

**SOUTH
AFRICA'S
UNDECLARED
WAR AGAINST
MOZAMBIQUE**

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The violation of our border, the attack and destruction of Mozambican property, and the murder of people under the protection of our flag are serious violations of our sovereignty and independence. In military and diplomatic terms, these are acts of war.

- President Samora Machel

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COVER PHOTOS

Body of worker at Somopal jam factory killed in South African air raid, 23 May 1983 (AIM)

Tractors destroyed by MNR at Vanduzi in Manica Province (AIM)

Interior of house at Matola hit during South African air raid, 23 May 1983 (AIM)

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The bodies of Ana Mutombene, Rosita Munamate and Xavier Marremisse, killed in South African air raid on Somopal jam factory, 23 May 1983.

Photo:AIM



M O Z A M B I Q U E
 provinces and
 provincial capitals

INTRODUCTION

The apartheid state of South Africa - one of the world's most heavily militarised nations - is waging an undeclared war on Mozambique, its north-eastern neighbour.

This war is part of a pattern, a wider strategy aimed at subordinating all the less developed but politically independent countries of Southern Africa, and also at destroying the African National Congress (ANC) liberation movement and with it the hopes for a democratic South Africa free from racism and injustice.

Pretoria's war is being waged also against Namibia, which is occupied and administered by the racist regime, and against Angola, which is subjected to repeated attacks, invasions, destructive strikes and violations of its territory. These two countries are suffering most from South African aggression, but the attacks are spreading throughout the region and other nations - Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia - have also experienced armed aggression. And all are subject to hostile economic pressure from the racist Republic.

None of these countries has attacked South Africa. Some are far distant, sharing no common frontier with the RSA. All are economically and militarily far weaker than the nation that threatens them, with its well-developed agricultural and industrial economy. South Africa is rich in natural resources and has used its wealth to dominate the region and to build up one of the strongest and best-equipped armed forces in Africa.

South Africa's war against Mozambique shows clear signs of intensifying. It incorporates the 'total strategy' that the rulers of apartheid are fond of alluding to in their fight to maintain white supremacy.

This total strategy includes direct military attacks on a neighbouring state and the bombing and killing of its citizens. It includes military and political destabilization through the promotion and support of the anti-government terrorist organization known as the MNR. And it includes indirect economic and psychological destabilization through attacks on transport routes, food production, water supplies and industrial sites, and through malicious and mendacious radio broadcasts and rumour-mongering.

There is ample evidence of South African involvement in all these areas, as the United States and British authorities

have accepted. Several European nations have pledged their support to Mozambique directly, and others have done so through the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). But there is a tragic lack of action where it is most needed - against the policies and aggression of the apartheid state.

DIRECT SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS

The first major military attack on Mozambican territory came at the beginning of 1981 when a commando team from the South African Defence Force (SADF) crossed the border in disguised trucks and drove swiftly to Matola, a suburb of Maputo, capital city of Mozambique. On the way, a Portuguese civilian working in Mozambique on contract was shot and killed. At Matola three houses were attacked by mortar fire and machine guns.

Twelve South African refugees, members of the ANC and SACTU, were killed in the attack; one died later in hospital and three were kidnapped and taken to South Africa. The houses were virtually destroyed by the ferocity of the attack.

A month after the attack, Mozambique expelled four United States diplomats who had been revealed as CIA officials engaged in acts of espionage, including cooperation with the South African authorities over information relating to ANC refugees in Maputo. As if to warn Mozambique against direct retaliation, South African temporarily suspended rail traffic to and from Maputo, causing problems for Mozambique.

Shortly afterwards, in March 1981, regular SADF troops crossed into Mozambique at the coastal resort of Ponto da Ouro south of Maputo. Challenged, the platoon opened fire and a gun battle followed in which two South African soldiers were killed and a Mozambican wounded. It is thought that the purpose of this provocative action was to test the local defence capacity of the Mozambican forces.

Other direct incursions have taken place in the Namaacha district, near to where Mozambique's border meets Swaziland and South Africa's eastern Transvaal Province. In August 1982 South African attackers killed three people, including a Portuguese citizen, in Namaacha town, and kidnapped three others. In an earlier incident, a house in the town was attacked with explosives and an occupant killed. In April 1983 a group of South African saboteurs was intercepted by the Mozambican defence forces, who had been alerted by local residents. When challenged, the group opened fire and then fled, abandoning their packs - which were found to contain explosive charges, parts for time bombs and forged identity documents. It is believed that their objective was to plant bombs in public places to cause fear and insecurity during the meeting of the

Frelimo Party Fourth Congress, which was about to take place in Maputo.


This was followed a month later by a major air attack on sites close to Maputo, mainly in the Matola area. At 7.20 on the morning of 23 May 1983 a squadron of 14 South African aircraft strafed and bombarded the district with machinegun fire and air-to-ground fragmentation rockets.

The targets appear to have been the Maputo oil refinery (a strategic economic site) the bridge over the Matola river, and the industrial and trading area nearby. Anti-aircraft defences protected the first two of these, and casualties were heaviest in the industrial and residential areas. At the Somopal fruit juice and jam factory three workers were killed. The factory creche, luckily unoccupied at the time of the raid, was also hit. In the residential area, a six-year-old child was killed playing in the street, and a number of other people, including a two-year-old infant, were wounded. One Mozambican soldier guarding the bridge was also killed in the attack. Claiming credit for the raid, a spokesman in Pretoria said its aircraft had attack an ANC military base and killed dozens of guerillas.

The British ambassador to Mozambique, John Stewart, was among those who visited the sites hit shortly after the raid and he refuted South African claims that the targets were ANC bases. He said "the factory is not, and there is no indication that it ever has been, a military installation of the ANC", and added that the Mozambican authorities had encouraged the diplomatic corps to visit and inspect everything they wished to see. It seems that one major purpose of the raid was in fact to attack Maputo's economic infrastructure and thus add to the city's problems; when this failed and civilians were the victims, Pretoria's spokesman tried a propoganda counter-offensive, perhaps as much for internal consumption as for self-justification to the rest of the world.

A tactically different act of aggression came in August 1982 with the assassination of Ruth First, internationally-renowned scholar, political writer and academic who was working as research director of the African Studies Centre at the University of Maputo. The killing was carried out by means of a sophisticated and lethal parcel bomb that also severely injured several other members of the Centre's staff.

José Antonio Monteiro Ramos, Portuguese cooperante killed in his car during South African attack on Matola, January 1981. Photo:AIM




Hit squads have also been used. In October 1983 bombs were planted in the building that houses, amongst other things, the ANC's public office in Maputo; in the subsequent explosion one Mozambican and four South African refugees were injured.

It is clear that South Africa is ready to use all types of attack against Mozambique, and that unless checked this aggression is likely to continue. Whether the weapons come by air, road or mail, and whether their origin is acknowledged or not, the effect is the same: murderous attacks on Mozambican citizens and foreign residents and refugees - undisputed acts of war.



Memorial meeting for Ruth First held in Maputo August 1982.

*Room in ANC office, Maputo, damaged by bomb blasts,
17 October 1983. Photo:AIM*



DESTABILISATION AND THE MNR

As well as direct attacks on the Front Line States, South Africa pursues a policy of arming and coordinating terrorist groups within neighbouring countries, groups that use murder, massacre, plunder, sabotage and abduction to create economic and social destabilization. In Angola, Pretoria supports, supplies, trains and protects the counter-revolutionary organization Unita; in Mozambique it directs and arms the self-styled Mozambique National Resistance, known as the MNR or sometimes, in its own propaganda, as Renamo.


Military training and planning of MNR operations take place in a camp in the Transvaal and to all intents and purposes its troops may be regarded, in President Machel's words, as "just an extension of the South African army".

The MNR was originally created in 1976 by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization under the Smith regime, as a means of intensifying the war against the liberation forces of Zimbabwe by gaining information from Mozambicans who had fled the country at the time of independence and were able to assist the Smith regime's strikes against Zimbabwean refugees and freedom fighters across the border in Mozambique. MNR members were drawn from the 'special units' of the Portuguese colonial army, from the PIDE political police and in some cases from Frelimo deserters. Most were Mozambican in origin, like the first appointed military commander, Andre Matsangaiza, but many senior members were European, of Portuguese nationality or descent. The most important of these leaders was Orlando Cristina, a former PIDE agent who helped form the notorious elite groups of the colonial forces, with whose files he fled to Rhodesia in 1975. From 1980-3 he headed MNR in South Africa. As well as carrying out bombing raids on ZANU camps and on strategic transport links, Rhodesia steadily trained MNR teams to attack and harass Mozambican installations in the provinces bordering Zimbabwe. The aim was to raise the cost of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation forces and oblige Mozambique, a poorly developed country with great internal needs, to put its own survival against the freedom of Zimbabwe.

When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, the personnel, armaments, radio equipment etc belonging to the MNR, was all transferred to South African territory and, as former members of the Rhodesian Special Branch have confirmed, a new programme was launched to develop the MNR into a mobile, nation-

wide armed guerilla force capable of causing death, destruction, damage and deep insecurity throughout the country, without ever aiming to 'win the war'. The objective was to hinder Mozambique's economic development programme and undermine popular support for Frelimo Party policies. This would keep the country weak, in the interests of South Africa, and persuade it to withdraw its political and material support for the ANC. Ultimately, as with Unita in Angola, the aim may be to present an 'alternative' government, which will be an ally of the apartheid regime; in the short term, however, it is to weaken the state and impoverish the country.

Since 1980 the MNR has been active in most of Mozambique's ten provinces and its operations have caused widespread distress and suffering. The effects have been particularly acute where MNR actions have exacerbated already harsh economic conditions, such as the prolonged drought that has afflicted parts of the country. In Inhambane, for example, food shortages have been worsened by MNR attacks on villages, shops, agricultural schemes, health posts etc., and by sabotage and ambush of the transport network, preventing relief supplies from reaching people in the rural districts.



New milk tanker destroyed by MNR attackers at Vanduzi, Manica Province, November 1982.

Photo:AIM

MNR activities are of two main types: local 'bandit' actions - killing, looting, ambushing, burning, kidnapping - carried out by roving armed gangs who obtain most of their supplies from their victims and may be constantly on the move; and specialised 'commando' units where skilled teams are sent into the country to sabotage strategic installations.

There is direct South African participation in both types of operation, although it is greater in the 'commando' actions, which required skilled saboteurs trained by the SADF or recruited from international mercenaries. From an HQ base in the Transvaal, South African military authorities oversee and direct all MNR activities, issuing instructions by radio and arranging delivery of important supplies by air or sea. At the MNR base at Tome in Inhambane, for example, MNR captives in 1983 saw six white South Africans training MNR personnel in the use of radio equipment, and the arrival of arms and other supplies by parachute drop. Documents captured at the MNR base at Garagua in Manica Province destroyed by the Mozambican Armed Forces (FPLM) in December 1981 showed that this process has been a continuous one. They included records of meetings between the current MNR military commander Afonso Dlakama and a South African military intelligence officer identified as Col. van Niekerk or Colonel Charlie.

BANDITS

In the early days of their operations, most MNR operations were in the mountainous regions of Mozambique such as those bordering Zimbabwe, where the terrain made it difficult for the Mozambican army. The main base was at Garagua in the Gorongosa district, and this was supplied by helicopters from Rhodesia until the base's capture by the FPLM in December 1979. Since 1981, MNR actions with additional support from South Africa have been extended into other regions, in each of which there tend to be a number of bases, some large and some small and easily dismantled.

The military training pattern is for a number of selected 'commanders' to be taken to South Africa for training and briefing, with the majority of MNR 'rank and file' are given basic weapons training in camps inside Mozambique. Many of the recruits are young men who are forced or 'persuaded' to join the MNR by threats or bribes; once they have taken part in armed actions it is difficult to leave.



Peasant women mutilated by the deliberate actions of the MNR.

The strong dependence of the MNR on South Africa was illustrated at the trial of an MNR commander of a local unit active in 1982 in the provinces of Gaza and Inhambane. This man travelled on at least two occasions to South Africa by helicopter, where he collected weapons for his group. With the weapons, the group ambushed and burnt two buses, killing all the passengers, attacked and destroyed schools, shops, rural hospitals and villages, and caused widespread havoc in several districts. When eventually caught, the commander was sentenced to death by a military revolutionary tribunal.

A typical recruit to the MNR was 19-year-old Jorge Gumache from northern Inhambane Province, who joined the MNR in September 1981. The truck in which he was travelling was ambushed and he was taken to a camp where he was given six months' military training. "Then they gave me a gun," he said following his arrest in 1983, "and we went to Muapsa, where I burnt out a lorry full of sacks of sugar". Later his group attacked a rural hospital and took away supplies and forcibly abducted four members of staff, who were made to cook and look after members of the gang. Other operations included vehicle ambushes on the roads in remote areas, plunder of shops and food supplies, and at least one attack on the rail line between Inhambane and Inharrime, when a train was derailed and 14 people taken off into MNR custody, no doubt to become active members in their turn, or be shot. Gumache, sent on a reconnaissance mission into Inhambane city, was finally caught and his particular reign of terror brought to an end.

At Christmas 1983 two especially horrific MNR attacks on innocent villagers took place. In one, an MNR group ambushed an intercity bus in Nampula Province, told the passengers to leave the bus and strip, and then shot them. At least 40 people were killed and 20 injured, some of whom sought succour in a nearby Catholic church where Christmas mass was being celebrated.

In the other incident the village of Marrangwa in the eastern part of Gaza Province was raided by an armed MNR gang during Christmas festivities. Five people, including the Frelimo Party Secretary, were hacked to death with hammers and axes. The head of one woman was cut off and stuck on a post. A witness said "There were armed men all around us and we had to sit on the ground and watch".

As well as these attacks on local people, with the objective of terrorising and disrupting their lives, the MNR also aims to destroy major economic and social installations, particularly those linked to Frelimo's development policies and to international assistance. The communal villages established as key elements in the drive to increase agricultural production and distribution in the rural areas by bringing family cultivation into a cooperative system, have been selected for attack. Through the communal village policy it is hoped to bring social benefits such as health care and education to all citizens, and so the MNR has consistently attacked targets such as village health posts, school classrooms and community shops, leaving the inhabitants without their much-needed services which they have in most cases laboured to provide from their own resources. In Inhambane Province a total of 400 village shops have been burnt down. In extreme cases, residents have been forced to leave the village and return to scattered homesteads and fields wherever they can find shelter.

In all areas, the war has aggravated other problems such as cultivation and marketing of food crops or the poor distribution of manufactured items like tools, utensils and clothing. The standard of life for many peasant families has declined and in certain areas the combined effects of drought, poor supplies and MNR operations have led to actual famine and death.

State agricultural enterprises have sometimes repeatedly been singled out for attack by the MNR. Daniel Manhique, manager of a cattle farm in Gaza province, experienced three MNR attacks in ten months, during which farm workers were killed and injured and livestock was stolen or let loose; the objective was to force the farm to suspend its operations and thus reduce production, a form of economic pressure that pushes local agriculture back towards the subsistence level of farming from which Mozambique is trying to advance.

The MNR also carried out attacks on development projects funded by foreign aid or where foreign workers (known as cooperantes) are employed on contract, as industrial or agricultural specialists or in teaching and medicine. Here the objective is partly economic and partly propaganda and intimidation, and also serves as a means of involving other nations in what the MNR's masters in Pretoria would like to project as a conflict between the Mozambican government and

its political opponents. Attacks on aid projects may, it is thought, lead to a withdrawal of overseas cooperation with Mozambique. Capturing foreign citizens and offering to negotiate for their release is an attempt to gain international recognition and political credibility.

The first such incident took place in 1981 when a British ecologist and a Chilean teacher working at the Gorogosa Game Park were kidnapped. After long treks on foot with small MNR groups evading capture, the former was released just across the border in Zimbabwe and the latter some months later in Malawi. In August 1982 six Bulgarian construction engineers working on a road project in Zambezia province were captured and held hostage until freed by a Mozambican army operation. At the same time seven Portuguese cooperantes kidnapped in Manica province in October were released on the Zimbabwe border.

Foreign workers have been intimidated by MNR actions even when not directly threatened. In the Chimoió district cooperantes working at the Swedish-supported Ifloma forestry and sawmill project were temporarily withdrawn in mid-1982 and although the sawmill began its operations at the end of the year the foreign workers again withdrew in April 1983, leaving the project without much needed technical support.

Other projects have been delayed and hampered by abduction of skilled workers. In December 1982 work on power lines in Zambezia province was halted by the kidnapping of two French engineers and only resumed after their release in February 1983. In October 1982 a Sri Lankan cooperante working at a tea processing factory was kidnapped and later released.

The most serious attack to date took place in August 1983 when the MNR launched an assault against a tantalite mine at Morrúa in Zambezia, killing two Soviet geologists together with two Mozambican members of the works militia guarding the mining complex, and kidnapped 24 other Soviet cooperantes. Eyewitness reports describe the attackers opening fire on the quarters where the geologists were sleeping and rounding them up to carry away loot: "They smashed all the windows of the houses. They smashed up the laboratory and the guesthouse. They stole everything they could - clothes, food, even spectacles. They stole all the medicines from the health post and then destroyed it".

In subsequent months, some of the captives were reported to have been killed in MNR custody and some to have been freed; at least 14 were still held at the end of 1983.

In general, the MNR displays more concern for the lives of Europeans than for Mozambicans, but it frequently announces its intention of forcing all foreign workers, particularly those from socialist countries, to leave the country or risk being killed. To date, few foreign workers have succumbed to this intimidation, but there is no doubt that a number of badly-needed economic projects have been hindered and disrupted. Planned projects for mineral prospecting, for example, have been delayed. As a foreign aid official commented early in 1983: "Mozambique has a lot of plans that cannot be pursued for the time being. Peace would make all the difference".



Shells containing toxic chemicals captured from MNR forces in Inhambane Province, 1983. Photo:AIM

SABOTEURS

Strategic sabotage, undertaken by specialist commando teams on direct instructions from South Africa, is aimed principally at Mozambican's vital transport networks. This both damages the already underdeveloped economy and creates extra costs in scarce foreign exchange for repairs, spare parts, alternative equipment, vehicles and fuel. It also undermines regional attempts to build an economic infrastructure that is less dependent on South Africa, through bilateral projects and SADCC schemes (Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference).

The main target has been traffic to and from Zimbabwe. Following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the rail links with Mozambique were again opened and imports and exports again carried through the ports of Beira and Maputo. One of the MNR's chief targets was the rail line from Beira to Zimbabwe which has been repeatedly mined and ambushed.

At the end of October 1981 road and rail bridges leading to Beira were blown up, causing severe problems within Mozambique as well as disrupting Zimbabwe traffic through the closure of the line from Beira to Mtare (Umtali). This attack was apparently the work of a well-trained sabotage group operating from South Africa. The body of a British-born mercenary who appeared to have killed himself while



Body of SADF soldier killed during South African attack at Ponta do Ouro, March 1981

Photo:AIM

placing explosives was found at another section of the line in Manica province, and it is assumed that the same or similar personnel carried out the bridge demolition. The dead mercenary was later identified as a former British Army officer who served in Northern Ireland and then joined the Rhodesian special forces before transferring at independence to the South African Defence Force.

A month after the destruction of the Pungwe bridges, marker buoys in Beira harbour - essential navigational aids for ships entering and leaving the port - were destroyed by a naval commando team that approached from the sea. Such an operation was clearly beyond the basic military capabilities of the MNR units in Mozambique and fits in with what is known of the special seaborne hit squads within the SADF, such as that assumed to have carried out the attack on the Angolan oil refinery in Luanda in December 1981.

During 1982 there were further attacks on Mozambique's rail lines, including an attack on a train near Chimoio in May and more explosions damaging the Beira line in July. The oil pipeline carrying fuel from Beira to Zimbabwe was also damaged. It is not always possible to say which of these attacks involves professional saboteurs drawn directly from the SADF and which are carried out by Mozambican-based MNR groups, since both have the same aims and objectives. Nor is it always necessary to distinguish between the two types of operation, for on occasion specialist teams and MNR units work together; such operations are clearly organised from South Africa.

The blowing up of fuel storage tanks at Beira harbour in December 1982 seems to have been undoubtedly the work of a special squad, and was similar in scope to the previous year's major attack on the Luanda refinery, where the remains of an unidentifiable white mercenary were found. The damage to the Beira storage tanks and the loss of fuel caused shortages in Zimbabwe, where emergency petrol rationing was required, leading to increased dependence on South Africa for fuel supplies. This provided a clear demonstration of Mozambique's vulnerability, and of Pretoria's power and determination to maintain its position of dominance.

ECONOMIC AGRESSION

Virtually all the targets of South Africa's direct and indirect aggression against Mozambique are of economic importance.

As well as destroying transport links, the attacks have severely disrupted power and water supplies. In 1982, for example, the Revue dam, where Beira's electricity is generated, was several times sabotaged, and there were also attacks on the city's water supply. These type of attacks, if successful, cause great economic and social problems.

There have also been repeated MNR attacks on the power supply lines taking electricity from the Cahora Bassa dam in Tete province south the South Africa, under a pre-independence agreement. To summarise an intricate situation, when the power supply is interrupted, South Africa does not pay the Portuguese-owned Cahora Bassa company, which then has difficulty meeting the costs involved in production and in paying off the loans raised to finance the scheme. Under the agreement some power is reimported from South Africa for southern Mozambique; when the supply is disrupted, Mozambique is obliged to buy South African-generated power, using scarce foreign currency. It is thought that as South Africa has no long term interest in Cahora Bassa electricity - which provides under 10% of South African consumption - and is currently making great efforts towards energy self-sufficiency, the MNR attacks on the transmission lines are aimed at inducing Portugal to abandon its interest in the Cahora Bassa plant, which would create a range of new problems for hard-pressed Mozambique to deal with.


Other economic threats used by South Africa do not involve the use of the MNR. Early in 1981 the South African authorities suspended traffic on the Transvaal-Maputo rail line, which caused financial difficulties to Mozambique through the loss of expected revenue. And in the months that followed, it is estimated that a total of 450,000 tonnes of cargo that would normally have been shipped through Maputo were diverted through South African harbours. The industrial and mining area of the Rand is an obvious customer for freight services in and out of Maputo, but other routes are available, leaving Mozambique rather at South Africa's mercy. In addition, recent plans to develop new routes via a rail link and port in Swaziland indicate that South

Africa intends to reduce much of Maputo's traffic.

Mozambique is particularly vulnerable to this type of action since much of its economy was developed during the colonial period in a 'service' relation to that of the Transvaal, and it will take some time before a more balanced economy is in operation. At the same time, the low level of development in the rest of the country means that there is very little cushioning, and fairly simple manipulation by South Africa can cause acute difficulties.

One example is the water supply in the southern part of the country where several rivers flow from South Africa through Mozambique to the Indian Ocean. Water is becoming an increasingly crucial commodity in Southern Africa, not just owing the agricultural needs caused by the prolonged drought but also because of industrial demand for water, particularly in South Africa, and control of the supply is an economic and political issue.

In Mozambique the immediate problem is drought and low rainfall. In March 1983 it was reported that emergency aid was needed in the district of Moamba, 80km north of Maputo and traditionally an area supplying food for the



*Oil storage tanks at Beira following sabotage attack
December 1982*

Photo:AIM

capital, which was facing a catastrophic harvest. Lack of rain had been aggravated by the deliberate reduction of river water by the closing of a dam on the South African side of the Incomati river, so that no water was reaching Moamba.

In another incident shortly before the opening of the Frelimo Party Fourth Congress, a dam on the Umbeluzi river in Swaziland was also closed, apparently at South African instigation, in order to deprive Maputo of water. After emergency ministerial talks, the supply was resumed.

Mozambique is vulnerable to this kind of pressure because 70% of its river water originates outside its boundaries. And South African plans to utilise for industrial purposes water that has hitherto flowed to the sea could make things worse.

South Africa's regional economic dominance, which can be and is used in a hostile manner against Mozambique, is being challenged through the SADCC, established by the independent states of Southern Africa as a system of project cooperation designed to reduce dependence on South Africa and thus diminish vulnerability to economic aggression. Through SADCC the independent states hope to strengthen their economies through bilateral and collective action, and through assistance and investment from Western European nations.

SADCC itself has been attacked by South Africa in acts such as the dislocation of communication links between the SADCC countries - an example of how powerfully the apartheid state controls economic infrastructures. In addition, Pretoria offers 'favourable treatment' to those Southern African countries which are willing, or obliged, to cooperate with South African financial and industrial enterprises.

President Machel has accused South Africa of attempting to destroy SADCC. At a SADCC summit meeting in July 1983 he said: "We are aware that the basic aim of the acts of destabilization carried out against our countries is to render SADCC non-viable. Our response to this threat must be founded on our unity".

He added: "We reject political or economic dependence on South Africa or any other country. We refuse to submit to manoeuvres or blackmail. We want to transform our region into a zone of peace, progress and well-being".

PROPAGANDA AND ESPIONAGE


In support of its military and economic aggression against the independent states of the region, South Africa employs powerful propaganda means, and through its access to communication technology is able to reach large numbers of listeners in Southern Africa.

The objective is a dual one: to convince those living in the Front Line States that South Africa, although the land of apartheid, is also a land of plenty and prosperity, where consumer goods not available in independent states may be easily purchased, and that inefficiency and instability are endemic to 'black' governments. The propaganda spreads a good deal of disinformation about independent Africa, all mixed up with straight international news so that the distortions are not immediately apparent; the aim is to confuse and demoralise those living in neighbouring states who may not have access to alternative information sources, but it is essentially the same propaganda supplied to and consumed by the Western press and news agencies.

Radio is the chief propaganda means in Southern Africa, and Pretoria beams broadcasts to the whole region. To Mozambique the programmes are in both English and Portuguese language versions, in addition to which there are various commercial stations whose output consists largely of pop music and advertisements, together with regional news items.

There are also radio stations that specifically promote destabilization by purporting to be run by the so-called resistance movements. These claim to be broadcasting from within the country but are in fact controlled and operated from South Africa.

The MNR radio station is now called the Voice of the Mozambican Resistance, and its transmitter is located in the Transvaal. In the early days of the MNR similar stations operated from Malawi and Zimbabwe but after 1980 everything was transferred to South Africa. Here the station retained its original name until the middle of 1983, when a reorganization took place in the wake of the murder of Orlando Cristina, who was domiciled in South Africa and played a leading role in the diffusion of propaganda by radio.



South African spy plane shot down over Mozambique on 30 May 1983. The remotely-piloted vehicle, made in South Africa under Israeli licence, was fitted with a French-made camera for aerial photography.

Typical broadcasts include claims that the MNR has 12,000 armed men in Mozambique and that 'new fronts' have been or will shortly be opened in various provinces. Large scale attacks resulting in huge numbers of casualties on the part of the Mozambican armed forces are claimed. In August 1983 it was stated that the MNR was launching a major offensive codenamed Red August, and foreign cooperantes were warned that they would be killed if they remained in their jobs. Not all MNR radio propaganda is false, so it is a useful means of spreading alarm and panic.

In the latter part of 1983 the Voice of the Mozambican Resistance appeared to be increasing the scope of its broadcasts and began short transmissions in the vernacular languages of Mozambique. It also carried items reporting on MNR activities in Europe and the United States, to give the impression of a movement with international respect and recognition.

South African aims are also furthered by agents and spies, who in many cases are directly in the pay of the apartheid state. One such was Finlay Hamilton, a British-born businessman living in Beira who in February 1983 was convicted of complicity with MNR actions in Sofala province, and who paid regular visits to South Africa. Hamilton had

prior knowledge of the attack on the Beira oil storage tanks, and a network of employees and contacts.

Two South African agents who infiltrated Mozambique were captured during 1983. The first was a military intelligence officer named Schoeman, who told the Mozambican authorities that he had been sent on various missions to collect information on such installations as the Cahora Bassa dam, the main post office and telecommunications centre in Maputo, and the capital's highest class hotel, where visiting dignitaries often stay. He also claimed to have been sent to assassinate President Samora Machel during the Frelimo Party Fourth Congress.

The second man was caught near the South African border in August, when he crossed the frontier illegally and was found to be carrying materials for a time-bomb; it is believed that he was on an undercover mission for the South African special forces.



Mozambican troops with equipment captured from South African reconnaissance unit that entered Mozambique on 22 June 1982

NEGOTIATIONS

Towards the end of 1983, the Mozambican government entered into preliminary discussions with South Africa on 'practical ways and means of achieving peace, security and good neighbourly relations between the two countries on the basis of internationally-established principles of relations between sovereign states'. One of the central issues at stake was South Africa's unneighbourly aggression against Mozambique and in particular its promotion of the MNR.

On 16 January 1984 a joint statement agreed that neither country should 'serve as a springboard' for attacks on the other. To date, however, there have been no practical moves on the part of Pretoria to reduce its military threat to Mozambique; it is hoped that the coming months will see some improvement in the position.

The costs of South Africa's undeclared war have been substantial to Mozambique, which is already a poor country. Early in 1984, the external debt to western creditors had to be renegotiated and in doing so Mozambique explained that this was in part due to the effects of South African actions.

Losses caused both by direct aggression and by the hostile economic strategy are estimated to have cost Mozambique some 3,800 million dollars. Over the past few years South Africa has steadily reduced its payments for Mozambican services, creating an effective economic boycott and seriously reducing Mozambique's foreign exchange earnings.

Direct aggression by the SADF and the MNR has caused many deaths and destruction estimated at \$333 million. Other figures given in this context show that in 1982-83 a total of 900 village shops, 490 primary schools and 86 health posts were destroyed. In 1982 alone, 140 communal villages were destroyed, affecting the livelihood of over 100,000 citizens.

Mozambique has appealed to western countries for aid to help develop its economy and prevent damage from natural disasters such as drought and floods. It has also appealed for trade links, both with the west and with the other nations of the region, since successful economic development is a priority. In this context international support for SADCC is of vital importance.

So too is international pressure, particularly from those countries which are South Africa's main trading partners. There is no doubt that the policies and actions of the Pretoria

regime are a grave threat to peace and stability in Southern Africa, and that this in its turn hinders effective economic development. Those countries with strong economic links to South Africa are asked to use their influence to restrain Pretoria from attacking the Front Line State. 'It is clearly irrational,' stated a recent SADCC communique, 'for such countries to invest in regional infrastructure only to see such resources wasted by South African sabotage'. Such pressure, combined with Mozambique's determination and increasing ability to defend itself and its revolution will, it is hoped, lead to an end to South Africa's undeclared war against Mozambique before too long. If it does not, more people will die, more will suffer injuries and disablement, and more will lose their homes, crops, belongings and hopes.



*Captured MNR members presented to the public at a mass rally
May 1983*

APARTHEID'S WAR AGAINST ANGOLA

by Marga Holness

An account of South African aggression against
the People's Republic of Angola



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to inform public opinion in Britain about the struggle of Mozambique and Angola for a socialist way of life and in particular their struggle against underdevelopment and against the forces which, taking advantage of that situation, seek to destroy their economies and subvert their economic and social independence; and to rally all progressive forces on a broad front in their support;

to develop forms of material aid for Mozambique and Angola;

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SOUTH AFRICA is currently waging a campaign of aggression in order to destabilise neighbouring Mozambique. The weapons in this undeclared war range from economic pressure to direct military attacks and support for the large armed MNR force. The social and economic advances Mozambique has made since independence in 1975 are in danger. Western nations that give aid to Mozambique are being asked to put pressure on Pretoria to stop its attacks. South African military might and economic power must not be allowed to prevail.

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