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THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE

SALAZAR · VERWOERD · WELENSKY



Many supporters of the sponsoring organisations have worked on this pamphlet, advising, criticising and helping with research. We must thank particularly Basil Davidson for vetting the draft. Dr. O'Brien for his advice on the Katanga section. The sole responsibility for the contents, however, remains that of the author and publishers.—*Rosalynde Ainslie*.

THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE

ERRATUM

Line 22 on page 8 should read :

One third of South Africa's total exports—worth about £350m.

FOREWORD

This valuable pamphlet should be read and acted upon by everyone in Britain who believes that the future in Africa can and must be better than the shameful past.

Whether in precise and documentary form or not, there undoubtedly exists today an unholy alliance for mutual aid and co-operation between all those baleful and blinkered men in Africa who believe that the future must be no better than the past, but the same. That colonialism must go on. That race hatred must persist.

Portugal, the Union of South Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the separatist puppet State of the Katanga with its huge subsidies from Belgian-controlled mining interests: the Governments of all these, with their wealthy friends abroad, have joined in a conspiracy to hold back the spread of political and economic freedom in central and southern Africa. Powerful British political and economic interests are deeply involved in this attempt to kill the hopes of constructive change.

Here, in these factual pages, the damning evidence is assembled for the first time.

How does it come about that Britain speaks of freedom in Africa and at the same time gives comfort and support to the Portuguese dictator Salazar? Why does Britain talk of peace in Africa and yet allow the sale of British arms to Verwoerd? What purpose other than aggression can be served by the tremendous growth of armies and armaments that is now under way—as this pamphlet clearly shows—in these White-supremacy countries of central and southern Africa?

These and other urgent questions demand the attention of us all.

We can answer them—and act upon our answers, as we surely must—only after studying the facts. Here are the facts.

BASIL DAVIDSON.

A MESSAGE FROM DR. CONOR O'BRIEN


The Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Movement for Colonial Freedom and the Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies are rendering a valuable service by drawing attention to the situation in Southern Africa, where the pattern of a well-organised attempt to perpetuate the supremacy of the white minority is beginning to emerge.

The feeling has been rather general among liberally-minded people that the "wind of change" in Africa is irresistible and will, in the near future, automatically end the caste system of minority rule in those parts of Africa where this system survives. No doubt in the long run the "wind of change" will prevail, but it would be a great mistake to suppose that it will do so automatically or quickly.

In Katanga, I came to feel that I was living at the point where the "wind of change" begins to veer: that is, the point where it encounters the escarpment of a relatively solid area of European settlement and rule. The 30,000 or so Europeans of Katanga felt themselves to be backed by the 300,000 or so of the Rhodesias and by more than 3,000,000 in South Africa. The Republic of South Africa casts a long shadow right over the southern part of the continent, right up as far as Katanga. The nature of Mr. Tshombe's regime may be gauged from the fact that two of his ministers, including his Vice-President, Mr. Kibwe, toured South Africa in August, 1961, and found nothing to criticise in their tour. The controlled press in Katanga also upholds the Portuguese action against the rebels in Angola. There is little sign that those in control throughout Southern Africa are disposed to accept genuine change and real political rights for Africans peacefully. It is very likely, however, that further efforts will be made to hoodwink Western opinion on the lines of Rhodesian "partnership," Portuguese "no-colour-bar" and especially what *The Times* has called "that phenomenon of African nationalism, Mr. Tshombe's government." Unfortunately, a large and even relatively liberal section of Western opinion shows a strong propensity to content itself with such simulacra of freedom, as is strikingly evidenced by prevailing Western attitudes towards Dr. Verwoerd's Government and that of Sir Roy Welensky. Almost everyone outside South Africa regards Dr. Verwoerd's regime with well-founded abhorrence. Relatively few people, however, have much fault to find with the system prevailing in Rhodesia, although the uncontroverted facts set out in such a book as Cyril Dunn's *Central African Witness* make it clear that the underlying realities in both cases are similar, and that Sir Roy Welensky differs from Dr. Verwoerd on tactics rather than on principle. Any moral difference there may be would tell in favour of Dr. Verwoerd, who is at least honest about what he is doing.

Your Movements' booklet is a timely one, for it is clear that in the bitter political struggles which are impending as regards the future of Southern Africa, resolute, skilful and well-financed efforts will be made to mislead public opinion in the West as regards the real issues involved. Your Movements, therefore, are facing a difficult task and redoubtable antagonists. The work, however, is essential, if the terrible historic burden of hatred and mistrust between the white peoples and the other races of the world is not to be made still more heavy by events to come.

CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN.



Southern Africa.

THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE

by Rosalynde Ainslie

In Southern Africa there has emerged over the past year or so a growing alliance between the white Governments of South Africa, Portugal and the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, which is on the one hand a conspiracy to obstruct African advance, and on the other may well become a threat to the peace of Africa and the world. "We will go the whole hog," and "use force if necessary," brags Sir Roy Welensky, determined to maintain the Federation; "apartheid is a granite wall," says Dr. Verwoerd; "Angola and Moçambique are part of Portugal," says Dr. Salazar, as he exports more and more Portuguese troops to crush the Angola rebellion. In face of world condemnation they have turned for aid to each other, and the outside world is very little aware of just how closely they are now bound together.

In Dr. Salazar's own words (*Star*, Johannesburg, 8.7.61), "our relations—Moçambique's and Angola's on the one hand and the Federation's and South Africa's on the other—arise from the existence of our common borders and our traditional friendships that unite our Governments and peoples. Our mutual interests are manifold, and we are entirely conscious of the need to cooperate to fulfil our common needs." In pursuit of this cooperation, leaders of the three Governments have been meeting frequently. Dr. Verwoerd and Sir Roy Welensky have had personal meetings over the past few years, notably in 1959, in Pretoria, when no communiqué was issued. In 1961 Welensky visited Dr. Salazar in Lisbon, and afterwards expressed himself tremendously impressed with the Portuguese Government's "progressive outlook and understanding of the difficulties on our continent of Africa." He also visited the Governor of Moçambique, Admiral Rodrigues, at the beginning of 1962. Meanwhile, the Federation Defence Minister, Mr. Caldicott, visited Luanda, capital of Angola, and Lisbon; the South African Defence Minister, Mr. Fouché, visited Lisbon; and a South African defence ministry delegation visited Moçambique.

In fact, in 1961 Press reports suggested that a secret defence agreement had been signed by the three Governments; and these allegations were repeated in April, 1962, by Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia, and by spokesmen of the Zimbabwe African People's Union of Southern Rhodesia. South African spokesmen have denied the charges in public, and so has Sir Roy Welensky, on the ground that the Federation has not legally the right to enter into such an alliance without the consent of the British Government. But Welensky has elsewhere insisted that the Federation is **entirely responsible** for its own defence (*Guardian* 23.1.62).

There may indeed be a formal, signed agreement between the three Governments; but it is far more probable that co-operation is on a largely informal basis. There is plenty of evidence of military co-operation. Last year, Southern Rhodesian army units for the first time took part in training exercises in South Africa; and military missions from both South Africa and the Federation visited Lourenço Marques (capital of Moçambique) at the invitation of the Portuguese army command, and took part in training exercises involving several units and some 2,600 men. This included paratroop training. Indeed, a bilateral military agreement between South Africa and Moçambique is widely assumed to exist; considerable pressure has been put on the South African authorities to help the Portuguese in Angola; and the air-field now in use in the Caprivi Strip (bordering Angola and South West Africa) is reportedly for use by both the South African and Portuguese air forces.

Certainly, collaboration among the police forces of the three Governments has gone far beyond the requirements of courtesy. According to three South African newspapers (the *Sunday Times*, *Sunday Express*, and *New Age*), on April 4th, 1962, two men from Moçambique, who had worked nearly all their lives in South Africa, Edward Ngubeni and Philip Sobral, were illegally repatriated by the South African police "on instructions from the Portuguese Government." It is believed also that it was pressure from the Portuguese that caused the Federation recently to refuse a permanent residence permit to the American Methodist missionary, the Rev. Wendell Golden, after he had been expelled from Angola. And South African political refugees have met with no sympathy in the Federation either—a recent sufferer is Mr. Jordan, who was offered a post in Salisbury earlier this year, but on arrival to take it up was put unceremoniously on a train for the Republic, under police escort. Prohibited immigrants are normally at least given the choice of returning whence they have just come—in this case, a British Protectorate.

Katanga

What exactly has driven these three Governments into close alliance, was thrown into relief when a new ally joined the conspiracy—Tshombe's Katanga. Tshombe found himself fighting not only African nationalism, but international opinion and the United Nations itself. One after the other, the Southern African Governments lined up behind him.

Long before Congo independence, Welensky reported approaches by Katanga settler interests for union with Northern Rhodesia. One of the first acts of the breakaway Katanga Government was to exchange "trade missions" with South Africa and the Federation. And Mr. Tshombe and Sir Roy Welensky have been meeting regularly—most recently, on the 18th January, 1962, and it was suspected that they met again at the beginning of March. Significantly, South African and Rhodesian mercenaries

played an important role in the Katangese forces opposing the U.N. in Katanga.

During the U.N.-Katanga fighting in December and January, constant reports were published in the Press of movements across the Northern Rhodesia-Katanga border: that Katangan-piloted planes have used Northern Rhodesian airfields, lorries constantly crossed the border without any check on their contents, armoured vehicles, mortars and men have been sent into Katanga from Northern Rhodesia, was alleged by U.N.I.P. in Northern Rhodesia to the U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant, in December, 1961. All these charges were strenuously denied in Salisbury. U.N.I.P. alleged that a network of secret roads on the Northern Rhodesian side of the border was maintained by Katanga Government employees to facilitate this illegal traffic. The United Nations authorities finally requested that U.N. observers be posted along the border—as along the Angola-Congo frontier—to put an end to this traffic, a request refused by both the Federal and Portuguese governments. Welensky insolently invited U Thant to come and discuss the matter with him in Salisbury, and intensified his campaign of propaganda against the U.N., by demanding an inquiry into the operation in Katanga. He declared (*Daily Telegraph*, 11.12.61) that no U.K. bombs for the U.N. should pass over “one inch” of Federal territory; accused the U.N. of using arms against civilians (*Times*, 27.12.61), and (*Guardian*, 1.1.62) alleged that “the corruption of the U.N. ideals by a clique of members has been brought out into the open.” In this last statement he was echoing *Die Transvaler* (Johannesburg) in September, 1961: “The U.N. have paralleled Pearl Harbour—Katanga has been made a second Hungary and the U.N. a second Soviet. The U.N. have irrevocably lost the last shred of moral prestige.”

The Katanga crisis, then, helped to define what the alliance finds itself opposing: African advance in white Africa; independent African States; eventually, the U.N. The next step is to ask why they should have this common interest, which is really a common interest in opposing change.

THE LAND OF APARTHEID

<i>Land Area</i>	472,359 Sq. miles.
<i>Population</i>	15,841,128 (1960).
	10,807,809 Africans.
	3,067,638 Europeans.
	1,488,267 Coloureds.
	477,414 Asians.

The oldest and richest partner in the alliance is the Republic of South Africa. Settled first in the middle of the 17th century by the Dutch East India Company, to supply its ships on their way to trade with the East, by the end of the 18th century white farmers

had occupied most of the fertile south-western Cape. From the beginning theirs was a slave economy. After the British occupied the Cape for strategic reasons during the Napoleonic wars, they abolished slavery, so the Boer farmers trekked north in disgust, armed with their muskets and their bibles.

They founded the two independent republics—the Transvaal and the Orange Free State—which were finally brought under British rule after the Boer War in 1902. In 1910 the Cape, Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal (a British colony) were united in the Union of South Africa, and granted independence within the British Empire by the British Liberal Government.

Economic structure

Gold was discovered on the Rand in 1886, and it remains the basis of South Africa's economy. But manufacturing industry has swollen since the last war, making South Africa the most highly industrialised country in Africa, producing heavy machinery, especially mining machinery, light engineering products and consumer goods, which are exported. This is the sector of South Africa's economy which most needs to expand, but which has been most heavily hit by African and Asian trade boycotts. Wool, skins and hides are second in export value to gold.

One third of South Africa's total exports—worth about £350 annually, apart from gold—go to Britain, the Central African Federation being the next largest market, followed by the United States and Western Europe.

Trade, then, is one of the Republic's links with other Southern African countries—£55m. worth of exports to the Federation, £4½m. worth to Moçambique and £½m. to Angola, and £3½m. to the Congo, most of it to Katanga. But migrant labour is another. Some 58% of the total labour force on the Rand comes from outside South Africa, mainly from the British Protectorates, Moçambique and Nyasaland. The Government has frequently claimed that South Africa can get along without this 'foreign' labour, and threatened to curtail or end immigration altogether. But the mining companies continue to recruit outside South Africa some 250,000 African men annually, and the exporting countries continue to rely heavily both on the income and the taxation earned through the migrant labour system.

Who benefits from South Africa's riches ?

In 1957, the average European wage was £68 a month, and the average African wage £13. 75% of all African families are estimated to live below subsistence level. Cheap and docile unskilled African labour has in fact been the primary objective of South African 'native policy', and Africans have been confined to Reserves (totalling 13% of the total land area of the country), totally inadequate for their needs. Cash poll and hut taxes have been imposed as an added incentive to seek work on white farms and in industry. While the pass laws have ensured that African

workers form no permanent urban community capable of organising for themselves, by political or industrial action, a greater share in the plenty around them. Where these measures proved insufficient, political restrictions have followed.

The non-white political organisations have conducted a disciplined and non-violent struggle for democratic rights: but non-violence has been met with brutality. The disruption of the 1946 African miners' strike, the shooting of 69 Africans protesting against the pass laws at Sharpeville in 1960, were part of a consistent pattern. It has become more and more difficult for opposition to be to any degree effective, while using legal, or even illegal but non-violent, methods, and the main political organisations—the African National Congress, Pan-Africanist Congress, South African Indian Congress, Coloured People's Congress, Congress of Democrats, Liberal Party—have all called for support from overseas in the form of boycotts.

U.N. resolutions calling for an end to apartheid and submission to international authority over South West Africa have met with no modification of South Africa's policy; nor has Verwoerd's enforced withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961, or the trade boycotts imposed by several Afro-Asian States. The last two U.N. sessions have debated strong resolutions demanding economic sanctions against South Africa, and when a vote was taken in November, 1961, 48 nations voted for sanctions, 31 against and 22 abstained. The resolution was not adopted as it failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

Land Area 318,099 sq. miles.

Population 525,064 (1960).

427,980 Africans.

23,930 Coloureds.

73,154 Europeans.

Most of South-West Africa was subdued by German troops during the scramble for colonies at the end of the last century. The Hereros, the second largest of the African peoples there, put up a strong resistance, and it is estimated that during their rebellion of 1904-1907 their numbers were reduced from 80,000 to 15,000. German settlers took over the Africans' land, mainly for sheep and cattle farming, and were later joined by Afrikaner farmers, now about two-thirds of the European population.

After the first World War, the League of Nations granted the mandate over the territory to His Britannic Majesty, to be administered by the Union of South Africa. When after the Second World War the Mandates system was replaced by a system of Trusteeship under the United Nations, South Africa refused to submit a Trusteeship Agreement or to accept the supervision of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In 1946 South West Africans first petitioned the U.N. against South Africa's plan to incorporate the territory in the Union. In 1949 the South-West African Affairs Act virtually annexed the territory, and in 1954 the administration of the African population was transferred to the Union Department of Native Affairs—in direct defiance of U.N. resolutions. Since 1955 trade and economic statistics have been incorporated with those of the Union, making it very difficult to determine the extent to which capital and other resources are being transferred. Nearly all South Africa's apartheid laws, including the pass laws, job reservation and industrial laws forbidding strikes, the Suppression of Communism Act and now the Bantu Education Act, apply to South West Africa.

The pressure in the U.N. for economic and other sanctions on South Africa to enforce the will of the Assembly, is now very strong. In 1960 a 9-man U.N. Committee was instructed to enter South West "with or without the co-operation" of the Republican Government; they were unable to do so, however, as Britain refused them permission to go to Bechuanaland. In 1961 the Assembly declared itself in favour of self-determination for the people of South West Africa, and instructed a special committee to go there by May, 1962, in order to achieve the evacuation of all military forces (there in flagrant defiance of the Mandate), the repeal of all apartheid laws, and preparation for general elections to a legislative assembly as soon as possible.

By the end of 1955, 38 million hectares of African land had been alienated for European settlement, and only 20½ million reserved for Africans . . . whole African communities have been forcibly shifted to make way for whites. Expenditure for development, too, has been blatantly discriminatory, in 1956-57 less than £27,000 of a total development grant of £4½m. being spent on the 'Native Areas Account.' Expenditure on 'Native' health, education, administration and development has averaged less than 10% of the total territorial budget over the last decade, and in 1955-56 it was less than 1%.

South West Africa's economy is based on the mining industry (diamonds and base metals), and the export of karakul pelts, fish and fish products, meat and dairy products. As in South Africa, labour for the farms and mines is migrant labour from the Reserves, and Africans have no real rights outside 'their own areas.'

THE PORTUGUESE YOKE . . . ANGOLA

<i>Land Area</i>	481,352 sq. miles
<i>Population</i>	4,155,266
	4,036,687 Africans
	78,826 Whites (according to latest estimate, now at least 200,000)
	29,648 Coloureds

The Portuguese first reached what is now Angola in 1482, and during the 16th century they occupied bases along the coast. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, these bases served as the ports of exit for slaves brought in from the interior and shipped to Brazil. But after the ending of the slave trade (under largely British pressure), they set about the conquest and occupation of the interior, and began to exploit the mineral and agricultural resources of the colony. There were sporadic African revolts, but only in about 1950 came the first stirrings of articulate African nationalism; and Portugal's total failure to meet peaceful demands for reform with anything but repression, led finally to the violent rebellion of 1961. Many Angolans now owe allegiance to organised nationalist parties which are hardened by military action.

Portuguese reprisals against the initial rebel terrorism have been savage. Whole villages have been wiped out. Baptist missionaries estimated that 20,000 Angolan men, women and children were killed in the first three months of the war, calling Angola "the blackest spot on the continent of Africa." Refugees poured into the Congo Republic at the rate of about 800 a day. There is powerful evidence that Napalm bombs (supplied by NATO) have been used against the Africans.

The theory behind Portuguese colonialism is that Portugal has a 'civilising mission' and aims to raise the African peoples to a standard at which they will be considered worthy of the benefits of Portuguese citizenship. In the 1950 census, however, only 56,000 of the total African and Coloured population were judged to be 'assimilado,' or 'civilised.' Until recently, only the "civilised" were entitled to the hollow privilege of a vote in Portuguese elections, but even now Salazar's much-boasted concession of citizenship to the 'indigenas' (natives) applies only to the literate — and 99% of the Africans remain illiterate.

As in other parts of white Africa, Government labour policy is based on settler demands for cheap, unskilled labour. There have been three systems of employing labour: one is technically voluntary, though the worker must go to the employer the authorities pick for him; the second system supplies employers with labour compulsorily recruited by local chieftains — chieftains being frequently savagely punished for failing to meet their quota of men; and the third method is direct conscription by the Government for work on roads and public projects. In Captain Galvão's words, "only the dead are really exempt from compulsory labour."

In 1962, a Commission appointed by the International Labour Organisation concluded that the Portuguese authorities were making genuine efforts to bring their labour policy into line with their commitments under the I.L.O. Convention, but that public authorities and Diamang continue to recruit labour in a way tantamount to forced labour. However, the Rev. Clifford Parsons, Associate Foreign Secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society,

has pointed out that "the effective period for which evidence of forced labour was acceptable to the Commission in regard to Angola was one of *four months only*" (letter to the *Guardian*, 15.3.62). Since then the Portuguese have issued a new rural labour code which specifically prohibits official intervention to help private employers, but whether this will bring any more effective change than did Portugal's entry into the U.N. in 1955, remains to be seen.

Another grievance, more widespread in Moçambique but present in Angola, is compulsory sowing of cash crops. The African smallholder may be required to divert land from the subsistence crops his family needs to, for instance, cotton. If it comes up, the concessionary companies will buy it; if not, the small-holder goes hungry and the companies go scot free.

Finally, there has in the past ten years been a dramatic rise in white immigration from Portugal, intended to strengthen the settler element in Angola. The arrival of a substantial poor white population brought with it competition for unskilled and semi-skilled jobs between white and African, and the development of colour-bar practices which became a further cause for African rebellion. Resentment has been intensified by the fact that money for Angola's development has been spent on establishing these new settlers — and on transport and power projects in the interests of the mining companies and plantation agriculture — rather than on African health, education or agriculture.

Economic structure

According to official Portuguese statistics, the average wage for 'contracted workers' (forced labourers) in 1958 was £1 4s. 0d. per month, and for 'free' African skilled workers wages in Luanda ranged between £5 and about £20 per month, while for whites doing similar jobs wages ranged from £18 to £65 per month.

The mainstays of Angola's economy are plantation agriculture and mining, the products of which are exported. The main crop is coffee, of which some 85,000 tons were exported yearly between 1958 and 1960, the main market being the United States. Next come cotton, sisal and sugar. The principal mineral product is diamonds, mined by Diamang, a Portuguese associate of De Beers. But exports of iron ore have been increasing rapidly, and the Krupp empire is currently helping to finance iron production in the south. There exists a little light industry.

Angola's foreign trade is closely tied to Portugal, which is both the main supplier, providing 28% of its imports in 1960, and the principal market, taking 45% of its exports. Most foreign investment is Portuguese — in fact, Angola and Moçambique literally subsidise the Portuguese economy by providing a protected market (tariff preferences being often as high as 50%); by providing commodities which save Portugal the foreign exchange required to buy equipment from abroad for its own development plans; and by earning foreign exchange to reduce

Portugal's own substantial trading deficit in its dealings outside the Escudo Area. In 1960, over one tenth of Portugal's deficit was offset by Angola's surplus.

The Benguela Railway is the most obvious economic link with the rest of Southern Africa. Owned by a British company, Tanganyika Concessions, it links Katanga with the coast at Lobito. 1960 and 1961 have been bumper years for the railway, since the export route through the Congo Republic has been closed to Katanga. The Portuguese actually claim that the increased revenue from the railway fully compensates for losses in taxation due to the Angola war.

MOCAMBIQUE

<i>Land Area</i>	297,731 <i>sq. miles</i>
<i>Population</i>	6,310,000 (<i>U.N. estimate 1959</i>) 5,764,262 (<i>Portuguese estimate 1959</i>) 5,651,511 <i>Africans</i> 65,798 <i>Europeans</i> 29,973 <i>Coloureds</i> 15,235 <i>Indians</i> 1,945 <i>other Asians</i>

The Portuguese have been in Moçambique since 1505, though the African armies were not finally defeated until 1897. Britain has a substantial strategic interest in the territory, because of its long sea frontage on the Indian Ocean, and its excellent ports. Beira is even sometimes called a British 'sphere of influence,' because it is an essential outlet for exports from the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Lourenço-Marques, the capital, is on the other hand Johannesburg's chief outlet to the sea, and the biggest port for the whole Transvaal.

Export of Labour

About 90% of Moçambique Africans live off the soil, and agricultural products are the primary source of revenue to the country — mainly tea, cotton and sugar, grown on Company-owned plantations. Coal is the principal mineral exploited, but Moçambique is stagnant industrially. About 28% of its imports come from Portugal — mainly consumer goods — and the rest come from the United States, South Africa, Britain and Belgium. The United States has considerable investment in the territory.

Moçambique is more closely economically integrated with Southern Africa than Angola, a principal export being labour for the Rand and the Rhodesias. By the Conventions of 1926 with the Union of South Africa, and of 1934 with Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese Government is bound to send these countries a

quota of approximately 160,000 workers annually, in return for a large proportion of South African and Rhodesian export traffic channelled through Moçambique ports. This emigration forms an important source of foreign exchange; while it is the revenue from the goods traffic through Beira and Lourenço Marques that provides sufficient revenue in tariffs to close Moçambique's trade gap.

PARTNERSHIP IN THE FEDERATION

<i>Land Area</i>	486,722 sq. miles—Federation
	150,333 sq. miles—S. Rhodesia
	290,323 sq. miles—N. Rhodesia
	46,066 sq. miles—Nyasaland

Population (1959)

	<i>African</i>	<i>European</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Federation</i>	7,890,000	303,000	38,000	8,220,000
<i>S. Rhodesia</i>	2,800,000	219,000	15,000	3,030,000
<i>N. Rhodesia</i>	2,310,000	75,000	9,900	2,390,000
<i>Nyasaland</i>	2,780,000	9,000	12,400	2,800,000

David Livingstone reached the Zambesi in 1851 and Lake Nyasa in 1859. A few missionaries and adventurers followed him — and then gold was discovered in Mashonaland. Cecil Rhodes, already rich with the diamonds of Kimberly and the gold of the Rand, tricked the Matabele king Lobengula into selling him monopoly mineral rights over his entire territory. When the Matabele rebelled, they were virtually wiped out by Rhodes' forces. In 1889 the great 'Empire-Builder' persuaded the British Government to grant a Royal Charter to his British South Africa Company to administer, settle and develop Southern Rhodesia and large parts of Northern Rhodesia, and until 1923, when Southern Rhodesia became a 'self-governing colony' and Northern Rhodesia a British Protectorate, the company ruled the territories, even running its own police force. Nyasaland has been a Protectorate since 1891.

White settlement was restricted in the Protectorates, but in Southern Rhodesia the Europeans annexed 53% of the total land area. Their legislature is elected on a virtually all-white franchise (the qualifications have been raised when an appreciable number of Africans seemed likely to qualify); and social and industrial colour bars, coupled with a system of cash taxes and passes for Africans, ensure a supply of cheap black labour with minimal rights in urban areas, on much the same principles as in South Africa.

A proposal to amalgamate Southern and Northern Rhodesia was rejected by white settlers in Southern Rhodesia in 1915. The north would be an economic burden, they argued, and there were

only about 2,000 Europeans there, mostly employed by the British South Africa Company. In 1926 the whole situation was transformed by the discovery of the Northern Rhodesian copper belt. European immigrants flooded in, and talk of amalgamation began in earnest. A series of Commissions investigated the possibilities, but white settler demands were resisted by Britain because of the differences between the territories' 'native laws.'

After the Second World War, the demand for amalgamation was dropped on British insistence. Sir Godfrey Huggins (now Lord Malvern), assisted by Roy Welensky, called for a **federation** of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and any hope that a Labour Government would prevent Federation went when the Party lost the 1951 Election. Against the wishes of the African people, the Federation came into being on August 1, 1953.

The Federal Assembly consisted of 35 members, 26 to represent the 300,000 (mostly Southern Rhodesian) Europeans. In 1957 the total was raised to 59, 44 to represent whites. A special African Affairs Board was set up which could refer legislation discriminating against Africans direct to the U.K. Government, but on the only two occasions on which it used its powers, the British Government turned down its appeal. Despite official commitment to the idea of race 'Partnership' (the partnership of horse and rider, as Lord Malvern accurately expressed it), African fears have been more than justified. The Federation is virtually ruled by Southern Rhodesian settlers, and its economic benefits have been bestowed on whites almost exclusively. In 1960, average earnings for Europeans were £1,209 per annum, and for Africans £87.

African nationalist militancy therefore grew in all three territories, and after the return of Dr. Banda to Nyasaland in 1958 demands for secession reached a pitch too loud to be ignored. When in 1959 civil disorders broke out, Welensky sent in Federal troops and the Governor declared a State of Emergency and arrested some 1,000 Congress leaders. In Southern Rhodesia 500 more were imprisoned, the African National Congress banned and the Government took powers to detain opponents for five years without trial.

The Monckton Commission of 1960, charged with investigating the situation in the Federation before the Federal Review Conference in 1961, reported that the Federation could not continue against sustained African opposition; and recommended immediate constitutional advance for the two Protectorates. Nyasaland has now achieved limited internal self-government, but three successive sets of constitutional proposals leave Northern Rhodesia without any guarantee that an African majority will result at the next election; and in Southern Rhodesia the new constitution makes no pretence of providing an African majority. African leaders in both the Rhodesias are now appealing for help to the U.N.

Economic structure

Broadly, Northern Rhodesian copper is the basis of the Federation's wealth, accounting for £107.6 m. worth of exports in 1959, as against £33.5m. for tobacco. Southern Rhodesia's main export crop. Nyasaland is very largely undeveloped, forming the pool of migrant labourers for both the mines and industries of Northern Rhodesia and the farms of Southern Rhodesia. Some 170,000 adult African men are working outside Nyasaland at any one time, and recruiting agents of South African mining companies are allowed to operate there freely.

Cobalt, lead, zinc and manganese in Northern Rhodesia, and asbestos, chrome, gold, coal and mica in Southern Rhodesia, are the other main mining products of the Federation. Metal manufacture is the biggest manufacturing industry, after which comes tobacco processing. Cotton, hides and skins, tea (Nyasaland), oil, hardwoods, maize and beef are the main agricultural products for export, after tobacco.

The Federation had a favourable trade balance of £43.7m. in 1959, exporting £193.9m. worth of goods, and importing £150.2m. worth, mainly from South Africa and the U.K., though Western European countries and the United States are also important trading partners.

The Federation has no port of its own, depending on Mozambique ports or the railway link with South Africa. Southern Rhodesia also depends on Mozambique for the annual supply of some 70,000 migrant labourers.

TSHOMBE'S KATANGA

<i>Land Area</i>	191,878 sq. miles (21% of the total area of the Congo)
<i>Population</i>	1,484,840
	1,456,383 Africans
	28,457 Others, mainly Europeans

The proportion of whites to Africans in Katanga before independence was approximately 1:52, while in the Congo as a whole the proportion was approximately 1:121.

Conakat, the present ruling party of Katanga, was supported from its foundation in July 1959 by the Union Minière (exploiting Katanga's vast mineral resources), and the Belgian settlers, who encouraged the idea of Katanga secession to form a 'Belgo-Congolese Community' round the slogan 'Katanga for the Katangans,' and had ideas of union with British settlers in Rhodesia.

In the elections of May 1960, Conakat won 25 of the 60 seats in the Provincial Assembly, and the Balubakat Cartel 18.

But with Belgian connivance Balubakat was excluded from the coalition Government. In the elections to the National Assembly (137 seats), Conakat won 8 seats to Balubakat's 6, though Conakat had a minority of the total vote (91,116 votes to Balubakat's 134,916).

On July 11th, the day after Belgian paratroops landed in Elizabethville and disarmed the Congolese Army forces there, Tshombe, without any popular consultation, declared Katanga an independent State. With the aid of Belgian Government forces and a high-level Belgian Technical Aid Mission—headed first by the Comte d'Aspremont-Lynden and afterwards by Ambassador Rothschild—the secessionist State, to which the Union Minière paid the taxes legally due to the Republic of the Congo, consolidated itself. It used part of its enormous resources—estimated at between 50% and 60% of the revenue of the entire Congo—to buy weapons and ammunition and recruit mercenaries. When the regular Belgian forces withdrew, under U.N. pressure, a European-led gendarmerie, together with the armed European civilians of the mining centres, became the main pillars of the secession.

After attempting over several months to negotiate the withdrawal of more than 500 foreign officers and N.C.O.'s who led Tshombe's forces, the United Nations, on the 28th August, started to apprehend them. This operation was, however, halted at the request of the Consular Corps, the Belgian Consul undertaking to see to the voluntary departure of the mercenaries. A number of mercenaries, of whom the most important were a group of French-Algerian officers implicated in the attempted April putsch in Algiers, went into hiding with the complicity of the Katangese authorities. The Katangese had quietly submitted to the U.N. action on the 28th August, but, following a message of encouragement from Sir Roy Welensky (delivered to them by the British and Rhodesian Vice-Consul in Elizabethville, Mr. Smith, who was accompanied by the Consul himself, Mr. Dunnett), they launched an anti-U.N. campaign. Hostile demonstrations were organised against U.N. forces and a terror campaign was begun against the many Africans loyal to the Central Government. This campaign, by the second week in September, had led more than 25,000 Africans of Elizabethville to seek U.N. protection. U.N. forces intervened to bring this situation to an end and to complete the expulsion of the mercenaries. In the course of the fighting that resulted, the diplomatic resources of the United Kingdom and other Western countries were brought to bear in support of Mr. Tshombe, who, from his sanctuary in Rhodesian territory, exhorted the Katangese forces to continue to fight. The U.N. then reached a cease-fire agreement with Tshombe, repeated breaches of which by the Katangese led to a further outbreak of fighting.

Economic Structure

Katanga, as the richest in minerals and the most highly industrialised of the Congo provinces, has also been the biggest

earner of profits for the Belgians. Between 1950 and 1956, £100m. of monopoly profits were exported from the Congo to Belgium, the largest proportion from Katanga. However, Africans in Katanga have been allowed training as skilled workers, and to settle as a permanent urban community with their wives and families, provided with reasonable social services such as health, primary educational and vocational training facilities. All this is in obvious contrast to the industrial colour bar and migrant labour systems practised in the Rhodesias across the border. But no political rights whatever were accorded before 1959.

Until independence, the Belgian Société Générale controlled between 65% and 70% of the business of the Congo. The Société acted as Central Bank and bank of issue for the Congo. The Union Minière, which owns concessions over 13,000 square miles of Katanga, was controlled jointly by a Katanga Special Committee (C.S.K.), Tanganyika Concessions, and private Belgian interests, the C.S.K. itself being 2/3 controlled by the Congo Government. When independence came, the Société Générale dissolved the C.S.K., and the Central Government lost direct control of the Union Minière, which chose to deal with the break-away Katanga Government instead.

THE BARE BONES OF THE MATTER

The foregoing chapters reveal elements of a common political and economic structure in the territories constituting the Unholy Alliance: white minority Governments (in Katanga, a black Government acting largely as agent of white capital interests), industrial and agricultural enterprise in white hands needing plentiful unskilled cheap labour, and common methods of ensuring this labour, such as the alienation of land, cash taxation, pass systems for Africans. A common pattern of economic inequality, industrial and social colour bar, and political repression of those who demand change, logically follows.

Yet this is not the full extent of connection between the allies. Behind similarities in political and economic systems, lies a picture of a high degree of actual economic integration. The main industrial centre in the sub-continent, the Rand, absorbs migrant labour not only from the Republic itself, but from the Protectorates, the Federation and the Portuguese territories. In a smaller way, the Northern Rhodesian copper belt is another magnet to contract workers from outside Northern Rhodesia, and so is Southern Rhodesian industry. The migrant labourers in turn earn an income for their own countries which they cannot afford at present to lose.

The Federation and Katanga have no ports of their own; and the traffic they send through Mozambique and Angola is helping

to bail Salazar out of the economic difficulties consequent on the Angola war.

These alone are reasons enough for an alliance: a change of regime in one member country might mean not only a hostile State on the borders of the rest, but could fundamentally upset their economies. Just how close is the economic integration can only be understood by examining some of the private financial interests that form the very skeleton of the sub-continent. By far the most important of these are the great mining groups.

The Cape-to-Katanga Miners

These groups are involved in the mining of gold, diamonds, copper, and other valuable minerals, but they all have widespread interests in manufacturing industry, real estate, coal, oil, and agriculture. Because of their size and the proportion of total national wealth that they control, they have considerable influence in both economic and political spheres. They have direct control over their thousands of employees, special relations with the Governments and political pressure groups, and substantial power over the international markets for their products. In South Africa, they have unusually close connections with the Press. The Argus Newspaper group in particular is directly controlled by mining houses, and it includes all the evening papers in Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Pretoria and Port Elizabeth; the morning papers in Bloemfontein and Kimberley; the Natal Sunday Press; and A.I. daily newspapers but one in the Federation.

Each group discussed here is vast by itself, but the groups do not act in isolation or in competition. There is a complex set of inter-connections between the Cape-to-Katanga Miners: there are few secrets where directorships interlock, and although a group may act independently in fields which do not impinge on the

interests of the others, on most questions it must have at least the tacit agreement of the rest.

The fields in which the biggest companies are most active, are diamonds throughout Southern Africa, gold in South Africa, copper in Northern Rhodesia and Katanga, and a vast range of other valuable minerals in Katanga.

The diamond industry is controlled by De Beers, part of the Anglo-American group. Until recently, De Beers, through its selling organisation the Diamond Corporation, controlled 95% of world diamond sales outside the Soviet bloc. Exclusive agreements with the producers ensured this control, but in 1960 the agreements with Ghana and Guinea lapsed, and though Guinea is only a minor diamond producer, Ghana is responsible for over 10% of diamond production in the West. Some of the loss to De Beers was offset by agreement from the Soviet Union, after long negotiations, to sell through the Diamond Corporation, which now controls 80% of the Western market. Sales in 1961 were worth £95m.—a record.

In addition to the marketing organisation, De Beers directly owns and controls major diamond mines in South and South West Africa. The three De Beers companies in this field are: De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd., Premier (Transvaal) Diamond Mining Co. Ltd., and Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa Ltd. In 1960 export sales from these companies amounted to £34m., and in 1961 £42m.

The fourth De Beers mining company is Williamsons Diamonds in Tanganyika, acquired on Williamson's death in 1958. A substantial share went to the Tanganyika Government as death duties, and De Beers subsequently agreed to sell a further share to bring the Government interest to half of the £600,000 share capital. Oppenheimer is chairman of the company, but it is small compared with the other three.

All diamonds in Angola, about 3½% of Western production,

Charts from 'Towards Freedom,' Chicago, January, 1962.

SYSTEM OF INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES IN THE MINERAL INDUSTRY OF AFRICA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR

Societe Generale de Belgique	Union Miniere du Haut Katanga	TANGANYIKA Concessions	British South Africa Company	Anglo-American Corp of SA	De Beers Cons. Mines	Rhodesian Anglo-American	Rhokana Corporation	Mululiza Copper Mines	Chibuluma Mines	Roan Antelope Copper Mines	Rhodesian Selection Trust	American Meta Climax Inc.
Gillet	Gillet	Oppenheimer, H.	Oppenheimer, H.	Oppenheimer, H.	Oppenheimer, H.	Oppenheimer, H.	Oppenheimer, H.	Oppenheimer, H.	Hochschild, W.	Hochschild, W.	Hochschild, W.	Hochschild, W.
Van der Straeter	Van der Straeten	Van der Straeten	Wilson, A.	Wilson, A.	Wilson, A.	Framet	Rowlandson	Hochschild, H.	Hochschild, H.	Hochschild, H.	Hochschild, H.	Hochschild, H.
Devillet	Devillet	Robins	Robins	Robins	Robins	Krogh	Seys	Bradford	Bradford	Bradford	Bradford	Bradford
Bonvoisin	Selborne	Selborne	Annan	Clark	Clark	Clark	Clark	Moore	Moore	Moore	Moore	Dean, A. H.
Robiliart	Robiliart	Robiliart	Emrys-Evans	Emrys-Evans	Joel	Newson	Newson	Newson	Newson	Newson	Coolbaugh	Coolbaugh
Dubois-Paterin	Guillaume	Guillaume	M. of Salisbury	Hagart	Hagart	Hagart	Taylor	Taylor	Taylor	Finch	Finch	Childs
de Spirlet	de Spirlet	de Spirlet	d'Erianger	Wilson, W.	Wilson, W.	Wilson, W.	Wilson, W.	Goudie	Goudie	Goudie	Goudie	Goudie
Marthoz	Marthoz	Hudson	Berry	Oppenheimer, P.	Oppenheimer, P.	Bennett	Bennett	Lascelles	Lascelles	Lascelles	Lascelles	Bunker
De Merre	Hutchinson	Hutchinson	Greenfell	Albu	Campton	Richardson	Richardson	Richardson	Richardson	Irwin	Irwin	Irwin
Wallef	Wallef	Serichan	Malvern	Coulter	Rudd	Prain	Prain	Prain	Prain	Prain	Prain	Burder
Smis	Blaise	Cochran	Kiek	Beckingham	Beckingham	Beckingham	Beckingham	Beckingham	Kirkpatrick	Kirkpatrick	Kirkpatrick	Mudd
Nokin	Terwagne	Dickenson	Hambro	Smith	Smith	Forsyth	Forsyth	Peterson	Peterson	Thomson	Thomson	Thomson
Lambert	Alexander	Alexander	Robson	Koch	McHardy	Koch	McHardy	Murphy	Murphy	Murphy	Murphy	de Neufville
Renders	Sengier	Pinto Basto	Hawskley	Harrison	Leeper	Harrison	Leeper	MacLaren	MacLaren	MacLaren	MacLaren	Loeb
	Cousin	Turner	Baring	Baring	de Villiers	de Villiers	de Villiers	Buch	Buch	Buch	Buch	MacGregor
	Waterhouse	Waterhouse			Kroaert	Kroaert	Kroaert	Tucker	Tucker	Tucker	Tucker	Sears
	Pavus				Rothschild	Rothschild	Rothschild					Stold

go though the Companhia de Diamantes de Angola on whose Board sit Harry Oppenheimer and H. J. Joel (both of De Beers). This company recently loaned the Portuguese Government £1½m. at only 1% interest to help bail Angola out of its economic crisis. (*Guardian*, 8.2.62.).


The De Beers group profits for 1961 amounted to £24.8m., as against £22.5m. for 1960.

The value of gold production is far higher, but unlike diamonds this industry is not dominated by one group alone. Most of the gold is produced in South Africa, where production is worth well over £250m. a year (£250m. in 1960, £275m. in 1961). 1958 profits were £61½m., rising to £86m. in 1959, and net dividends in 1958 were £43½m. Profits are about 35% of total revenue, largely because labour is so cheap. About 400,000 Africans are employed in the South African gold mines, earning about £4 PER MONTH.

The old gold mines are all on the Rand in the Transvaal, but more recently vast new deposits were discovered in the Orange Free State. These have been developed since the war. Another recent development has been the extraction of uranium as a by-product of gold, under contract for the U.K. and U.S. Governments. 1958 profits from uranium were £37.7m., but new contracts are unlikely to prove so profitable since uranium is now more plentiful and the world demand is small.

The gold industry in South Africa is dominated by seven big groups. Before the war, new capital could be attracted by placing

Charts from 'Towards Freedom,' Chicago, January, 1962.



"May I say at once that no company in our Group holds a single share in any concern operating in the Katanga, or in any other part of the Congo": Lord Robins, Chairman of the British South Africa Company, in his company report, February 1962.

ordinary shares with individual shareholders, but since 1946 it has only been possible to raise new capital through the big established corporations. The new Orange Free State mines have been financed by De Beers, and by loans guaranteed by other big groups. Considerable Swiss and American capital has been subscribed in this way.

In order of importance in South Africa gold production, the big seven are:

1. Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd., responsible for 18% of production worth £50m. in 1961. Net profit in 1961 was £4.1m. on £14½m. capital, most of which is British. This company has big interests in both the Rhodesian copper groups: Rhodesian Selection Trust and Rhodesian Anglo-American.

2. Central Mining and Investment Corporation Ltd., with £10m. subscribed capital. There are substantial American interests in this company, and there is a connection with Anglo-American through Rhodesian Anglo-American. Oppenheimer is on the board of directors.

3. Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd., with only £7½m. capital, but 1961 profits were £8.4m. and dividends £4.9m. This is the central company of the Anglo-American group. It is an old-established company on the Rand, and has also been one of the corporations active in the new Orange Free State gold fields. Originally helped by American capital, this corporation is now almost entirely British and South African, and it is run by its chairman Harry Oppenheimer and his close associates.

4. Anglo-Transvaal Consolidated Investment Co. Ltd. is the newest of the giants, with American connections through Kennecott Copper, and a capital of £4½m.

5. Union Corporation, the other big corporation active in the Orange Free State mines, has £1½m. capital, and 1961 profits were £6.4m. The chairman of this corporation is Sir Charles Hambro of Hambro's Bank, and who is also a director of the Bank of England. Others on the board include prominent British peers and one American. There are close links between the Union Corporation and the British South Africa Company, which acquired 700,000 Union Corporation shares last year.


6. General Mining and Finance Co. Ltd., with £4½m. capital, has interests in several companies in the Anglo-American group, and at least three prominent Anglo-American directors, including Oppenheimer, on its board.

7. Johannesburg Consolidated Investment has a capital of £5.9m. and no obvious financial connections with other big groups, but several of its directors are prominent on Anglo-American company boards.

The Northern Rhodesian copper companies have fairly close connections with South African gold companies. Copper of course dominates the whole economy of the Central African Federation, and is its major source of wealth.

There are seven copper mining companies, three controlled by the Rhodesian Selection Trust, the other four by Oppenheimer's Rhodesian Anglo-American. The Rhodesian Selection Trust (R.S.T.) is itself controlled by an American company, American Metal Climax Co., but its chairman, Sir Ronald Prain, is Rhodesian. There is some connection between R.S.T. and Anglo-American, though they are apparently rivals. There are Anglo-American directors, including Harry Oppenheimer, on R.S.T. subsidiaries of which Prain is chairman. There is also a connection through Consolidated Gold Fields, which has financial interests in both Rhodesian Anglo-American and R.S.T.

The third major source of wealth in white Africa is Katanga. Katanga is the chief mining area of the Congo, and it is responsible for 34% of the copper, 86% of the cobalt, 53% of the tungsten and zinc, and 51% of the silver produced in Africa, as well as other important minerals (1953 figures).



Anglo-American Group Mining interests in Southern Africa
(From S.A. Mining Year Book, 1961)

The Katanga mines are almost entirely in the hands of one company, the Union Minière, which is closely linked with Tanganyika Concessions (TANKS), an old British Company. Tanks has widespread interests in forestry, property, and mines in Katanga, Tanganyika and Central Africa. The £10m. capital is British, and in 1959-60 dividends were £3m. The company was transferred to Salisbury in 1950, when it gave an undertaking to the British Government not to dispose of any of its interests in Union Minière or the Benguela railway (except to the Portuguese Government under the original railway agreement), without Treasury consent. Since 1960, the British Government has had the first option in the case of sale. Tanganyika Concessions performs an important function in southern Africa, connecting Belgian and Anglo-American groups financially. Some of the directors are among the most powerful political pressure groups in the U.K. parliament, and they were especially active in the Congo crisis. They have also lobbied successfully on Central African Federation and other issues.

The Benguela Railway Co. was formed by Tanks to build a railway to the West Coast of Africa to export the Katanga minerals. Over 90% of its capital is owned by Tanganyika Concessions, and since Katanga secession the company has enjoyed bumper profits due to increased traffic, as the route through the Congo republic is closed to Katanga products.

The Union Minière du Haut Katanga controls most of the Katanga mines, and has major interests in some of the most important companies in Belgium. It has a capital of over £57m., and 1959-60 dividends were approximately £19.5m. It was formed in 1906 to acquire mineral rights obtained by Tanks from the Comité Spécial du Katanga over 60,000 sq. miles of Katanga. Half the capital was put up by Tanganyika Concessions, half by a Belgian Finance House, while the C.S.K. (itself 2/3 State and 1/3 private capital) retained the right to 60% of the profits.

There are many second and third rank companies of some political and economic importance, which have not been discussed here; but of all the big groups in Southern Africa, Anglo-American is outstanding. The map above shows the extent of its interests and subsidiaries (except for Williamsons Diamonds). Oppenheimer, the Anglo-American tycoon, is the chairman of many of the companies mentioned, and he is on the boards of two big gold groups other than his own, one Rhodesian Selection Trust copper company, and Tanks. He has a hold on nearly all of the important groups, and thus is in a position to know what his rivals are doing. Often his control reaches much further, and influences or even controls decisions of other companies. Oppenheimer has his friends in the U.K., just as the other groups have friends in the U.K. and the U.S.

The International Stake in Southern Africa

Western capitalist interests are involved in Southern Africa

up to their necks. By the end of 1958, total foreign investment in South Africa alone was £1,580m. Of this £900m. was British, £200m. American, and the rest mainly French, Swiss and West German --Germany's share is increasing

Investment takes place either through British companies with Southern African subsidiaries, or directly through British individuals with shares in Southern African companies. Of the companies discussed, Tanks has more influential British directors than any other: Lord Robins of Rhodesian fame ("why should it be supposed that a black African, just because he washes, speaks English, and wears European dress, must of necessity be accepted in the society of white men of the top grade?"); Captain Waterhouse, the chairman, Suez rebel and leader of the Katanga lobby; Lord Selborne and Sir Ulick Alexander; and the ubiquitous Oppenheimer. De Beers directors include a British ex-Ambassador to Greece and Argentina, Sir R. Leeper, and Lord Robins. Consolidated Gold Fields has two prominent British Conservatives on its board, and the Union Corporation has Sir Charles Hambro, as well as two Conservative peers with close connections with the leaders of their party. The British South Africa Company, which has large property interests in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but less substantial mining interests, has been extremely active, especially over the Central African Federation. Lord Robins is the chairman of a board which includes Lord Salisbury, Oppenheimer, Hambro, Annan, Viscount Malvern of Rhodesia ("all Africans, until they are very much advanced, are liars."), and other prominent Conservatives. B.S.A.'s net profit in 1961 was £8m.

In addition to mining, there is hardly any field in which British companies and their subsidiaries are not engaged. To mention only a few, there is African Explosives and Chemical Industries, a huge concern manufacturing industrial explosives, fertilisers, chlorine and now engaged in making munitions for the Verwoerd Government. African Explosives is owned half by De Beers and half by the British firm I.C.I., which has agreed to leave the market in Africa south of the Sahara entirely to African Explosives. The chairman of the company is Oppenheimer, and deputy chairman Paul Chambers, the I.C.I. chairman prominent in the recent take-over attempt. Other leading companies with South African subsidiaries include Courtaulds, Vickers, English-Electric, Stewarts and Lloyds, Tube Investments, Guest Keen and Nettlefold, Turner and Newall, and Unilever. South African Breweries appear to be a consortium of British companies. In banking, the two most important of the four large banks in South Africa are Barclays D.C. & O., and the Standard Bank (no longer 'of South Africa'), both of which are British companies, and also occupy a dominant position in the Federation and in Mozambique. Lord Robins and Oppenheimer are on Barclays board of directors.

This deep financial and economic involvement helps to explain the concern of the metropolitan powers not to jeopardise 'economic stability' in the countries of Southern Africa, and their tendency to help perpetuate the political status quo. It is not only treaty obligations which concern Governments, but also economic commitments and the pressures of private lobbies—most of the activities of the company chiefs go unnoticed behind the scenes and can only be guessed at, except when crises such as out into the light. These lobby activities have been most obvious in the United States—an organisation to aid the 'Freedom Fighters of Katanga,' financed from abroad, took full-page advertisements in the New York papers at the end of last year; and an American public relations firm, Selva and Lee Inc., spent some \$200,000 between May and December 1961 as agents of the 'Overseas Companies of Portugal' in order "to publicise Portugal's policies and achievements in Angola and other territories" (Daniel M. Friedenberg, *Africa Today*, April 1962). But the lobbies are active and influential in this country as well.

SOUTHERN AFRICA ARMS ITSELF

South Africa is militarily by far the strongest partner in the alliance. Besides a police force 26,000 strong, armed with revolvers, sub-machine guns and Saracen armoured cars, she has a permanent army of 20,000, armed with modern weapons, highly mobile and decentralised: voluntary rifle-commandos (skiet-komandos) organised on military lines; an air-force equipped with jet fighters, turbo-jet transport, long-range maritime Shackletons and a helicopter squadron; and a small navy equipped with an extensive coastal radar system, its headquarters at Simonstown, under an agreement with the Royal Navy. No non-whites serve under arms, and African policemen are armed only with truncheons.

But over the past eighteen months, the Government has declared that these security arrangements are not enough. In March 1961, Mr. Fouché, Minister of Defence, was quoted in the *Cape Times* as saying, "In the same way as world powers are continually preparing for war, South Africa intended to be ready for internal trouble." And in April he added, "The maintenance of peace and order internally is the main requirement of any operation against aggression" (*South African Government Fortnightly Digest*). Meanwhile, Mr. Hans Abraham declared war afresh on the Pondo opponents of the Government's "Bantustan policy": "No quarter will be given. We have been very lenient with these beasts of darkness."

So towards the end of 1960, a plan to expand, reorganise and modernise the security forces was announced. In 1961, Govern-

ment expenditure on defence rose by £14m. to £35,750,000; the 1962 budget — the “Bombers and Bantustans Budget,” as the *Financial Times* called it (22.3.62) — brought a further dramatic increase to £60m. “Defence is at once its dominant theme and its ultimate justification,” said Dr. Donges in introducing the budget: but “What will inevitably strike outsiders,” wrote the *Financial Times*, “is the discrepancy between defence spending and that allocated for the development of the so-called African Bantustans — a mere £12.5m.”

There is to be a vast increase in the size of the standing army (planned to consist of 60,000 trained men by 1966, organised in 12 tank and infantry regiments, to be deployed throughout the country), improvements and increases in weapons and equipment, and the development of South Africa's own arms industry and internal military research, as “we cannot continue to depend on research by other nations,” (Mr. Fouché).

Thus, for the first time in South Africa's history, 10,000 white youths were compulsorily called up in 1961 and the figure will be 15,000 from 1962. White women are being taught by the police to handle rifles and revolvers under Government subsidy. 25 new English-speaking “Skiet-Komandos” are being established, to average about 300 men and 16 officers, to be trained for internal security duties. 150 “pillboxes” were ordered from abroad in 1961 to house security posts all over the country — many of them overlooking African “locations” or villages in the reserves. Paratroop officers have been on special courses in the U.K. and in Algeria.

Automatic rifles, mortars, revolvers and aircraft bombs are already being made in South Africa, which also produces artillery shells for weapons up to 25-pounders. .22 and .303 ammunition is manufactured there, and the Defence Force is also supplied by a munitions plant operated by the South African mint.

The arms industry is now considerably enlarged. Arrangements have been made to manufacture Belgian automatic rifles under licence. A French armoured car, the Panhard AML, is to be built under licence in the Republic for the South African Defence Force. ISCOR — the Government-controlled iron and steel corporation — is to be partly responsible for the scheme. Last October it was also reported that by agreement with a French armaments firm producing rocket missile components for NATO, Le Carbone South Africa (Pty.) Ltd. had established a factory on the Rand capable of producing rocket missile equipment.

But the most disturbing news of all is that three new armaments factories are to be set up, at a cost of £10 million. The deal was concluded by African Explosives and Chemical Industries Ltd. and the South African Government. One of the factories, near Johannesburg, will be in operation soon. It has been reported that the specifications for these factories are based on British designs and that a British technical expert is on contract to African

Explosives. The whole project is being treated with the utmost secrecy in order to prevent further Press leakages.

In January 1962 there were reports in the Press here and in South Africa that South Africa is buying 8 of the new British Mark II Victor bombers, at a cost of £12 million, from the British firm of Handley Page. These are suitable for carrying nuclear weapons, including Blue Steel and Skybolt.

France is to supply 1,600 m.p.h. Mirage jet fighters, and Alouette helicopters; together with an undisclosed number of Fouga jet aircraft. These are small two-seater planes, described as suitable for stationing throughout the country "ready to strike immediately."

Another French contract from the South African army was reported in *The Times* (22.9.61) — the Hotchkiss-Brandt Engineering Co. is to supply equipment to the value of £1,145,000. No details were given on grounds of military security.

Meanwhile, Mr. Fouché has begun (February 1962) to talk of developing rockets to carry bombs, adding that to place an atom bomb a "rocket is necessary." Dr. Andries Vissar, a member of the South African Atomic Energy Board, announced some months ago that South Africa should begin manufacturing atom bombs to arm against "loud-mouthed Afro-Asian States," and though the statement was later denied by the Chairman of the Board, an unnamed scientist was quoted by the *Rand Daily Mail* (12th January, 1962) as saying: "It is within the bounds of our resources to make an atom bomb."

A deliberate war hysteria is being created within the Republic, a mood of violence whose first victims will be the non-white people of the country, but which constitutes a very real threat further afield.

The Minister of Justice announced in February 1962 a new plan to strengthen state security "to the absolute maximum." The Security Branch — already virtually a power unto itself — is to be expanded as a matter of urgent priority; special mobile security units equipped with helicopters are to be formed; security controls along the borders of the Republic and South-West Africa are to be tightened. The death penalty for "sabotage" and house-arrest for political opponents are among plans for legislation in the 1962 session, the 'sabotage' bill — which defines sabotage so widely as to cover almost any kind of opposition — being one of the most savage yet to be put before Parliament.

Rumours are being circulated that African states are preparing to "go it alone" against South Africa, and a real "invasion scare" has been worked up among white South Africans. In the Senate defence debate in March, senators demanded that school-boys in Cadet corps be taught to use modern weapons, increased State assistance be given to women's pistol clubs so that "in our hour of need they will be able to help defend the fatherland"; that

military gymnasia be provided for young girls eager to "roll up their sleeves"; and air-raid and nuclear fall-out shelters be built.

Mr. Fouché himself, while refusing to give any evidence in support of the invasion scare, announced in Parliament that South Africa had to be strong enough *not to rely on outside help which might lead to policies being forced on the Republic irreconcilable with the policy it considered necessary.* "Because the morale of our Defence Force is correct and because our nation will not allow itself to be frightened and because its morale is also correct, I have the fullest confidence that these spiritual qualities, supported by our modern weapons, will strengthen us in the *struggle for our existence.*"

In the words of the *Rand Daily Mail* (13.3.62), "We are being shepherded into a White laager — South African whites against everyone else in the world who does not agree with the Nationalist Government . . . For the Government there are many advantages to be derived from capitalising on tensions in this way. Criticism at home can be more confidently stifled; the public can be made to tolerate even more restrictive legislation; heavier taxation can be explained away more naturally; and above all Dr. Verwoerd can hope to come closer to his ideal of 'White Unity'."

Much was in fact made by the Minister of the necessity to deal with the "fifth column" within the country: the Nationalist Press was in March already hinting that anything which might hamper defence — strikes and go-slow movements — will be sabotage, and *Die Burger* (13.3.62) said "the entire able-bodied population will have to be integrated in the defence of the country so that, so to speak, we will live with the trowel in one hand and the sword in the other." These articles are seen as part of a Government-inspired propaganda campaign to create a "brink-of-war psychology" in which Radio South Africa and the new Information Ministry play a major part. The editor of the *Rand Daily Mail* commented (15.3.62): "If the Transkei has failed to convince the world about apartheid, then the Government has nothing left with which to turn the flanks of humanity's wrath . . . To-day its attitude to the world is this: 'We have made our gesture and it has not persuaded you. You wish to compel us to change our policy? All right, now we stand and fight.'"

Southern Africa and the United Nations

Dr. Verwoerd's New Year speech may afford a clue to the attitudes behind the arms build-up: "The United Nations has failed as an instrument of peace . . . the realisation of the strong resistance which any aggression towards South Africa or South-West Africa will undoubtedly raise . . . contributes to the expectation of a peaceful year for the Republic." President Swart, opening the first Republican Parliament (19.1.62), chose the same theme:

"The outstanding feature of the present international situation is the progressive deterioration of the United Nations," he said, and described attacks on South Africa at the United Nations as aimed at securing black domination of the whole continent in the interest of "world communism."

When in July 1961 the 9-man U.N. South-West Africa Committee planned to visit S.W.A., according to Press reports at the time men and helicopters of the South Africa Defence Force were deployed along the South-West Africa-Bechuanaland border forcibly to prevent their entry. South Africa also has an air-training centre in the Caprivi strip, and were using an air-strip at Ohopoho in South-West Africa last year, when South African troops were stationed along the Angola border during the first months of the rebellion. Senior Air Force officers are believed to have surveyed the territory recently.

The *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg) of March 11th, 1962, carried the headline "Hot reception awaits U.N. Committee"; alleging that Nationalist officials were privately boasting of military plans to meet the Committee, which was again instructed to enter South-West Africa this year.

Mr. Kozonguizi, President of the South-West African National Union and SWA petition to the UN, quotes a former Chief Native Commissioner for SWA as telling the Herero leaders some time ago, "Our blood, Afrikaner blood, was shed here on South-West African soil, and then we got SWA. So it is quite impossible for us to give you the country back, unless you can get it, if you like, through bloodshed."

Considerable significance is being attached in South Africa to the news that Active Citizen Force Units are being sent to Walvis Bay (in S.W.A., but technically part of the Republic, where it is also reported that naval installations are being erected) for desert training -- Defence Force policy has recently been to concentrate on bush and guerilla training, not desert warfare. At the same time, other A.C.F. units are being sent to Zeerust (near the Bechuanaland border), Bethlehem (near Basutoland and Zululand) and Ladysmith, Natal (within reach of Zululand and the Transkei).

The placing of these camps -- effectively covering S.W.A. and the High Commission Territories -- lends force to fears that South Africa's intentions will not remain defensive. South Africa has for long demanded the transfer of the High Commission Territories, and though they have lately dropped the demand publicly, the Nationalists make no secret of the fact that their plans for the territorial division of South Africa have included Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland as "Bantustans."

But what of the other partners in the Unholy Alliance? Angola is in a state of war, and 20,000 Portuguese troops are in action there; Moçambique, victim of the economic depression caused by the drain on Portugal's finances, is in a state of extreme unrest. 10,000 troops are stationed in the territory; and recently

the Security Headquarters at Lourenço Marques embarked on an operation to "uncover" potentially subversive Africans by sending out *agents provocateurs*. (*Observer* 18.3.62). Reinforcements of 700 Commandos from Portugal have been sent out recently; while a report in a South African aviation magazine *Wings* (Dec. 1961) states: "The Portuguese are hastily building nine new aerodromes in Portuguese-East Africa (Mozambique) following their trouble in Angola. The new 'dromes are all capable of taking jet fighters and are situated along or near the borders of Tanganyika and Nyasaland."

The pattern in the Federation seems to be very little different. Last year, there were 3,650 officers and men in the regular army, and 3,500 in the Territorials. On February 12th the Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, announced on opening Parliament that the Federation Government was buying helicopters and Hawker-Hunter jet fighters (used for ground attack) "in the light of the generally unsettled conditions prevailing in Africa." Last year the Federation Defence Act was amended, requiring registration by all *non-African* men between 31 and 50. A Free Church Missionary, Rev. Mervyn Temple, has refused to register on the ground that the Act "arms one section of the community against others." And in May, the 1962 defence budget was increased by £800,000 to approx. £8m. Sir Roy Welensky, explaining the increase, referred to "the shrinking number of friends we have on this continent and elsewhere."

Despite Britain's continued technical responsibility for the Federation's foreign relations and defence, Sir Roy (*Guardian*, 23.1.62) insists that "it would be nonsense to suppose that we would have to await agreement or consent of any party before we set about taking steps to defend our borders," and he told the Federation Parliament that the Federation is *entirely responsible* for its own defence.

Like the South African Nationalists, Welensky has recently been vocal in his criticism of the U.N. On American television on January 14th he announced that he did not regard the U.N. as an impartial body, and would not allow U.N. observers into Northern Rhodesia. Sir Edgar Whitehead on February 24th equally defied any U.N. investigating committee to enter Southern Rhodesia. This hostility, when set beside the Federation's attempts to subvert the U.N. operation in Katanga, ranges Central Africa quite clearly with South Africa, as possibly preparing for *military* resistance to international resolutions. In justifying the Republic's own arms build-up, South Africans have frequently demonstrated their identification with white Rhodesia. "We in South Africa do not need to ask for whom the bell tolls. It tolls also for us," writes *Die Burger* of the prospect of the break-up of the Federation. South African papers are already talking of the shift of the "frontier against Communism" from Egypt to Rhodesia, following the drastic changes on the continent in the past few years.

And a nasty reminder of what armed resistance by white settlers can mean was contained in a report in the *Evening Standard* on March 31st, alleging that the O.A.S. had set up a secret rear headquarters and supply organisation in South Africa, and smuggled part of its financial assets to Johannesburg.

WHERE DOES BRITAIN STAND ?

The *Observer* (18.3.62) expressed in an editorial comment the strongest fear that a secret defence treaty may exist between Britain and South Africa, and called on Her Majesty's Government to make public the truth about its military relations with Dr. Verwoerd's Government. No denial of the charge was forthcoming. Mr. Fenner Brockway on 28th February had already attempted in the House of Commons to elicit the extent of armaments and technical military assistance being supplied to South Africa. Mr. Watkinson, Minister of Defence, replied that "it has been the practise of successive Governments not to disclose information about the supply of arms" (*Guardian*, 1.3.62), but that the Government was not providing technicians to help establish armaments factories in the Republic.

Mr. Fouché, in South Africa, has been more frank. He explained that South Africa's defence relations with friendly nations had never been based on written agreements, except in the case of the Simonstown agreement, by which the U.K. has the right to use the Simonstown naval base in the event of war, but maintained that he had "the fullest trust in the U.K." He said that the West was fully aware of South Africa's strategic value, and hinted broadly that Britain could thus be expected to stand fully by South Africa.

The *Observer* was far from satisfied, and repeated its challenge to the Government to reveal the truth a few weeks later. On April 18th, the *Guardian* joined in with a vigorous editorial plea for an arms embargo against South Africa: "It is hard to believe that a peaceful solution to South Africa's troubles will be furthered by helping to build up the armed strength of the Government."

Britain has supplied South Africa with the Saracen tanks used at Sharpeville, and continues to supply her with the teargas used against African demonstrators. Three anti-submarine frigates of the "Whitby" class are being built here for the South African navy, and there are rumours that South Africa is to buy an aircraft carrier and two submarines in this country. Lightning missiles have been mentioned. And confirmation of an order for eight Mark II Victor Bombers (suitable for carrying nuclear weapons) is expected by Handley-Page.

According to an announcement in the South African Parliament on May 3rd, 1960, South Africa "obtained quite a number of concessions from the British Government in regard to the facilities in the Protectorates. Inter alia, they include a site for the establishment of radar stations, if necessary, in Bechuanaland, and a suitable site has been investigated." (S.A. *Hansard*, 6610). As far as is known, this concession has not been implemented.

Britain is in fact deeply involved, politically, militarily and economically in the Unholy Alliance. Mr. Gaitskell, speaking in the House of Commons on 5th February, 1962, referred to Portugal and South Africa as "this tiny group of colonial powers, dictatorships, with which the Foreign Secretary has linked up this country." Mr. Harold Wilson, Labour spokesman on Foreign Affairs, wrote at the same time, "More and more we have become associated with a small group of colonialist and ex-colonialist powers, Portugal, Belgium, France and South Africa." (*Reynolds News*, 4.2.62). The (Conservative) Bow Group's pamphlet *The New Africa* referred to Britain's voting record on southern Africa at the United Nations as "weak and puzzling." And Mr. Jo Grimond called the South Africa Act "a victory for Verwoerd."

Britain is still technically responsible for the external relations and defence of the Federation, and so must bear directly much of the responsibility for the Federation's part in the conspiracy. Historically and economically she is very closely linked with South Africa. U.K. Government Ministers were talking of Portugal as "our oldest ally" only a few months ago, and selling her arms and warships; and Britain is also bound to Salazar through common membership of NATO. Without NATO arms, Salazar could certainly not continue the Angola war; and though the British Government was finally forced to give a (valueless) assurance in the House of Commons that British arms to Portugal were not to be used in Angola, African guerillas insist that British and American armaments are being used against them. The attitude of many Conservatives was reflected in a response by Mr. Orr-Ewing to a question from a Labour M.P. protesting at the goodwill visit of H.M.S. Leopard to Luanda at the height of the rebellion: "I do not have any evidence of 20,000 people being killed in Angola... I do not see any point in letting down an old NATO ally by withdrawing at this stage."

At the United Nations, Britain has earned the heartfelt thanks, not of the African people, but of the South African Government. The adviser on South-West Africa to the South African delegation returned from the 1961 U.N. session to tell the *Windhoek Advertiser* (20.12.61): "The delegation of the U.K. carried out an immense struggle on behalf of South Africa... We are indebted to Britain because it was through her that the motion calling for economic sanctions did not obtain a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. The United States also assisted in this matter."

The chart at the end of this chapter shows Britain's voting record on South-West Africa --- her record on apartheid and on Angola is not much better. The U.K. voted against Portugal on Angola for the first time on January 30th, 1962, leaving only South Africa and Spain to support her.

In March 1961 the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference made it clear that apartheid has no place in a multi-racial Commonwealth, and Dr. Verwoerd was forced to 'resign.' In March 1962, a South Africa Bill to regulate Britain's future relations with the Republic extended virtually all the existing trading privileges to South Africa. What is more, the Bill was found to include South-West Africa in all its provisions, as though it were legally part of the Republic. Labour and Liberal opposition M.P.s pointed out that the extension of Commonwealth privileges to South Africa could only devalue Commonwealth membership, and bring the U.K. into contempt throughout the Afro-Asian world as a supporter of apartheid. But the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, according to a summary in the *Times* (16.3.62), "pleaded economic necessity for the Government's action. An export market in South Africa worth £150m. annually was not to be jeopardised lightly, nor were invisible exports of the order of £100m. We were South Africa's most important market, taking goods to the value of about £55m. a year [in fact this figure is over £100m., R.A.]. To abolish the preference of about 10% (admittedly they gave us less), would damage trade in both directions. More, if this action were taken South Africa might leave the sterling area. With 70% of the world's gold production coming from the Union and being sold through the London market, this was hardly to be countenanced." One Conservative M.P., Mr. Julian Critchley, voted against the Bill in the Committee stage.

Britain's responsibilities to the High Commission Territories, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, which she rules directly through a High Commissioner *who is also British Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa*, of course involve her with the Southern African powers, however unwillingly. For all three territories are economically undeveloped, and dependent on South Africa. 43% of the adult male population is away from Basutoland at any one time, and 20% of the men of Bechuanaland, working mostly in the South African mines. Over three sevenths of the land in Swaziland is owned by whites, most of them South African citizens, and South African capital is involved in Swaziland development schemes. Customs for the three territories is handled by South Africa: and even their defence is dependent upon permission to fly across Republican soil.

Finally, Britain's rôle in the Katanga operation ranged her clearly with the Union-Minière-backed Tshombe régime at a time when it was openly defying the United Nations. A 'Katanga Lobby' led by Waterhouse, and Lords Robins, Selborne, Clitheroe

and helped by Lord Salisbury, directed a vociferous Tory campaign for Katanga secession and against the U.N. operation.

By the middle of December 1961, Dr. Conor O'Brien, former head of the U.N. in Katanga, together with powerful elements of African and Asian opinion, had accused the U.K. Government of surrendering to this lobby. It was alleged that British diplomats had obstructed the U.N. behind the scenes; that Britain deliberately held up Ethiopian fighters needed to cover U.N. forces; that, after supporting the earlier resolutions, she abstained (with France) from the Security Council resolution authorising the use of force to expel mercenaries, and then, though bound by a resolution she had not vetoed, continued to demand a cease-fire and negotiations between Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Adoula; that she shilly-shallied over the supply of block-buster bombs, and refused to accept U.N. observers on the Northern Rhodesia border.

Lord Home finally crowned these efforts with a speech alleging that "the U.N. encourages policies that endanger law and order -- a large part of the organisation which is dedicated to peace openly condones aggression." This judgment the Prime Minister endorsed on February 5th in the House of Commons: "The whole foundation on which the U.N. was built has been undermined; I must be quite frank and say I think this (a resolution of international problems) can only be done if we reach some kind of détente — some kind of working arrangement -- not through the United Nations but by direct negotiation between East and West." He added that the U.N. was based on the principle of one nation, one vote, which did not correspond with the power position in the world.

Britain's participation in the Unholy Alliance is something of which we ought to be bitterly ashamed, something which the colonial peoples will not forget. The arms drive brings a new urgency to the need for Britain to reassess her policies in Southern Africa; and it is in fact open to us to make a lasting contribution to African democracy and to world peace—

- **by throwing our weight fully behind African demands for democratic government**
- **by supporting an immediate arms embargo against Salazar and Verwoerd**
- **and by voting in the U.N. for international economic sanctions against Verwoerd.**

If Britain does not act now, she may bear the responsibility for bloodshed and suffering in Southern Africa far beyond the horrors of the Angola war.

U.K. VOTING ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA AT THE U.N.

(with recent data on Apartheid and Indians in South Africa)

If this material does not cover all resolutions that have been passed on South West Africa in this period, it is because the record of votes *not taken by roll-call* cannot be pinned down to particular nations, and many of those on S.W.A. have been of that nature. Only in recent years have U.N. Member States asked for many roll-call votes on this subject.

The record shows that the U.K. vote on this and related questions has been almost entirely negative, with the following exceptions—cases in which the U.K. has voted *for* a resolution:

1957: voted for setting up Good Offices Committee and was one of its three members.

1960 (15th G.A.): voted for resolution requesting assistance of U.N. Specialized Agencies for S.W.A.

1961 (resumed 15th G.A.): voted in favour of milder resolution on Apartheid in S.A.—change from previous consistent NO.

<u>Resolution or Motion</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>U.K. Vote</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
1954 Only res. in which roll-call vote taken was that to seek the advice of the International Court on whether 2/3 vote under U.N. rules or unanimity under League of Nations Mandate rules applied to question of S.W.A.	25-11-21 (Plenary)	Abstain	Nov. 23	Press Release GA-1193
1955 Controversial question this year was whether Comm. 4(C4) and S.W.A. Sub-committee could hear oral petitions. Rev. M. Scott had asked to be heard. 3 days' debate preceded his permission to speak. (Resolution to extend life of 3-man commission on racial situation in South Africa.)	25-11-10 (C4)	NO	Nov. 11	N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, '55
	37- 7-13	NO	Nov. 9	N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, '55
1957. Only resolution to receive rollcall vote in Committee was "Establishment of a Good Offices Committee on S.W.A." (Britain agreed to be member of Committee.) Amendment to above (Uruguay) 2nd preamb. par: "Considering that the United Nations Charter makes it incumbent on each Member State to pursue every available means of negotiation and conciliation for the settlement of international problems on the basis of respect for the pur-	52-10-17 (C.4)	YES	669th Meeting	A.C.4.I. 496
	33-19-27 (C.4) (adopted)	NO

poses and principles of the Charter."

Amendment to above (Uruguay). Change wording in op. par. 1 to (G.O. Committee members) "elected by the General Assembly" rather than "nominated by the President of ..."

28-35-16
(C.4)
(defeated)

NO

1958

Motion to hear Scott and Kerina on Report of Good Offices Committee.

45-19- 9

NO

Sept. 30

A/3959 '58

Motion to hear Scott and Kerina on social conditions in S.W.A.

60- 5- 9

NO

Sept. 30

"

Only res. to receive rollcall votes were:

Par. 3 of res. on "Conditions in S.W.A." expresses its deep concern".

59- 2-18
(Plenary)

NO

Oct. 30

A/PV.778
30/10/58

Proposal of Liberia for verbatim record of Good Offices debate.

30-17-21
(Comm.4)

NO

Oct. 29

A/3959
Add. 1 '58

(ALSO. Apartheid: request S. Africa to change policies)
(Also, Indians in S.A.: Negotiate)

70- 5- 4
(Plenary)
69- 0-10
(Plenary)

NO
Abstain

Oct. 30
Dec. 10

A/PV.778
30 Oct. '58
A/PV.783
10 Dec. '58

1959

Rollcall vote on hearing Emory F. Bundy

43- 5-23
(C.4)

NO

Sept. 24

A/4272 '59

Rollcall vote on hearing Sherman M. Bull (both Americans who had visited S.W.A. and talked with African leaders).

32- 2-22
(C.4)

NO

Oct. 5

"

Res.: "Question of S.W.A." asking S.A. to negotiate with U.N. through S.W.A. sub-committee.

56- 5-12
(C.4)

NO

931st
Meeting

"

Words "with grave concern" in above resolution

52- 8-13
(C.4)

NO

"

"

Resolution on Legal Action study.

52- 4- 7

NO

932nd
Meeting

"

(Also, 1959. Apartheid: Ask S.A. change policies.
(Indians in S.A.: Negotiate)

62- 3- 7
(Plenary)
66- 0-12
(Plenary)

NO
Abstain

Nov. 17
Dec. 10

A/PV.838
17 Nov. '59
A/PV.852
10 Dec. '59

Is Comm. 4 competent to re-open S.W.A. question to grant hearings to petitioners on Windhoek violence of Dec. 10?

29-26-12

NO

Dec. 11

(Mislaïd)

15th G. Assembly 1960-61 Motion by S. Africa: no debate on S.W.A. because <i>subjudice</i> .	1-82- 9 (Plenary) (defeated)	Abstain	Dec. 18	A/PV.954 18 Dec. '60
Resolution on Political Freedom in S.W.A.	62- 0- 8 (C.4)	Abstain	Nov. 24	A/4643 '60
Resolution on Legal Action (commend Ethiopia and Liberia for bringing case of S.A.'s possible violation of Mandate to International Court for Compulsory jurisdiction).	86- 0- 6 (Plenary)	Abstain	Dec. 18	A/PV.954
Res. requesting help of U.N. Specialized Agencies in S.W.A.	79- 0- 1 (C.4)	YES	Dec. 6	A/4643 '60
Amendment to Resolution on Windhoek Location (prosecute and punish guilty; compensate victims) about shooting of Africans by police, Dec. 10, 1959.	58- 0-22 (C. 4)	Abstain	Dec. 6	A/4643 '60
Res.: "Question of S.W.A." deplores apartheid in S.W.A.; sends S.W.A. sub- committee to S.W.A.	78- 0-15 (Plenary)	Abstain	Dec. 18	A/PV.954 18 Dec. '60
Res.: "Appeal to Member States which have particu- larly close and continuous relations with the Govern- ment of the Union of South Africa; with respect to the situation in the territory of S.W.A."	74- 0- 9 (Plenary)	Abstain	Mar. 16 1961	A/PV.963 1961
Res.: Question of South West Africa": S.W.A. sub- committee go to S.W.A. "without" co-operation of S.A. if necessary	83- 0- 9 (Plenary)	Abstain	Apr. 7	A/PV.979 7 Apr. '61
(Also in 15th Assembly, resumed Res. on Indians in S. Africa.	71- 0- 6 (SPC)	Abstain	Mar. 24	A/SPC/SR. 231 27 Mar. '61
(Apartheid; Res. A: specific sanctions: vote on par. 5, sanctions.)	42-34-21 (res. withdrawn)	NO	Apr. 13	A/PV.981 13 Apr. '61
(Apartheid; Res. B: requests states to take means open to them).	95- 1- 0	YES	Apr. 13	"

N.B. The U.N. voting figures quoted are votes FOR . . . AGAINST . . .
ABSTENTIONS respectively.

Buy and study this pamphlet: then

1. Invite a speaker to address your local political party or trade union branch; or your organisation.
2. Pass resolutions at your local meetings so that this question becomes an issue at national conference level.
3. Start a correspondence with your M.P., and get as many others to do so as you can.
4. Boycott S. African goods and campaign for economic sanctions against South Africa and arms embargo against Salazar and Verwoerd at Government level.

Further information from the publishers:

Anti-Apartheid Movement, 15 Endsleigh Street, W.C.1

Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies,
374 Grays Inn Road, W.C.1

Movement for Colonial Freedom, 374 Grays Inn Road,
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