change of policy is required in order to seek an end to South African intelligence operations in the United Kingdom and stop the use of Britain as a base for such operations. We therefore urge the Government actively to consider measures, including the following:

- 1) the termination of the no-visa agreement with South Africa and stringent control over the entry of South African nationals into the UK.
- 2) a full investigation to be undertaken immediately into the activities of South African diplomats in the UK, with a view to expelling any South African diplomats involved in such operations, and the introduction of a policy by which the credentials are not accepted for any diplomat known to have a security, military or police background.
- 3) the establishment of a Parliamentary Enquiry into this entire subject, with the Enquiry charged with making comprehensive recommendations for Government policy.