

UK Policy towards South Africa

Submission to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee



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Introduction

The Anti-Apartheid Movement has been working for more than thirty years for freedom in Southern Africa. During this period we have seen the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique and Angola and independence in Zimbabwe and Namibia. We have sought to give support to those seeking freedom and democracy and to secure the adoption of international policies which contribute towards these objectives. It has always been our belief that a policy of international sanctions would constitute the most effective form of international action to bring a rapid end to the system of apartheid and to create conditions of peace in the region. This remains our view.

British involvement in the system of white minority rule in South Africa, and in opposition to it, pre-dates the foundation of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. The Foreign Affairs Committee, in its report on South Africa of 1986 (hereinafter the 1986 report), referred to British obligations arising out of the colonial legacy and noted that "the development of apartheid as a legal system was made possible by the British Parliament's release of its responsibilities for the non-white population in 1909."

It is worth recalling that delegations representing African opinion have been seeking the support of the British Government and people over the past eight decades. Indeed, the last time that a British Prime Minister met a delegation from the African National Congress (ANC) was in 1919, when Lloyd George met its Secretary-General Sol Plaatje.

We believe that it is a tragedy that the calls of the African National Congress and others who seek a democratic solution in South Africa have not been acted upon and that successive British governments have instead embarked on policies that have served to prolong the existence of apartheid.

We are now witnessing encouraging developments within South Africa. Sadly, Britain's contribution, if any, to this process has been minimal. Now is really the last chance for Britain to address the damage done by years of alignment with the white minority power structure in South Africa. The British Government should be supportive of those seeking a genuinely non-racial democratic solution in South Africa. Without such action, Britain's long-term interests in the region could be irreparably damaged.

It is our belief that the only long-term basis for British interests in the region is through the creation of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa with which Britain can enjoy normal commercial, cultural and diplomatic relations in an equal partnership for mutual benefit. Pending the achievement of this goal, the point of departure for British policy must be recognition of the fact that the problems of South Africa and indeed of the whole region stem primarily from the continued existence of the apartheid system. The abolition of that system must be the central objective of British policy towards the region as a whole if Britain's long-term interests in, and relations with, South and Southern Africa are to be assured.

Britain's Record

In its 1986 report, the Committee noted that "the United Kingdom Government appears to have found itself in a minority position in every one of the international fora in which the issues have been discussed." The Committee further warned that the British Government would face the probability "of more immediate difficulties, particularly in its relations with the Commonwealth" if it continued its opposition to sanctions pressures against apartheid.

The British Government chose not to heed this warning and has continued to pursue policies towards South Africa that have left it isolated in international fora. The British Government is isolated not merely on the question of sanctions, but on a range of fundamental policy questions: the goal of a new South Africa; creating a climate for negotiations; and relations with the ANC.

It is particularly noticeable in this regard that the memorandum of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Committee makes no reference to the United Nations Declaration on South Africa, adopted by consensus at the sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly from 12th-14th December 1989. This Declaration, for the first time, lays down internationally-agreed positions on the steps needed to create a climate for negotiations; the process of negotiations; and the fundamental principles on which a new constitutional order must be based. The British government was alone in expressing reservations to the Declaration and has since increased its isolation by abandoning support for key aspects of the international consensus position.

The Goal of a future South Africa.

The British government's stated policy is to "help bring about the end of apartheid and the peaceful transition to a democratic non-racial prosperous South Africa." However it has distanced itself from the internationally agreed basis for such a new constitutional order.

For example, speaking on the eve of the Commonwealth Summit in October 1989, the then Foreign Secretary, the Rt. Hon. John Major MP stated that: "The important thing is to encourage and bring South Africans along the programme of reform that they set out in their election manifesto."¹ Yet that Manifesto contains explicit references to 'group rights' widely recognised as a euphemism for continuing white minority domination.

The UN Declaration laid down fundamental principles for a new constitutional order in a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa, and stated that the ending of apartheid "and not the amendment or reform of the apartheid system" should be the goal of the negotiations.

The British Government was alone in entering a reservation to the reference to a "non-racial voters' roll"² amongst the fundamental principles laid down in the UN Declaration. This view was re-iterated by the Prime Minister on 10th April when she wrote: "You mention the need for a non-racial voters' roll. This is not a matter for us."³

Speaking in the House of Commons on 14th February 1990, the Foreign Secretary further stated that the British government was urging the South African government "to think in terms of protection for minority rather than 'group' rights." Here again, British policy falls short of the otherwise universal demand for a non-racial democracy in South Africa.

These are not matters of semantics. The fundamental issue at stake in any negotiating process is whether it will lead to the genuine end of apartheid or simply to a system of neo-apartheid in which white domination is maintained in a new guise. Thus where British policy stands on this matter is of critical importance.

Creating a Climate for Negotiations.

The first major international initiative to try to secure a political settlement in South Africa through negotiations was the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. It recognised, as have the United Nations, the European Community and other concerned inter-governmental bodies, that there was no prospect of negotiations taking place whilst political leaders and activists were imprisoned or detained and free political activity was denied.

The systematic repression of its opponents has been an integral feature of apartheid. For example, since the imposition of the state of emergency on June 12th 1986, fifty-three thousand eight hundred people have been detained without trial.⁴ At the beginning of this year, it was estimated that over three thousand people were serving prison sentences for political offences.

Regrettably, the British Government's record of intervention in this area has contrasted unfavourably by comparison with those of other Western nations. Recent examples include its refusal to take up the cases of United Democratic Front leaders sentenced for treason and the "Upington 14".

One of the significant features of the adoption of UN Declaration by consensus was that it provided an internationally agreed framework for the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations. It specified the steps which the South African Government should take in order to create such a climate. Here again, the British government was alone in entering a reservation, to the proposed repeal of the Internal Security Act, cornerstone of South Africa's repressive legislation⁵.

Whilst it is encouraging that the South African government has taken some of the steps laid down in the UN Declaration, six months after its adoption, a number of major steps remain to be taken. However, the Foreign Secretary claimed as early as February 2nd that "the importance of what President De Klerk announced is that he has done enough in the minds of most reasonable people to open the way for negotiations."

The British Government has not only abandoned its already qualified support for the international consensus on the steps necessary to create a climate conducive to negotiations. It has further sought to absolve itself of responsi-

bility for ensuring that these steps are taken. The Foreign Secretary, referring to the criteria for the release of political prisoners, stated: "This problem can only be resolved by the parties directly concerned. I do not believe outside intervention on one side or the other would be helpful."⁶

A further obstacle to the creation of a climate of free political activity is the situation in Natal. We have followed closely the efforts of the churches, trade unions, the Democratic Party and the ANC itself to achieve peace in the region. We believe the root cause of the problem to be the apartheid system and in particular the bantustan policy. We therefore take the view that the South African Government should address the proposals which have been made to resolve the situation including disarming and disbanding the KwaZulu police; dismantling the KwaZulu bantustan and lifting the state of emergency. It is widely believed within South Africa that the leadership of Inkatha has felt able to sabotage numerous attempts to bring peace to the region because of the recognition which the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Gatsha Buthelezi, enjoys from the British Government and a number of other Western governments. We believe that this is a further area which requires action by the British Government towards promoting a negotiating process.

Relations with the ANC.

In its 1986 report, the Committee noted that until the early part of that year, the British Government had operated a ban on Ministerial contacts with the African National Congress. This ban was re-imposed by the Prime Minister after the Commonwealth Summit in Vancouver in October 1987 when she described the ANC as "a typical terrorist organisation". It was re-affirmed in October 1989 and was only lifted this year.

The Committee, in its 1986 report, noted that even those "with little natural sympathy with the ANC" supported its claim to majority representation. Since the unbanning of the ANC and the release of some of its leaders, the overwhelming support among South Africa's people commanded by the ANC has become abundantly clear.

The British Government's hostility to the ANC has severely undermined British influence both within the region and in the international community, where the ANC's centrality to any political settlement in South Africa has long been recognised. Indeed it is significant that even the South African Government had met with the ANC before Ministerial contacts by the British Government were renewed⁷.

Relations with the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) have also been notably cool. It was only in 1989 that the Prime Minister met with representatives of the United Democratic Front, despite clear evidence that it has enjoyed a wide range of support since its formation in 1983. The low level, infrequency and coolness of relations between the British Government and organisations which represent the majority of the people of South Africa are in sharp contrast to the relations sustained with representatives of the South African Government and those working within apartheid's bantustans and other structures.

International Pressure.

The objective of sanctions and other forms of international pressure is to help secure the abolition of apartheid with the minimum of violence and with the most rapidity. This conception of the role of sanctions was re-iterated by Commonwealth leaders, including the Prime Minister, in Kuala Lumpur last October when they stated that: "their purpose was not punitive, but to abolish apartheid by bringing Pretoria to the negotiating table and keeping it there until change was irreversibly secured."

A broad international consensus has developed that external pressure, in particular sanctions, has played an important role in promoting change in South Africa. For example, at the Commonwealth Summit in Kuala Lumpur in October 1989, the statement which Britain endorsed stated that "such encouraging signs as there had been were very much the product of a combination of internal and external pressures."

However, the Prime Minister contradicted this view in the statement which she issued in Kuala Lumpur: "Britain does not agree that sanctions have the political effects claimed for them. While they certainly weaken the South African economy, the political effect of sanctions is to increase resistance to change rather than to encourage change." In taking this view, Britain again finds itself isolated from the international consensus that sanctions have been an effective form of pressure on the South African government. For example, the US administration's view is that: "Sanctions have played a role in stimulating new thinking within the white power structure. It is now increasingly clear to that government that the well-being of the white minority cannot be sustained without a negotiated political settlement that results in political equality for all South Africans."⁸

The latest evidence on the impact of sanctions, produced by South Africa's Trust Bank suggests that: "Many South Africans and most international observers, including possibly the sanctioneers themselves, would seem to underestimate the full impact of sanctions on the South African economy." The study calculates that the total cost to the South African economy as a whole of sanctions over the last five years has been R 100 billion [£23.3 bn] and that GDP is "at least 10 per cent lower than without sanctions."

Even the South African government has admitted that financial and other sanctions have had both an economic and a political impact. According to the Star (Johannesburg): "Government financial experts agreed with the gist of [Trust Bank's] report quantifying the effects of sanctions and disinvestment on the economy."⁹ The state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation's "Comment" programme of November 6th 1989, regarded as a mouthpiece for the government, further stressed the point: "Sanctions can no longer be brushed aside as irrelevant or easily surmountable. The starting point is to acknowledge that sanctions have had an influence - and a serious influence - on the national economy."

The need to counter the economic impact of sanctions by substantial political change had been recognised by the South African Government by early 1989 at the latest. Referring in his budget speech of 15th March 1989 to the problems of "economic survival in the face of an internationally-organised assault on the economy", Finance Minister Barend du Plessis stated that: "The answer for us clearly lies in a full-scale effort to break the isolation imposed on us, by a dynamic expansion of our trade with the outside world and a restoration of our creditworthiness by means of the correct economic measures and political progress."

The South African Government has further been obliged to acknowledge the impact of the mandatory UN arms embargo which was a major contributing factor to South Africa's loss of military superiority in Southern Angola in early 1988. It was the defeat of South Africa's armed forces at Cuito Cuanavale which opened the way to the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and the implementation of the UN plan for the independence of Namibia.

President de Klerk, in a speech of 7th June 1990, summed up this reality: "We cannot live in isolation from the rest of the world. We need foreign trade and investment. We need technological, cultural and sporting interaction with other countries."

Britain's contribution to South Africa's international isolation has been minimal. Not only is the package of measures adopted by Britain the weakest of any of South Africa's major trading partners, but its enforcement has been extremely limited. It has also undermined sanctions measures imposed by other countries. Britain has even resisted moves by the Commonwealth to strengthen the UN mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. Despite the fact that the UN Security Council's own committee on the arms embargo has identified numerous loopholes in the operation of the embargo, the British Government takes the view that "we do not believe the existing UN Arms Embargo requires amendment."

The international belief that sanctions have been an effective form of pressure has also been reflected in commitments that sanctions must be maintained in order to secure the total abolition of apartheid and not just its reform or modification. In the UN Declaration, all member states committed themselves to "maintaining international pressure against the system of apartheid until that system is ended and South Africa is transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country, with justice and security for all its citizens." The Prime Minister had earlier joined with our Commonwealth and EC partners in agreeing that sanctions would not be lifted until profound and irreversible changes have been achieved.¹⁰

Despite this, the British Government unilaterally lifted sanctions agreed with our EC and Commonwealth partners following President de Klerk's announcements of February 2nd and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela. Furthermore, speaking in the House of Commons on 22 May 1990¹¹ the Prime Minister stated her belief "that there is now no place for sanctions and that they are almost irrelevant." Britain's isolation on this issue was highlighted at the

European Council meeting in June of this year, where the need for profound and irreversible change was re-iterated.

Britain has increasingly presented its aid programme in South Africa as an alternative to sanctions. We believe this to be misconceived, since our view is that the central objective of British policy must be the abolition of apartheid. The purpose of any aid programme must therefore be to help secure this objective. This requires clear criteria. The European Community has successfully developed such criteria, but there is a widespread impression that the British Government is critical of these criteria. We believe that it is urgent that the British Government draws up similar criteria for any bilateral aid policy, including that of the British Council.

Reasons for Britain's Isolation

In its 1986 report, the Committee noted that the policy questions then facing the British Government would have a decisive influence on future developments and warned of the risks involved in continued opposition to the international consensus in favour of concerted action to force the South African Government to the negotiating table.

Since that report the British Government's isolation has increased. On the question of sanctions, even those who had previously doubted their effectiveness, such as the US administration, have now come to accept that sanctions have played an important role. Moreover, Britain finds itself isolated on a range of the most fundamental issues affecting policy towards South Africa: creating a climate for negotiations; the role of the ANC and other organisations seeking a democratic solution; and on the goal of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

We believe that the British Government's policy since the 1986 report of the Committee was published has been, and continues to be, fundamentally flawed. Britain's international isolation on the question of South Africa is a direct and inevitable consequence of the failings of British policy.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement shares the view of most commentators that recent changes in South Africa have come about primarily as a consequence of popular resistance to apartheid and the impact of sanctions. We find it both remarkable and highly disturbing that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's submission to the Committee makes no mention whatsoever of the role played by either of these two key factors in promoting change in South Africa.

We believe that the failure of British Government policy, and the consequent international isolation which Britain faces, arise from a profoundly mistaken political analysis by the British Government of the situation in South Africa and especially of the main pressures bringing change. These it identified as being "a rapidly expanding population, the waste of resources through apartheid, recognition that a system based on minority rule will always be unstable and that apartheid is immoral."¹² However, no analysis of the South African situation can ignore the central role of events such as the unrest which swept

the country from 1984, major industrial conflicts, schools protests, the defiance campaign in the period surrounding the election of September 1989 and, most recently, the upheavals in the bantustans.

It is clear that the British Government sees the de Klerk Government as the key to change. "It is they who must take the initiative to dismantle apartheid" according to the Prime Minister.¹³ In fact, the initiative has always rested as it does today with the ANC and the wider anti-apartheid movement within South Africa which, through popular resistance to apartheid, have been primarily responsible for recent developments.

The Causes of Change in South Africa.

We believe that recent changes in South African Government policy have occurred not through any change of heart by the ruling National Party, but because the Government was faced with a combination of political and economic problems from which it could not escape without such a change of policy.

President de Klerk has, for example, announced the desegregation of beaches and hospitals and the repeal of the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (from October 15th). However, all of these were areas which had been successfully targeted by the campaign of defiance of unjust laws launched by the Mass Democratic Movement in August 1989. Equally, other changes have followed from gains by popular campaigns of resistance or pressure from the international community, rather than having been initiated by the de Klerk Government¹⁴.

President de Klerk has himself confirmed that the changes which have taken place did not follow from any desire by the National Party to abandon apartheid, but rather from simple necessity:

"If our old policy, which was so unpopular in many circles, could work, then we would surely have clung to it ... we came to the conclusion that the policy we had planned could simply not work, and that change was absolutely necessary. That's why we went through the process."¹⁵

Democracy versus 'power-sharing'.

In its 1986 report the Committee noted that:

"It is very significant that in public statements about possible constitutional negotiations President Botha's Government has consistently referred to the 'sharing of power' and has rejected the idea of a 'transfer of power' to a majority government. To a large extent this policy has been dressed up in terms of a constitution - probably a federal constitution - which would provide for 'the protection of minority rights in a manner which would ensure that there will be no political domination by any one community or the other.'

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“It is our fear that this attitude of the South African Government, which probably reflects the views of the majority of the white community, will present a serious impediment to the negotiation of a new Constitution for South Africa.”

Four years later, speaking to the South African Parliament on 17th April 1990, President de Klerk outlined current South African Government policy:

“We believe that majority rule is not suitable for a country like South Africa because it leads to domination ... We are convinced that power sharing based on full participation by everyone, as well as protection against domination, is the only workable answer.”

Similarly, the Minister for Constitutional Development, Gerrit Viljoen on 5th March 1990 said that:

“I wish to state it clearly that the National Party’s point of departure is that there has to be own representation and, therefore, also voters’ rolls for every group which desires to make use of the National Party’s point of view concerning the opportunity for the protection of groups and minorities ... Therefore the National Party is unable to accept the unqualified provision of a common voter’s roll as part of a new constitutional dispensation.”¹⁶

The de Klerk government, faced with unprecedented internal and external pressures, has clearly adopted a different policy on many issues to that of President Botha. However, it sadly remains the case that the South African Government is not yet committed to the creation of a new constitutional order for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa based on the fundamental principles laid down in the UN Declaration.

The gulf between the vision of a new South Africa shared by the ANC and the international community and that of the National Party Government remains wide. President de Klerk has confirmed this: “It is well known that the ANC’s basic vision of a new constitution and that of the NP differ drastically from one another”¹⁷.

Irreversible Change?

In the UN Declaration, all member states committed themselves not to relax sanctions and other measures until “there is clear evidence of profound and irreversible changes, bearing in mind the objectives of this declaration.”

The British Government has sought to portray recent changes as such evidence. Speaking in the House of Commons on 22nd May 1990 the Prime Minister claimed that President de Klerk “has embarked on reforms which are irreversible, which will bring an end to apartheid and which will, through negotiation, bring about a democratic government on a non-racial basis”.

It would seem that the British Government believes that the process now underway in South Africa will automatically lead to a political settlement. Much as we hope that this will occur, such a view seriously underestimates the obstacles which still need to be overcome. A climate conducive to negotiations has still not been created. No agreement exists on the nature of the negotiating process and, indeed, on who should be the parties to this process. As we have outlined above, there remains a tremendous gulf between the vision of a new South Africa set out in the UN Declaration and that of the National Party. The Foreign Secretary himself has admitted that there is "a long and difficult road"¹⁸ to the achievement of a settlement.

Of course we recognise that the South African Government could not easily re-imprison Nelson Mandela or re-impose the bans on the ANC and other political organisations. However, it maintains a battery of security legislation which allows it to detain without trial; impose restrictions on individuals and organisations; and otherwise curtail free political activity. Moreover, nothing that has occurred constitutes the profound and irreversible change required by the UN Declaration, i.e. the changes set out as the objectives of the Declaration, namely the eradication of apartheid and the transformation of South Africa into a united, democratic and non-racial country.

Wider Issues.

We have focussed in this memorandum primarily on British policy towards South Africa. This in no way implies a lack of concern for the region as a whole. All the states of the region have been targets of South African aggression and destabilisation. The strict enforcement of the UN arms embargo would make a serious contribution to reducing South Africa's military capacity. British policy should also be directed at securing an end to South African and international support for Unita and the MNR.

We have always taken the view that the elimination of the apartheid system is a pre-requisite for genuine peace and development in Southern Africa. However, the international community has an important contribution to make at this stage to assist the development of the member states of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and to reduce their dependence on South Africa. The issues which need to be addressed include: aid to compensate for the consequences of South African aggression and destabilisation; the cancellation of external debt; and aid for newly-independent Namibia.

We regret the fact that when Namibia came to independence Walvis Bay remained under South African control. Britain needs to take the lead in a new international initiative to secure the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 432.

Future Perspectives.

It is clear that the future is one of hope. Never before have the prospects for achieving an internationally-acceptable political settlement in South Africa been so great. However, in order for the momentum of change to be sustained, it is important that the international community preserves the consensus which was achieved at the UN Special Session last December. This will require careful and thoughtful deliberation by all the major actors on the international stage. This will be especially the case for Britain.

The contribution which Britain has made to the changes which we are now witnessing has been minimal, especially compared with the support which Britain has given to the apartheid system. The British Government has to be sensitive to this reality if it is to be able to make a constructive contribution during the critical period ahead. Likewise we believe that Parliament needs to be vigilant as the process of change in South Africa develops. We believe that the Foreign Affairs Committee could make an important contribution. We would particularly suggest that it ensures that international pressures are sustained by monitoring the implementation of British sanctions measures. Likewise, we believe that it would be a constructive contribution to this process if the Committee monitored the implementation of the UN Declaration and in particular the British Government's initiatives to secure its implementation.

Finally, there are a number of suggestions for future British policy which we hope would assist the Select Committee in its deliberations.

Recommendations.

We believe that:

1) The Government must clarify its policy objectives for a future South Africa by endorsing the UN Declaration on South Africa that sets out the fundamental principles on which the constitutional order for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa should be based. The Government should express its full support for these principles and in particular it should withdraw its reservations to the proposal for a non-racial electoral roll.

2) The Government should play a much more active role in ensuring that a climate conducive to negotiations is created. The UN Declaration on South Africa sets out the minimum steps which the South African government should take to create such a climate. The existence of an international consensus on this matter is highly significant. We regret that the United Kingdom was the only UN member state to express any reservations when the Declaration was adopted. A clear commitment by the British government in support of this consensus would greatly improve the prospect of negotiations starting in circumstances in which free political activity can take place.

3) The Government should encourage the process of negotiations set out in the UN Declaration and in the Organisation of African Unity's Declaration which was welcomed in the UN Declaration. Moreover in the light of the success of the UN Plan for Namibia, Britain should support the proposal for a Constituent Assembly to draw up a new constitution for South Africa. This proposal has been widely endorsed within South Africa. Such a process would ensure a framework for the democratic expression of all views in determining the future of South Africa.

4) The Government should re-affirm the need for maintaining international pressure until the system of apartheid is ended and South Africa is transformed into a united, non-racial and democratic country. We believe that the British Government was profoundly mistaken in lifting certain sanctions measures in February. We believe these, and especially the EC's common policy of discouraging new investment, should be re-instated. We have also made a series of proposals for consideration by the Special Session of the UN General Assembly when it reconvenes in the near future and we would commend these to the Foreign Affairs Committee and the British Government¹⁹.

5) The Government should recognise the central role of the African National Congress and the wider democratic movement within South Africa as the primary force for change and in future develop its policy in the closest possible consultation with the ANC.

6) The Government should ensure that Britain's aid policy inside South Africa in no way contributes to any relaxation of international pressure to end apartheid. The criteria established for the European Community's Special Programme minimise such risks and we believe that the British Government, and also the British Council, should adopt the same criteria and should support the continued use of these criteria by the Community. We would particularly encourage both the Overseas Development Administration and the British Council to start a process of dialogue with the ANC to establish the circumstances in which it is appropriate for British aid to be provided within South Africa. We would particularly urge support for any request from the ANC for British aid for the return and resettlement of refugees.

7) The Government should expand its programme of aid and assistance to the Frontline States and other members of SADCC. We would particularly urge the Government to recognise its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to secure the implementation of UN SCR 432 on Walvis Bay. We would further urge the Government to cancel all outstanding debt to SADCC states. It should also work to ensure an end to all South African and other international support for the MNR and Unita.

Notes on the Text

1. The World This Weekend, 15th October 1989.
2. Explanation of position by the Deputy Permanent Representative of the UK, Mr T.L. Richardson, 14th December 1989.
3. Letter to Archbishop Huddleston, 10th April 1990
4. The Human Rights Commission, South Africa.
5. Explanation by Mr T.L. Richardson op. cit.
6. Letter to Archbishop Huddleston, 9th March 1990
7. The first contact took place between the Foreign Secretary and ANC Director of Foreign Affairs, Thabo Mbeki on 16th June 1990.
8. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, before the Senate Foreign Relations sub-committee on Africa, October 3rd 1989.
9. 3rd November 1989.
10. At the Kuala Lumpur Summit of October 1989 and the Strasbourg Summit of December 1989.
11. Hansard, 22nd May 1990, col. 167
12. Submission by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Foreign Affairs Committee.
13. Letter to Archbishop Huddleston, 10th April 1990.
14. For further details see 'Six Months of Change, a review of developments in South Africa, January - June 1990' Anti-Apartheid Movement, June 1990.
15. Interview with the South African Broadcasting Corporation TV, in Afrikaans, 7th April 1990.
16. Quoted by President de Klerk, House of Assembly debates, 19th April 1990.
17. Interview with SABC-TV, 7/4/90 op. cit.
18. Speech to the South Africa Foundation, Johannesburg, 20th March 1990.
19. See 'Six Months of Change' op. cit.