

**Interview with Ethel de Keyser by Håkan Thörn, 3 March 2000, reproduced on the Anti-Apartheid Movement Archives Committee Forward to Freedom project website <http://www.aamarchives.org/>**

*Håkan Thörn: Could you start with saying when you were born and where, and then in which organisations, groups or activities associated with the struggle against apartheid you have been in and what periods?*

Ethel de Keyser: Well, I am South African. I am one of two children. I have an older brother who was involved in the anti-apartheid struggle when he was very young. He was quite a lot older than I am, and I think that I became much more aware of the situation in South Africa than I would have done as a white South African, brought up in much the same way as other white South Africans, because of him. He was getting arrested when he was still at school.

*HT: When was this?*

E de K: This would have been in the late 1940s or the 1950s. He was very active in the trade union movement at the time and I think he was a member of the South African Communist Party, as many South Africans were at that time, because the SACP was the only Party that had a totally non-racial stance. Even the Liberal Party was for a qualified franchise at that time. I could go on at great length. I came to Great Britain just after I left school in the 1950s to study English literature. I went back and forth to see my parents, and then one parent died and my brother was arrested again, in 1960 during the State of Emergency. And I went back to help out, and then again he was arrested and charged with the transportation of dynamite from Johannesburg to Cape Town and was sentenced to 12 years in jail. I wasn't there at the time, though I tried to go back. When I did I saw him once, and then he was moved to Pretoria and I was arrested and deported, because I had married an Englishman when I was 18, and I had a British passport.

*HT: Which year were you deported?*

E de K: 1963, and I found – I mean I got married when I was 18 in this country. I wasn't allowed back into South Africa under the deportation order. I had to apply to go and subsequently when my brother had a heart attack in jail, I applied, but they wouldn't let me in. He insisted on serving his full 12 years, though he was not very well, and when he was released from jail, they didn't agree to him coming to the United Kingdom. That took quite a lot of work and I had resigned from being Executive Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement because of his coming out of jail. My feeling was that they would not have allowed him to come here if I was still in the post. After a while, almost a year, quite a lot of pressure from the government in Britain on the South Africans, he was allowed to come here and he died here.

So his presence in the house, I think, contributed in no small measure to my being alert. I was involved largely through him at that point in South Africa. I tried to help somebody escape – Chris Hani's uncle – from South Africa and so on, but that was really under his

tutelage. I went to work in the Anti-Apartheid Movement as a volunteer in 1964 and was asked to come and work there in 1965 and I started doing so in March of that year and I left ten years later, just when we had asked Angela Davis to come over as part of our work on the political prisoners campaign.

*HT: Did you participate in any other organisations or groups after you left the AAM?*

E de K: No, I remained on the Executive of the Anti-Apartheid Movement after I left in 1974–75. I think I decided that I wasn't going to stand about 11 years later, so I was there for in all – I mean I was very involved. And in other organisations in opposing racism in the UK a little, but my primary interest has always been Africa and I strongly believe that much as one would like to very often you can't do everything. So I focused very much on Southern Africa.

*HT: But were you working in IDAF before?*

E de K: No, after I left AAM, I went to work in publishing, but remained in Anti-Apartheid on the Executive. Then I was asked to come and work in the British Defence and Aid Fund [BDAF] – the British end, Canon Collins and Frank Judd asked me to come there, to be the Director. And that was a fairly dormant organisation, it had been the original organisation, but had been subsumed into the international organisation, which was also based in this country. I thought about it for quite a long time, and then under quite a lot of pressure I decided to do it. That was just after my brother died here, and I went to work there, I think it was June 1980. I tried to develop a role for British Defence and Aid that didn't impinge on the role of the Anti-Apartheid Movement or indeed the role of the IDAF [International Defence and Aid Fund]. Our major effort was focused on educational work in schools. We produced quite a lot of publications which are now in South Africa. One of them was written by individual people – we had an education committee. We did quite a lot of work on that and also on political prisoners and, of course, fundraising. That was quite a big job, because we worked with a very small staff and very little money, which is quite right.

*HT: You said your brother was important for your commitment. What made your brother then, and you, as whites in South Africa ... ?*

E de K: I think that is an interesting question, which a number of people have raised. I think a general awareness – my parents weren't total National Party apartheid supporters – and wide reading and consciousness of where you lived. Though I must say we were brought up with people looking after us, black nannies and so on, who were as much mothers as our mothers were. It is very difficult to account for that. It is obviously the home environment, the influences you encounter and just people you know and the extent of your awareness and what you see and whether you condone it, I suppose.

*HT: In which part of South Africa?*

E de K: Cape Town.

*HT: Can you recall that you read things that were important for your consciousness?*

E de K: Yes, I read things that had very little to do with racism. I read a lot of Afrikaans poets, and I read Dostoevsky from beginning to end and the Russian nineteenth century literature was great. I still read it. And I think a lot of American literature – Richard Wright and a lot of those writers who were writing in the '40s and '50s and were making an impact on the issue of race. Yes, I was always a great reader as a child and I'm sure that was a factor. But as a small girl I admired my brother a lot and I am sure that was an influence.

*HT: You can't really single out any particular books or reports?*

E de K: That were a sudden revelation, is that what you are asking?

*HT: No, I mean later on, perhaps when you were trying to form your own analysis?*

E de K: Later on, not in those days, not as an adolescent. But in my 20s, I met in this country a number of people from the Caribbean, a number of writers, and I remember having social contacts for the first time, despite my background. Except as a schoolgirl I once came home and my brother had brought Walter Sisulu home for lunch. I always remember this. My mother was serving them, but she didn't sit down with them, and when I went into the kitchen, the woman who was our maid was sitting there with an apron over her head shaking. I thought she was crying, but of course she was laughing; she found it really funny to see that Walter Sisulu would come to lunch and that my mother would serve both my brother and Walter – who I subsequently met years later and who I liked very much. So through these people from the West Indies, I learnt a great deal, yes.

*HT: Did they include Stuart Hall?*

E de K: I knew Stuart, yes, and I knew a chap called George Lamming very well, who was a novelist, and they were very interesting and very enlightening.

*HT: Did you as an activist travel a lot?*

E de K: Not as much as subsequently – I mean I know Mike [Terry] travelled much more than I did, but when I moved into the Anti-Apartheid Movement it was not a terribly well-structured outfit, you know, in a basic sense. The membership system, we didn't sort of – we used to work on two levels. We had campaigns and then we would have the focus of campaigns, so we worked in the UK in the political parties and during my time we set up a system of circulating all the Constituency Labour Parties, who were then thought to be more sympathetic to our cause – I don't know that the Labour government didn't do very well when they actually came in. And we would have various meetings at conferences. I think we tried to do that at the Tory conference, it didn't really work at the time, but we did at the Labour Party conference and the Liberal Assembly – those were the predecessors of the Liberal Democrats now. And so we did quite a lot of internal sort of

auditing of different aspects of the work and of course we never had any money so and again subsequently sort of international bodies funded the Anti-Apartheid Movement much more than they did in my time. In my time, I had this thing that it was necessary for us to raise from people the bulk of the money we needed. It was a way of involving people and committing them, and also to subsidise us. At that point anyway I had some questions about it. But certainly I went to Moscow, I went to the Sudan via Moscow, for a very important conference for all the Southern African liberation movements that were linked at the time. That was the ANC [African National Congress], ZAPU [Zimbabwe African People's Union], SWAPO [South West African People's Organisation], PAIGC [Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde] and MPLA [Movement for the Liberation of Angola], and it was great for me to meet with Amilcar Cabral, with Agostinho Neto. And all that was terribly important. I mean I realised how much I was missing sitting by my desk from morning to midnight.

*HT: Do you remember which year that conference was?*

E de K: I think it was '72. It was a very big conference and I was so astonished when we were transported in Khartoum, where the conference was being held, and I got out of the car and a whole load of students there cheered and clapped me. I was terribly embarrassed – somebody said they thought I was part of the Palestinian liberation movement. Yes, I went to a number of conferences in Holland, but not a lot – that development into Europe and into the EU [European Union] took place much more in Mike's time. I did more travelling in Defence and Aid than I did in Anti-Apartheid. Defence and Aid I think, the more I have worked in it, and this Trust, that I set up when I went to work there, and we are doing quite well at the moment – well is a bad word – but we are surviving and managing to expand the number of students we are supporting and the projects, and I hope that we are able to do something in Mozambique, on an educational thing, which is the limitation of this Trust. But Defence and Aid is such an important organisation, and I am extremely conscious, having been in both, how little it has been recognised, and I feel rather sad about it, more particularly in a personal sense for Diana Collins, you know, who is still alive, because its role in South Africa was really so important, and even outside, in terms of the material we produced.

*HT: If you compare working in the AAM and the Defence and Aid Fund?*

E de K: You don't want me to go on to that: both I found, neither, was easy. In Anti-Apartheid it was different. I had people there, particularly Vella Pillay and Abdul Minty, who were very crucial to the whole movement, until it closed down really – although I had my disagreements with them, they were really invaluable. But both organisations, I am sure I'm not supposed to go on to this, it's not part of your interest, and I don't want to get – because I have a lot to say on this subject. You know how good organisations, that are themselves so well situated in terms of their objects and what they are trying to do, and are doing quite well, get a curious kind of, afflicted by a kind of egotism, and a territorial thing, that is so unhelpful to the struggle, for the purpose for which they ... . I can give you one example. We were involved – we being Anti-Apartheid now. There was a committee set up by Norma Kitson, who was married to Dave Kitson, who was in jail for 20 years, and they set up the City Anti-Apartheid. They were an organisation that was

part of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. That whole episode is so interesting. I think they were a part of the Revolutionary Communist Group; they were essentially disruptive. At the same time they were very able, and I think that they did very well. They had a picket outside South Africa House for about two years, all night and day, snow, wind, there was always somebody there. And this was for the release of Nelson Mandela. It was in the early '80s, because I everybody was so angry with me for not taking sides. I used to come to my desk in Defence and Aid, and people would put on my desk journals, *Fight Racism Fight Imperialism*, where we, the Anti-Apartheid Executive, were being attacked. I think everybody, Bob Hughes, Mike, Chris Child, and even me, but in quite a different way, tried to solve that problem, and it became very public, and in a way I think for a period, more effort was going into dealing with the City AA, who were eventually expelled from the Movement. And I voted for them because there wasn't anything else you could do, they had broken every rule in the book, then we were about South Africa, and that kind of internal thing was very important, because I think we should have joined the picket. Anyway people attributed it to the AAM – because that would have been a way of diffusing this, but no.

*HT: I am in fact interested in tensions between different organisations, because there are so many organisations involved here. So if you could take a few minutes for important conflicts or tensions that were there, between different parts of the movement in a wider sense, I mean not just the AAM, but the movement including the ANC, the IDAF?*

E de K: Well, I think that the IDAF or BDAF – I think the only big tensions that existed during my time, I think it was very different afterwards, because once the Soweto uprising had happened in South Africa, and once Botha came here [in 1984], and Botha's coming here turned the AAM round. I had left in '75 and until '81 or '82 it was limping. And then when Botha came there was such outrage that everybody came out, and it took off after that, and gradually built up with the news, the media, everything that was happening in South Africa. But of course the main tensions within the Anti-Apartheid Movement – there were a number of organisations working at that time here. There was the Africa Bureau, there was the Movement for Colonial Freedom, as it was known, there were subcommittees that were set up on Namibia – the Namibia Support Committee; there was a committee set up on Zimbabwe, and we tried to harmonise, bring these all together. AAM would, but they also had their separate committees. The main tensions within the AAM were within the Communist Party, the South African Communist Party, and the rest of us. Now I have never been a member of the South African Communist Party, which is not to say I was opposed to the South African Communist Party, but nor was I in total agreement on all fronts, and I think that was, it was a – well, James can tell you ... . You have seen James? There were tensions, and I think it would be silly to suggest that they didn't exist, never to a point of exposure. There was never a disagreement – on a whole load of things. I am trying to think where there were disagreements. I remember it was quite late on, actually, before I left – or maybe I'd already left, when somebody came forward with the view – which actually, when I think about it, was quite logical. You know, the cultural boycott of South Africa – there were a lot of people who queried it – not because they opposed the boycott per se, but they didn't think it should extend to culture. I'm not sure about that. During the time of segregated theatres and cinemas it was logical that it should be included. But he came

forward with a book boycott and I'm crazy to think that it was wrong, because it actually was logical. I mean if someone wants to boycott South Africa and they ask a publisher not to sell there, and then give us the money they would have made in royalties, fine. Because it was true that Africans didn't have access to libraries to the same extent, or even to – in some – areas to any extent at all. But I was very opposed to that. I don't think it went very far. I think a few people – it was never a big campaign, not like the arms embargo was a big campaign, or political prisoners was a big campaign. The boycott of produce that came from South Africa was extremely effective at different times. The cultural boycott, the sports boycott during my time was most effective – and we worked with Peter Hain – who takes all the credit. But actually when we worked together, it went very well. And he was very good with the media and he was only 19 at the time. He was excellent. I've told him this.

*HT: What about the ANC and the AAM?*

E de K: Well the ANC – the AAM on paper had the ANC and the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] represented on the National Committee. In reality, there was a much greater closeness with the ANC for obvious reasons. We had a lot of people within the Movement who were Party members, many of them were South Africans, but we also had British Communist Party people and there was a link-up there. The PAC were really very hostile to us at different times, and at one stage, very early on, when I was first in Anti-Apartheid, a PAC group went around to different high commissions and embassies telling them that we, that the Anti-Apartheid Movement was a Communist front, and that they should dissociate themselves, and they went to Parliament and so on. But I think that was a bad period, it didn't always happen. But there is no doubt that we were closer to the ANC, and to be fair, it was because the ANC were closer to us. They were very much more involved, they came, they presented themselves as speakers. The PAC I think automatically assumed that we were separate, that we were distant, and they didn't come, though we were perfectly friendly. The same thing happened with ZAPU and ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union] and that I found really quite tricky, because in my early time I remember organising a rally in Trafalgar Square after UDI [Unilateral Declaration of Independence] announcing to the shock horror of the Executive that I had managed to get a speaker from ZANU and ZAPU. And of course they knew better, they were quite right, the ZAPU speaker didn't roll up. But I did try to make a special link with ZANU. And I recall we organised a big meeting at the time – I don't know if you know Guy Clutton-Brock and his wife. They used to run a farm in what was then Rhodesia and had a very rough time and came out here – a remarkable couple – he's now dead. We had a meeting and the ZANU people actually got up to complain and complained about me personally, and said that we hadn't invited them. So I mean there was a hostility, and that I think continued, except that with the release of Nelson Mandela, and with the constant splits within the PAC, which went on until not very long ago. The ANC became really the dominant organisation, and there was much less sort of questioning of Anti-Apartheid's links with the ANC. They were much closer after I left than they were before.

*HT: There have been discussions that the AAM was sort of dominated by white people*

...

E de K: It was...

*HT: ... and that they didn't get the black constituency...*

E de K: I think that is absolutely true. We were certainly very white. And during my time, I had personal links with quite a lot of black people in this country who didn't come in under an Anti-Apartheid banner, but when we were organising the sports campaign, they did come in, and that was because we had a very loose kind of federation. They came in under their own banner, as part of a larger grouping, and they were very effective, and having them was tremendous, because it made a big difference. It was during the Labour government at the time, and they were very reluctant to, especially on the cricket campaign, to have a largely black protest group, well not group, it would have been a man, outside Lords cricket ground. It would have been a riot, and they didn't like that. But no, whatever people say, they were – not in my time, but subsequently – there was the odd black person working in the office. But no, I don't think the black community in this country ever really saw the Anti-Apartheid Movement as leading the struggle against apartheid, because, you see, even with the ANC ... I remember when I resigned from AAM, and I was working in publishing, I joined the ANC here. I didn't do that before, because I really felt we should be non-aligned, and you couldn't join the ANC in those days in any case if you were white. But you could join the people here, and I joined them. And we made great efforts to link up with black groups here, we went to see them and I think, you see, I mean off the record...

*HT: About the media. I am interested in the relations between the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the media and the way that the British press covered the struggle. I'm also interested in your own media productions. But let me put this very general question. How would you characterise the importance of media and information in the struggle against apartheid?*

E de K: I think that media and information was tremendously important, and I can give you a very good example. You know we started, the month that I started to work in the Anti-Apartheid Movement, we also started to produce a newspaper called *Anti-Apartheid News*. This was largely due to the efforts beforehand of somebody you might like to see while you are here actually, Anne Page, who worked in Anti-Apartheid and Vella Pillay – he was a very very crucial character in the whole history of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and very important, I think myself. I think that the example that I choose is the campaign that we were organising together with the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, where against President – oh God, what was his name – Caetano, who was coming for a trip to the UK. And Polly Gaster, who was then running that committee, and I met, and we brought in other groups, and Polly was trying to reactivate them. It was pretty thin, it didn't look as if we were going to launch much of a campaign and we were working our socks off, through the night, days, whatever, and there wasn't a lot of interest. We had run in *Anti-Apartheid News*, about a year before, a story about a massacre in Mozambique at Wiriyamu and the role of the Catholic White Fathers there, and there was very little interest. Halfway through our efforts to get this campaign off the ground, the London *Times* ran a story on its front page. What is the guy's name – a Catholic chap – he's still around ... He had been there and he had heard

the story, and William Rees-Mogg was the editor of *The Times* and he's a Catholic. And he was so outraged that the Portuguese forces had come in and massacred this village. One boy was left who had seen what had happened. And they ran the story on the front page, and it absolutely galvanized the country. The other papers took it up. The *Sunday Times* sent out a reporter to Mozambique to interview this boy, and it went on. And the role the press could have played was absolutely significant, and I think would have made a tremendous difference. Denis Herstein himself – it's where you run it in the paper, and the size, that makes a big difference. Denis had done a lot of work on the wages paid to workers in South Africa in the companies that were British subsidiaries. And he had done a very good job in the *Sunday Times*. But it was in the business section and it didn't hit. When Adam Raphael did that in the *Guardian* – it must have been very frustrating for Denis – it was amazing, you see, the impact. But generally, with some honourable exceptions, the press was certainly not on our side, and even though I am sure he doesn't care to remember it, Hugo Young, of whom you might know – he is a very very significant journalist in this town. He chairs the Board of the *Guardian*. I told Denis about this at some length. We had a very good relationship with the *Sunday Times*. Hugo Young was there, Peter Jenkins was there, Bruce Page was there, Alex Mitchell was there, Peter Kellner was there – I mean there were a whole load of people that we could ring up. And what we had, we had a journalist friend, I mean, for instance, there was a chap on *The Times* diary, called Stuart Weir, who is now a professor somewhere, and when we were worried about, I think it was Govan Mbeki, on Robben Island, as to whether he was ill, somebody came to me with the information and said would I please try and run a story that he was ill to see whether or not ... The relationship we had was with the *Sunday Times*, because the *Observer*, who everybody would have thought would have a natural sympathy with the work of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, was quite vocal on Southern Africa at the time and took quite a radical, relatively radical stance, but there were reservations partly about them dealing with us, because they were very wary of this Communist influence, as they saw it, within the Anti-Apartheid Movement. All that changed subsequently.

HT: *When did it change?*

E de K: I think latterly, during the '90s really, '80s as well.

HT: The *Sunday Times* – Denis Herstein he sort of got fired when he came back from South Africa. I mean his editor told him to take leave and he left.

E de K: I don't think Denis ever told me that. I know he left the paper.

HT: I mean he took a year off and returned as a freelance ...

E de K: Was Harry Evans then at the time – the editor? Does he think it was because of what he did?

HT: Because he was deported and ...

E de K: I don't know. I can't comment on that.



HT: This was late 70s ...

E de K: Well, I mean they did run stuff you see, because I worked there, I worked in the *Sunday Times* for a weekend after I had left AAM, and they were doing a story about Rhodesia, as it then was. And I was absolutely furious with them, because these were my friends I was working with, and we were trying – and Judy Todd, who is a good friend of mine – they were coming in and talking, the Insight team, that was what. And they were incredibly ill-informed about the history, and then they ran the story entirely in Cold War terms. And I was so angry, and as you say that, I am thinking, did they actually do so much? I mean we had sympathy, can I ask somebody that question? I just want to ask somebody, one of the chaps who was working there at the time. If you give me a moment – stay here

HT: We could go on and then take that when we have finished ...

E de K: Because I am just interested that you are raising that, because certainly we had a lot of sympathy and a lot of support and what happened is that journalists on the *Sunday Times* actually came in to help run *AA News* – without payment, you know. Alex Mitchell was the editor for a while, and they wrote the odd article for *Anti-Apartheid News*. Bruce Page was then on the *Sunday Times* as well. *Sunday Times* journalists actually worked – as volunteers, obviously. You see, what I am questioning myself about is that certainly there were a whole gaggle of journalists on the paper that supported us, and that we could turn to, and they helped us produce stuff, like the newspaper and were sympathetic and so on, but I am just wondering how much actually appeared in the paper. That's what I am questioning and that's what I would like to ask somebody who worked there. But I can give you another example – there was a campaign in this country run by the Group of Ten, which was a South Africa House front, and they were putting big adverts in the papers, very cleverly done, seeking support for apartheid, but in rather human approach, as they thought, they hoped, would be quite seductive. And we were very concerned about this. And then I found out who was behind this whole thing – was a man called Sparrow. And one of our volunteers was working at a publisher that worked with – a book was going to be produced by this chap Sparrow who was behind this. And she came to me and said, 'Look I have looked through the files and I see that the South African Embassy has ordered in 1,500 copies of this book'. And I said to her, 'Go to the *Guardian* and tell them this story'. And she did, and it killed the Group of Ten, you see. We did a number of things like that, but I don't want to go on too long. Yes, so I am saying, the press played an important role, mostly negatively.

*HT: In terms of media strategies on behalf of the AAM, I mean making contacts with established journalists is one strategy. What other strategies were there to get attention from the established media?*

E de K: I think our main thrust was to try and do, if we demonstrated, to do it imaginatively, to think about the visual impact, which was quite new for us – very very anti this rigid puritanical sort of approach that anti-apartheid movements worldwide, I am sure, had. So it was a question of how you looked, whether you stood outside South Africa House, you stood in a particular way, you had banners with the lists of political

prisoners, with their names, you had pictures. We thought of how to do things, not just what to do, and that became quite an important factor. During my time, we did on the tenth anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre in 1970, we did two big events. We did a reconstruction of the Sharpeville massacre in Trafalgar Square, which – there are still pictures, I think, of a chap called Jan Hoogendyk, who has now died, but who was very involved in the anti-apartheid struggle, playing a policeman. And we did a poster with him on that, and we did the whole thing, and that could have trivialised what was a terrible massacre really, but somehow we got professionals to do the sound of the guns and the voices of the Afrikaners telling people to shoot, and had it beamed all over the Square. And it was very chilling, you know it made a powerful impact. And that same evening we did a huge event at the Lyceum in the Strand. It's a huge theatre in the round. I had approached four playwrights in this country to write a short play about Sharpeville and about South Africa, and we got very well-known playwrights to do it, David Mercer, Edward Bond and so on. And Lewis Nkosi was a South African writer. And we got very well-known directors to direct each 20-minute play, and in the intervening bits, between that, there's a stage that revolves, we had the ANC gumboot dancers and we had – you know, it was a very very exciting event, which was very well reported. So what we tried to do was, because the situation – the absolute horror of apartheid, and the effect it had on people at home, you couldn't get it across to people who didn't have a similar experience to draw on themselves, so you had to find ways of presenting it, in a way, that might hit home. And I think that we tried to do that as imaginatively as we could at the time. And also we had the constraints of time and money, but I think we didn't do badly on that front. And certainly on the sports thing, you know, the direct action woke people up as well, you know, because it essentially, of course it outraged people, even people like Harold Pinter, who is a strong anti-apartheid man, but also a great cricket man. And the fact that the pitch was dug up in Oxford was absolute sacrilege, you know, people found that very very upsetting. But yes, when you ask me what we tried to do, we tried to present our work, or our campaigns, the material we used in our campaigns, in different ways, so that it either would shock the public into registering some of the issues, or it would bring in the sympathy of people who were passing, you know, like if you went on a demonstration. And then we tried to do it, we produced, we did a thing on Labour's record on Southern Africa, which actors and various other people participated in, as part of a meeting. I mean we did a lot of things like that. I could go on at great length. But I think that what was an absolute inbred conviction in the Anti-Apartheid Movement Executive, was that the press was against us, which of course they were, in all essence, and certainly the owners of the press were against us. But I would argue, and I still do to this day, that you could find the odd journalist that would actually stick his neck out, and that might get things in, and we did.. I mean, I recall that at the Labour Party conference in 1970, after a lot of work, we would circulate to all the Constituency Labour Parties a letter, with a draft resolution for them to consider, and we got a resolution onto the agenda, in support – I can't remember what it said – I'm sure it couldn't have said in support of the armed struggle, but it would have been in support of the liberation struggle. And in 1970, when people here had hardly heard of the ANC, well, they hadn't heard of the ANC, that was really dramatic. And then we had to lobby the trade unions, you see, and where there were block votes, and the MPs and so on, and we got it through. And what's terribly interesting is that I thought at the time, being very young and rather ... that things were going to change the next day.

And I looked around for an MP who would be willing to be interviewed on this issue, and Stuart Weir, this man who was on the *Sunday Times* Diary, said he would run a piece and he would do an interview. And I couldn't find an MP at that time who would be willing to come out in support. I mean they found it was all too radical, and there were loads of MPs who supported us, but they didn't want to be public. The only one who – I always found this very interesting – was the man who married Claire Short subsequently – Alex [Lyons] – I have forgotten his name, he is dead now, and he was much more of a Christian left-winger, and he agreed to be interviewed. But I thought that was quite interesting. So the point is that we had odd journalists who supported us, and tried, and some succeeded. But Hugo Young, who declared a real interest and concern about Southern Africa, had a real discussion with me at the time too, about the campaign on investment and the withdrawal of investment. He didn't agree with it – he did subsequently, but not then. So your question is really, what did we do, what was our strategy? I think that certainly to cultivate particular journalists, which we did quite effectively, I think, and then to present ourselves in unexpected and imaginative ways on issues. And then just to prepare material where we – we didn't produce all that much material actually during my time – but what we did was to be effective and to the point and argue our case, which we did very well. And Defence and Aid was a great resource then, because they had the time and the money and the people to do the research that was absolutely crucial. Our links with South Africa were very tenuous, they became much stronger later on, but our connection with the ANC here, with SACTU [South African Congress of Trade Unions], with the trade union movement and so on, was very close. And we produced as much material and circulated it, you know, information, as widely as we could. I am sure there is lots more to say, but let's get on.

*HT: This symbolic strategy is extremely interesting. I heard from other people that you were very influential in setting up those things in the late '60s and early '70s. I wonder was that continued after you left. I mean in the '80s a lot of movements started to do in public these kind of symbolic actions – Greenpeace and so on ...*

E de K: Yes, I think they did. I think it took a long time in Anti-Apartheid before that started to happen. But it does take a long time, I mean when you start running an organisation like that, and it was, just as Defence and Aid was too, a very effective organisation. It may have looked chaotic, certainly in my time, and I think in Mike's time too, but it was very very effective, and I've always made a tremendous sort of focus on the voluntary assistance we had. You know, when we started to produce *Anti-Apartheid News*, which was, I haven't mentioned, a big factor in getting across. And *Anti-Apartheid News*, if you look at all of the issues, is a very good newspaper on Southern Africa, and it came out unflinching, it came out ten times a year. And in the first years, we used to run down the three stairs of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and lug up these big bundles of newspapers, and then we got in about ten or twelve volunteers who used to sit there till midnight wrapping it. You see it was all very basic during those years. Afterwards you – like here we don't send out appeals, we have a mailing house who does it, it's all different now, we have computers. We used to use stencils, and when we were burgled, as we were quite often, or threatened or something like that, they used to take the most idiotic things, I mean things that were public, that we sent out. And when we were threatened, we all had a technique – my technique was when people rang me in the

middle of the night and said that there is a bomb in the building, I said 'You have got the wrong number'. It was a different time, but the volunteers made an enormous contribution, absolutely enormous, and there was a spirit, because people were genuinely, those that were convinced were genuinely convinced, and there was a good feeling of people working together on an issue that was worth opposing. And I am sure you will find English people who were volunteers in those days who really miss it. Being active now is much more complex.

*HT: So getting across AA News, was it read mainly by members?*

E de K: Mainly by members.

*HT: What was the purpose, what was your address?*

E de K: The purpose was to get the information across, and it was binding, yes, and the person who was much more the driving force there is Anne. But she left and other people took over, Christabel Gurney, Margaret Ling, Alex Mitchell, this chap I've told you on the *Sunday Times* and there was a wonderful woman called Nancy White, who died very suddenly a short while ago, who used to typeset it and used to work with me in Anti-Apartheid, and was very English, really fervent on this issue. It was not a symbol, it was a source of information. It kept members up to date, and the local committee structure throughout made a lot of use of it. People would sell it in the street, if they were taking bulk orders, and it had to be subsidised of course, always, but it was a very very powerful resource in terms of information. We used to send it out to journalists, we used to send it to trade unions and to political parties ...

*HT: What about teachers?*

E de K: At one stage we started, I mean that's what I did in Defence and Aid, we started to work on a kit for schools, but we didn't get very far. Yes, we thought about this. Certainly we worked with the teachers unions, yes, and we worked with, one of the main things, one of the services we offered, which people had to pay for the fares, was speakers. When I first went to work in Anti-Apartheid as a volunteer, that is what I did, you organised speakers for meetings. And you needed sometimes to organise ten a week – you had to find ten speakers, and you couldn't always do that. We were fortunate, if you can call it that, in that there were a lot of South African exiles who were willing to speak and that wonderful woman who was so tragically killed, Ruth First, was here, and we used to ask her to speak at the Labour Party conference, at the Liberal Assembly, certainly in my time we used her a lot. Afterwards she was in Mozambique teaching, but she was a great asset, and there were others. But there were so many aspects of the work, if you look at any annual report, certainly from about 1967, say, onwards, you can see the range of work. It was really, for a very small office, which we were, it was pretty unusual, because everybody worked very hard, and it was driven.

*HT: In James Sanders' book you are quoted saying that the image of respectability was very important all along for the AAM. And I guess that this strategy of recruiting VIPs was a part of that.*

E de K: That's right, that's entirely what it was about, because, I mean, I gave evidence in Peter Hain's trial, his first trial, for three days, when they tried to make me a co-conspirator. And I hadn't read the book, which was very lucky, because I could express shock, horror at the fact that we were omitted so many times, and I think it helped him quite a lot, he got off on that one. The thing was, yes, we were respectable, we were the sober face, so that we weren't going to do anything – we wanted to keep our MPs with us. I mean I remember once having this great idea, that we would get MPs to occupy South Africa House.

*HT: That happened in Sweden actually.*

E de K: Well, I got about three who were totally persuaded, and then a man who is still around, he was an MP, Ben Whittaker, told them they were mad. And I went to the House of Commons absolutely outraged, for I was convinced that we were going to do this. And we did do it actually, but not with MPs and the ... I felt that they had to make a protest, they couldn't be seen, as they were seen and indeed were to a certain extent, as collaborating with this dreadful regime. In the end they all withdrew and I think they thought I was a real subversive and not doing them any good. But we started a – we did a series, we occupied South Africa House, and Ronald Segal was very good and very central to a subsequent occupation of the Foreign Office on the Rhodesian issue. And then we also occupied Rhodesia House, and then people climbed – when you talk about the methods we used to attract attention – people climbed a sort of pinnacle at the top of Rhodesia House, and stuck us up a flag there. You know we did – now none of that had anything to do with the Anti-Apartheid Movement, officially...

*HT: Ah, digging up the cricket ...*

E de K: Just like with Peter and the disruption of the grounds – we had nothing to do with direct action, but our members were all involved ...

*HT: I see.*

E de K: You see, and it was on the face of it, we were not going to, because the MPs wouldn't agree to it. I mean there was a famous case when we were picketing the Ministry of Defence, and one of us – and I mean I didn't know – threw a stink bomb,<sup>1</sup> and everybody went mad, and David Steel, who was then the head of the Liberal Party, and is now something in Scotland under the devolved Parliament, wrote me a stinking letter. How could I have allowed this to happen when he was involved in this picket? And it was that sort of thing that we wanted to avoid.

*HT: Were things still planned, I mean were you sometimes sitting in the office thinking out certain actions?*

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<sup>1</sup> Two AAM demonstrators threw smoke flares at P W Botha when he visited the Ministry of Defence in 1971.

E de K: I was certainly involved heavily in the sit-ins, oh very. I mean I was ringing the press, but from a public callbox, you see. And I brought a lot of the people to involve them the event, I remember. I couldn't go myself because the police knew me, but George Melly is reported to have walked up the stairs – have you been in the Foreign Office in this country? – very grand building, singing 'Ain't Misbehaving'. Humour is what we lacked, I am sure, very lacking in humour, ponderous.

*HT: That is also a media strategy then, the appointing of VIPs?*

E de K: Oh, yes, yes, oh no, that we used all the time, VIPs. We did that – whether we did – we did a range of things. I mean as I talk I remember all sorts of things that we were involved in. We used the presence of sort of well-known people in theatre, in pop groups, MPs, trade unionists, all of them, everyone, and of course we had a very powerful asset. On the cultural boycott, for instance, we had support from playwrights that was absolutely articulate and clued up and very impressive. I mean you didn't have to write the letters for them, they wrote their own letters, David Mercer and Edward Bond, and John McGrath, I don't think you know them, who were very well-known playwrights in this country, Harold Pinter himself, and so on. But then I have always had a great interest in the arts, and when I first went into the Anti-Apartheid Movement, my strong feeling, I think it changed afterwards, was that most of the members of the Anti-Apartheid Executive really saw the arts as the occupation of the lower orders, certainly not something that you involve in politics. And it's always been my view, and it is today, that getting the arts involved in whatever you are doing on issues like that is crucially important. It's a great asset to whatever campaign, and also I think, enlightening for the artists, and when we did, for instance, the campaigns on trying to prevent the unions showing television, the ACTT [Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians], for actors to go to South Africa and stuff like that, they got a lot of public attention, more than anything else. But of course at the heart of our campaigns, I mean I would say the main campaigns, the ones that we saw were the big ones were the arms embargo and disinvestment, and banks, the End Loans to Southern Africa, the banks, which was another organisation I haven't mentioned

*HT: Which one?*

E de K: End Loans to Southern Africa, which was really important and you know the contribution that people made. It's sad because everybody, not everybody, but lots of people, are looking for a sort of recognition of their role, and we forget – I know that Donald Woods, who was the editor in that film, *Cry Freedom*, which was really about Steve Biko, Donald Woods played quite a role in America in getting Congress to stop loans to South Africa and to get the banks out and so on. You know, these were really very important contributions. But to do a really comprehensive picture, you need much more time than you have got, and your issue is not the same ...

*HT: When there were events reported by the media, of course there was Sharpeville, the Soweto uprising and so on, did it have a particular significance in the sense that it made it easier for you to work?*

E de K: Unfortunately, well not unfortunately, Sharpeville was long before my time and Soweto was after, and I thought that was what was the great challenge during my time, because there wasn't visibly much happening in Southern Africa, and we had to struggle to get stories in, we really did. I mean Denis Herbstein, for instance, was very helpful on one political trial, that was the Pretoria Six or something – this was – who were the people – it was Moumbaris, a Frenchman. Oh God, who were the six in the trial? Anyway, there was a flat in London that the South African Special Branch had raided and I was given this information, and Denis Herbstein – we told it to him and he ran the story,

*HT: He showed it to me. It was Joe Slovo ...*

E de K: It was Joe who told us, but Denis came into the office and Joe was there.

*HT: What about the Olympic Games in 1968, there was some media attention around that?*

E de K: Yes, Abdul Minty, who is now in the South African Foreign Office, I used always because he was an Indian, and being conscious, despite what I say, of the need to show that we had black involvement, I always used to ask him – he was our Honorary Secretary, and remained so until the Movement shut up shop – to represent us. And I think he went along and lobbied. And we were then working, there were other sports organisations, quite apart from Stop the Seventy Tour and that kind of stuff we were involved in. The first campaign that I organised for the Anti-Apartheid Movement was on cricket. And we produced a whole lot of green stickers and went around Lords sticking them on. I had a Mini Minor then and I drove Anne, who was in Anti-Apartheid then and our Deputy Foreign Minister now, Aziz Pahad, and his brother Essop Pahad, and I was supposed to drive and they were supposed to go round and stick on these things and we all got arrested. I never forget that, and we had big posters. Sport was always one of the most effective campaigns. Certainly Peter Hain made a great contribution, but it was, I don't know if you have read his latest book. It's worth a read, and he sent it to me in manuscript and I read it, and I did point out that Anti-Apartheid should have much more credit. I mean he did a great job, I don't want to take – but I mean all these things are – so many people contribute, and so many factors contribute, that it is very hard to just say it was one thing. You know, you use the figurehead and he was a brilliant figurehead. But Abdul was often on the television and he was very interested in the sports campaign and worked with Dennis Brutus, Chris de Broglio and SANROC [South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee], and that was the Olympic thing, and it still exists to this day in South Africa. The chap who subsequently represented SANROC has got a big position now in the sports thing in South Africa. But we were active on all those fronts – I can't remember in detail what we did on the Olympic thing at that time.

*HT: Before we leave the media, is there anything else you want to say about that?*

E de K: I want to ask Bruce [Page], but just to be accurate, if he is around, or Anne I suppose, one of them. I think I'll ask Bruce – he is writing a book at the moment on Rupert Murdoch.

[Phone conversation]

E de K: I was just asking – the Sunday Times or the Sunday Observer had a picture of our re-enactment in Trafalgar Square right across the front page and I think one of them, yes that would have been the 23rd of 1970.

*HT: How would you characterise the relations between the state, or the governments, during your period?*

E de K: I should think, in terms, we had a Tory government for most of it, we had a Labour government and there were, I mean, I think our expectations of the Labour government were way off beam, of that Labour government, certainly. I remember we had a famous occasion at a National Committee meeting, when they were sending the British navy to Simonstown, during the apartheid era, and we were protesting at this, to a Labour government. And we had a meeting of our National Committee in the House of Commons, and Ronald Segal was so angry that he got up – he is a very powerful speaker when he gets moving – and he said that we now had to ensure that all the Labour Party members who were members of the government and who were members of the Anti-Apartheid Movement should be expelled for this action – which meant that Barbara Castle, who was the first President of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, would be expelled, and this made the papers the next day. And of course it caused a great consternation and Abdul Minty had, in his excellent way, to reconstitute the National Committee so that we could reverse that resolution. But I think we were very close to a lot of members of parliament, mostly Labour, some Liberal and a few Tories. We always sort of made a great play of trying link up with any Tory that had shown interest in the opposition to their official position. I mean even now that I work in this Trust which I set up, I am very pleased to have Peter Bottomley as one of our sponsors. He's a Tory MP, and had a great interest in South Africa and was opposed to apartheid – there were a few Tory MPs who were opposed to apartheid. So we used to make a great play, and certainly on the Namibian issue, because there was real illegality there, I mean South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal.

*HT: Would you go to the Foreign Office? Did they receive you?*

E de K: Oh, yes, all of that. That was done all the time. We made representations to the Foreign Office, we wrote to the government ministers on any particular issue, whether it was an arms issue or whether it was the economy, or on whatever was going on in South Africa. I mean British capital really resurrected South Africa after the last war, from everything I read, and was really central in maintaining it.

*HT: Did you ask for funding?*

E de K: No.

*HT: I mean, would you have taken it?*



E de K: I don't think so. I think that we were reluctant to take funding from any government because that would have impugned our integrity. And I think there was some talk at some stage with some African governments, whether they would help us. But we struggled. And that's the other thing, that I used to do quite a lot of, was bloody fundraising, which was a nightmare. But I remember once going into the Anti-Apartheid office on a Saturday morning and we hadn't paid anybody's salary, and I think I was earning £10 a week at the time, and I went up and everybody else was earning £8 or 9 or 7 but nothing very much, and we couldn't pay people. I mean it wasn't my responsibility, it was the responsibility of the Executive, but I took it upon me, I was going mad. And when I left Anti-Apartheid I was paid £30 a week, and I opened the post and there was a cheque for £2,000 pounds. I really thought that that was kind of miraculous. I even remember to this day who gave it to us, somebody had left money and that was the late 60s and it was much more money than it is now. During the Tory government, I sat on Labour Party committees on Southern Africa – we worked very closely. Somehow you were more offended by the attitude of Labour ministers who had been very vocal in opposition. Of course Margaret Thatcher, during her time, was almost beyond belief in her attitude and what she did and said, and the fact that she described the ANC as a terrorist organisation, and they were outrageous. They were absolutely so obviously entrenched in their position and support of white supremacy's role in Southern Africa that we were extremely angry and we showed this. But every issue – I mean I wasn't there then, but when I was there, and I'm just trying to think – we had both – who was in charge? Certainly we presented, one of the things that I recalled, we made a great representation on the Simonstown Agreement to a committee in Parliament, and I think, and of course we liked to think, that it had an effect. Whether it did or not, I don't know. But it was part of an accumulation of a number of things that were done, protesting at their going to Simonstown at the time. We also made representations – Vella, for instance, had a large hand in this – on the economy, on the business of withdrawal of investment, and the fact that we got it accepted as a mission, we felt was an achievement, that we were making some progress on this issue. Yes, I mean that was part of what we were there to do, to try and influence government in terms of its attitude and behaviour towards South Africa, apartheid South Africa, and to try and get people in this country to pressure government. So we often would have campaigns that you write to your MP or, I mean, I hated pictures of myself, but there is one that exists of me kneeling down at Downing Street to pick up all these petitions that we were taking into No. 10 – all that sort of thing. On the arms embargo, when Abdul went to the Commonwealth's heads of governments meeting in Singapore, we did a campaign and in six weeks we collected over a 100,000 signatures calling for an arms embargo against South Africa. You have to remember Harold Wilson promised, and of course then backtracked, as they all did. I am sure there's tons of stuff.

*HT: On fundraising, you wouldn't take money from governments – who else did you?*

E de K: Well, we used to try and raise money. We had a membership system, so people paid, and we always asked for donations, and this, unlike us here, in this organisation [BDAF], we raise money to give away. In Anti-Apartheid you raised it to keep yourself and produce material and to campaign. I must say we never worried about money when we started a campaign. We worked on the assumption that the campaign would raise the

money. And we were always in debt, but not uncontrollable. One of the things that happened in 1970, as a result of that concert at the Lyceum, was that I got representation from a big advertising agency, Doyle Dane and Bernbach, and this chap called Malcolm Gluck – do you read the *Guardian*? – he is the wine correspondent now. He was the copywriter at Doyle Dane and Bernbach. And he brought up six people to the office, to me, and he said, 'Look, we are going to work for you for nothing, and we are going to redesign your material, and we are going to do all this work that you need to do'. Well of course I thought it was a great idea, but my colleagues – corruption setting in, capitalism showing its ugly head. And I said, 'Well you know, we have got to get through to people'. And he did a series of posters for us which were absolutely brilliant. And he did a poster for us on the sports campaign, which has gone down in history. It's in everything. There is a – it's a picture of a riot in Durban, I think, in the '50s, it was called the Cato Manor riot, and the picture is of a policeman with his back to the camera and his arm raised with a sjambok in his hand, and this big crowd in front of him. And Malcolm had written the caption: 'If you could see their national sport, you might be less keen to see their cricket'. Absolutely brilliant! And he did a whole series, and they all treated him, all my colleagues in Anti-Apartheid, as if he was definitely out to undermine us. And really it was a great asset. And you talk about fundraising, because I remember ringing him up one night about 1 o'clock in despair, because we had no money, and we were in the middle of a big campaign on investment. And I had got Ronald Segal's house in the country, and we were going to try to do a fundraising event there, charging the astronomical sum of £20 at the time, and I hadn't sold any tickets or anything and I said, 'Malcolm, what am I going to do?' And the next day, he delivered up to the office the most beautiful tickets, on thick card, on poles. You bought the ticket, you didn't have to go to the event. And I must say, everything we did worked, they were all successful. And we used to organise fundraising events, so we had concerts, poetry readings. mixing the politics and the fundraising, and doing all sorts of things like that. I am trying to think who gave us money – people – I think the UN, Mr Reddy, he subsequently gave a lot of money to the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

*HT: So I have a question, when you were working in the Defence and Aid Fund I guess you knew that Sweden was funding ... did you know to what extent Sweden? Did you also know about the secret support to ANC also?*

E de K: I knew that the Swedes supported the ANC. I didn't know to what extent, but even though I actually worked within the ANC afterwards when I left Anti-Apartheid, I was a member of a couple of committees, including the Logistics Committee, and at that stage very few people in this country knew about the ANC. And we had, this would have been in the late '70s, and we started a campaign of producing leaflets and stuff like that, and also going on visits, and because we had a lot of connections with the churches, and different bodies – we used to take money from the churches sometimes, and certainly they helped on campaigns, they were very very ... . I lost my thread, the Nordic countries generally, and Sweden in particular, were always known, though I know that this is not entirely true, to have had a position on South Africa and on Southern Africa in general which was at odds and in great contrast to that of the West generally. When I was in IDAF, I knew that their support of IDAF was spectacular. And as the Executive Secretary of Anti-Apartheid I would go to events organised by IDAF, and I met all sorts of

people from Sweden. Somehow it didn't impinge to a great degree on the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and though we had some connections and there was some correspondence, I don't think we had this all developed. But I knew that they were very sympathetic to the ANC and that they helped a lot on IDAF, and in fact in the final year, in 1992, the British Defence and Aid, of which I was the Director, didn't close until '94, and we opposed the closure of IDAF in '92. But in '92 their budget was £11 million, of which the Swedes contributed £5 million. And I must say, for what it's worth, I don't think, I don't think that Sweden thinks that it's worth very much, which is a pity, but there were people who were thinking the whole world of those countries. I mean now we know better, in the sense that we know that there was collaboration, and I have read all about that, but the fact that they had such an enlightened attitude put the Nordic countries in a category, for some people, that no other country occupied – we used to hold them in a kind of sacred corner ...

*HT: So I want to move to the last question, which is of a different kind. How would you define solidarity from your own point of view?*

E de K: Well, it's actually quite a delicate question, and from my point of view, and I have been throughout fairly honest, probably not comprehensive, because I can't remember it all, and I didn't prepare myself, but I felt that solidarity is a limited experience. You see, I suspect that you think that it's, that sort of it sparks off, as a chain reaction and sort of brings in new things, and brings in other organisations and makes connections and all that kind of thing. And I think it does make connections, but when I was working in the Anti-Apartheid Movement, I saw our role as in support of, and when people said practical things like, 'Why don't we buy premises?' or 'Why don't we ...?' – anything to suggest a kind of permanency, I was opposed. I thought our role here is not to set up our own outfit, it is to do everything, explore every avenue, to expose what is going on in Southern Africa and try and contribute towards change, inasmuch as you can contribute from outside the country. Other people didn't see it my way, and I am not sure that they weren't more correct than I was. To me, it would corrupt the original impulse, the original intention, the original object, if you used it more widely, than what you said it was for, if you will excuse that convoluted sentence. But I see now that that is a limiting thing, because the Anti-Apartheid Movement in its – but certainly I can only speak for the time that I was there, but ten years is a long time – was a great learning process, I think, not only for the people who worked in it or were involved in it, but particularly, I think, for the large number of volunteers who were there, and of course more widely through its campaigns in the country generally. And it is important, I think, now for people to explore ways of making those connections afterwards. I think that some of those people have retained an interest in South Africa. Some of them have been quite disillusioned with what has taken place; some of them continue to try and help, but they have a link, you know, and some of them because of their experience, whether in local committees or local authorities who were involved, who missed that sense of people working together for a common purpose, that was justified, it was something that they didn't have to defend. I think that they will turn their interests and energies to other interests that are connected, and heaven knows that there are enough issues that should engage them even when AAM is not there. But my view of solidarity at that time was that we do not think of using the base that we have established in the AAM to sprout, either another

organisation or other things, we do not corrupt its purpose. It's there, you see here, in this organisation here, because I feel so strongly about Southern Africa, I am sure that education is the key to the transformation and change in South Africa, and obviously our contribution is small, but it's not insignificant. And I feel that it is something that we can do and therefore I try and do it. But I don't think it's got anything to do with Anti-Apartheid, now everybody has gotten interested in the Anti-Apartheid Movement and I am very curious why that interest is so limited, because it doesn't extend to Defence and Aid, and I think that Defence and Aid was such an extraordinary organisation. You are just nodding your head politely, you don't believe what I am saying?

*HT: Yeah, I do believe, I mean I have been talking to Per Wästberg. He is emphasising that very much. No, I mean I am interested in the anti-apartheid movement in a broader sense, I mean I think, there is always this confusion, because when you talk about the anti apartheid movement in Swedish, you would mean the whole spectrum, but when you say the anti apartheid movement here, you are talking about the organisation ...*

E de K: But you shouldn't be, because I stress again that the Anti-Apartheid Movement was not the only organisation. It was certainly the dominant organisation, but there were loads of other movements, at that time, during the '70s and '80s, that were concerned and very active on the South African issues, and some were very effective, like End Loans to Southern Africa, which was a tiny organisation, but it did a very good job. But there were loads, I mean if you sat down and drew up a list, there was the white men who would refuse to join the South African army, who were over here, and producing a very good journal, one of the best actually. Anyway, I am not going to keep you ...

*HT: OK, thank you very much for taking your time.*

