

**Interview with Enuga S Reddy, Secretary of the UN Committee Against Apartheid,
by Håkan Thörn, 21 June 2000, reproduced on the Anti-Apartheid Movement
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Håkan Thörn: You were born in 1924 – but where?

E S Reddy: South India, near Madras.

HT: You mentioned that your father was involved in the Indian independence movement. Could you say a few more words about that and about how you got involved with the UN. When we met last time you said you considered yourself as an activist, but you chose to work from inside an institution. Can you say how that started?

ESR: My father was a supporter of Gandhi. He was the Chairman of the Congress Party in my town for many years. In 1940 or '41 he went to prison for three months for the Gandhian movement – it was called individual satyagraha. The town was about 84 miles north of Madras. My mother was also interested. At one time when Gandhi came to our village she gave all her jewellery as a gift to Gandhi – he was collecting funds. I myself got interested. I was in the student movement in Madras, and came to the United States to study. I was highly political because of the Indian national movement. And in 1946 there was Indian passive resistance in South Africa. A South African delegation came here and India raised the issue in the United Nations. I was trying to follow developments. There was a Council on African Affairs here which had a library. I used to go there to read about the movement. Then when the matter came to the General Assembly and the delegation came, there was a reception for them. I met the delegation from South Africa, which was led by the President of the African National Congress, Dr Xuma, and included Indians. They decided to organise a demonstration outside the South African consulate and I took some Indian students to join the demonstration. So I got involved in South Africa. I was a little bit interested in South Africa when I was a student in India, but when I came here because of the passive resistance and the Council on African Affairs I became much more involved. In 1949 I was broke so I took a job in the UN. The job was research – a very low level job – research on Middle East and Africa, which included South Africa. So it suited me very well. Then I was changed to Far East. Then in 1963 when the Special Committee [on South Africa] was set up I was asked if I would be the Assistant Secretary. I said no, because I didn't agree with the person they had in mind for Secretary. But when the Western powers boycotted the committee, he didn't want to be Secretary any more – nobody wanted to be Secretary – so they offered me the job. I said yes, because first of all psychologically I was very much interested in the struggle in South Africa. But apart from that, in 1961 when Lumumba was killed there was a big psychological divide in the UN between those who were for Lumumba and those who were for Hammarskjöld. Behind this was the white–black divide. Somebody asked me – maybe we should resign from the UN. I didn't think that was the right thing – I thought we should do the best we could inside the UN. So in

1963 when I was appointed Secretary of the committee, my mind was very much on what I could do from inside the UN. I wanted to prove myself partly because of this whole psychological feeling. So I did things that nobody in the UN would have thought of doing. If people knew what I was doing in terms of contacts with the liberation movement and the anti-apartheid movement I would have got into trouble constantly and might have been thrown out of the job. But I managed, partly because I had the protection of the committee. The committee was boycotted by the West and I had a very good relationship with the Chairman of the committee.

HT: About the committee – you said it was boycotted by the Western countries. What did that mean?

ESR: In general, people thought it would have no power, no prestige in the UN. That's why nobody wanted to be secretary. A lot of people didn't even want to be members. Before the first meeting I sent a message to U Thant, the Secretary-General, saying that now the Western powers had not joined the committee, people thought it was useless. But I suggested to him that he should personally open the first meeting of the committee. And he was very committed against apartheid. He used to be the delegate of Burma before he became Secretary-General and there was a non-aligned committee on South Africa – he was the Chairman. He had met Oliver Tambo and others before. So he had very strong feelings on South Africa. So he opened the first meeting and he always showed a great interest in the committee. The Western powers didn't only not want to join, but they didn't want to deal with it. But we used the boycott to the best advantage, because the committee was completely united. We had no opposition, so we could act much more dynamically. The Chairman could have confidence. He would be given freedom. He could issue statements by himself. So the committee could act almost like an anti-apartheid movement – it was not a debating committee. That was an advantage – so it became a lobby for the liberation struggle in a sense. The committee's first meeting was on 2 April [1963]. In May there was the first successful summit conference of African states in Addis Ababa and the Organisation of African Unity was established. So we made an urgent report to the General Assembly about the repression in South Africa. I think about 2 May. And immediately the Chairman flew to Addis Ababa and he was made the Chairman of the Political Committee. They passed a very good resolution on South Africa and endorsed fully the report of the Special Committee. In fact nobody saw the report because it was not available yet, but they endorsed it all the same. So when the OAU was formed, for the first time Africa, which was so much divided, got united. Then the other countries had to respond. The OAU endorsed the Special Committee and took up the same line. Especially the United States, which was a major power, and Canada was the President. Very soon we got a call from [Adlai] Stevenson's office that he wanted to see the Chairman of the committee. Then we got a letter that the United States was very much concerned about apartheid, that it wanted to do its best – but not this way [i.e. through sanctions]. They had decided to announce an [arms] embargo. So within six months we found that when we went to the General Assembly the United States praised the Special Committee – everyone praised the Special

Committee. It became very popular. But the Western powers didn't join the committee – ever. But we were able to meet with them, have dialogue with them, get things done by them. At one time the Nordic countries were prepared to join the committee if some others would join. But they themselves advised us – why do you press us to join? We can make resolutions and have good relations, so it was decided not to press them.

HT: What countries were on the committee?

ESR: The committee started with 11 countries and then expanded. At the beginning it was African countries, Asian countries, then we had Hungary from Eastern Europe, and Costa Rica and Haiti from Latin America.

HT: How did you deal with the principle of sovereignty? That was one of the founding principles of the UN.

ESR: The African states decided to call for the expulsion of South Africa, complete sanctions against South Africa. The General Assembly resolution in 1962, which had a two-thirds majority, called for a break in diplomatic relations with South Africa and that the Security Council should consider expulsion of South Africa. We could not get expulsion through the Security Council because of the veto. But the position of the Special Committee was that it should be expelled. The African states wanted it to be expelled. The Asian states publicly agreed with that but they were concerned about the universality and the repercussions and so on. But they didn't come out opposing the African states. So from about 1965 or 1966 the African states would make a statement challenging the credentials of South Africa, and in 1970 the credentials were formally challenged by the African states and they asked the Credentials Committee to report. The Credentials Committee said South Africa's credentials would not be accepted. But then there was a ruling by the President – Hambro from Norway – that in practice this was only a strong warning. They would continue to sit. We didn't want to create a crisis in the UN. In 1974 Algeria was President and they ruled that there was persistent violation of the Charter and resolutions of the UN and that meant that South Africa should leave the Assembly. So they were no more entitled to the privileges of membership. They were in effect suspended, although not formally in terms of the Charter. Since then we had no South Africa in the General Assembly. And I think in 1973 or 1974 we started passing resolutions that the South African Government does not represent the people, the authentic representatives of the people were the liberation movements. So in a sense we derecognised South Africa as a state and recognised the liberation movements. So we never had to deal with South Africa as a state from the point of view of the Special Committee. The committee did not even seek the cooperation of South Africa. At the time of the Rivonia trial we sent a letter to the Secretary-General to appeal to South Africa not to impose the death sentence. So the Secretary-General talked to South Africa. Later, when there was a group of experts on South Africa – Mrs Alva Myrdal, they wrote to the Secretary-General saying they would like to visit South Africa and South Africa refused.

HT: So can you say that the UN had a double function: on the one hand, it was an international organisation and in that sense was subject to the power structure of the international community; but on the other hand, it was a global organisation and in that sense it was not mainly dealing through the nation states. So the Special Committee interacted directly with the NGOs. You were early in the UN to establish this. Can you develop a bit on how you dealt with the NGOs and states at the same time?

ESR: By about 1965 we recognised that we were not getting anywhere on sanctions. We got a limited arms embargo from the United States and Britain, but they were not able to move any further. Once I was in a seminar with the Head of the South Africa Section in the State Department and the question came up. He said 'Look, there is no constituency for action against South Africa. There is no active big lobby with a lot of votes on South Africa.' It made me start thinking – that our job is to create a constituency. How do we create a constituency? I am talking from a personal angle. So in 1965 I talked to [name inaudible] from the Secretary-General's office, the alternate delegate from Nigeria, and said the UN should do more information activity and propaganda to counteract South Africa. So we should have a radio programme, publications, etc. So this was approved. But then we had to think about the bureaucratic processes, so we got into publications. Then we had anti-apartheid movements who wanted to come to the Special Committee, so we invited anti-apartheid movements to come and speak. And then we started writing to the anti-apartheid movements, sending them our publications, reports and speeches and general appeals that everyone should do things based on the General Assembly resolutions, denouncing the Western powers. So our anchor is in the anti-apartheid movements, encouraging them to do more to attack their governments, because the UN is already condemning them. This process continued. The anti-apartheid movements were invited to conferences. If the Western powers were there they could come and denounce them in front of them, which did happen in some conferences. Sometimes they were elected as officers of the conferences or seminars, so they were treated as respected guests and invitees. If it was some other issue it would have been regarded as crass interference in internal affairs, but in this case there were not too many protests. The Western countries had democratic traditions, so they didn't bother us very much because there was a very strong general feeling against apartheid. No government wanted to stop us promoting anti-apartheid feeling. So we had a lot of leeway – until Reagan came to power in the United States. Then they wanted to stop the activities of the UN. That was the first time there was strong pressure by the United States in terms of General Assembly votes and so on. Before that, there was no strong pressure except on the question of expulsion.

HT: But was that pressure directly aimed at the committee?

ESR: They couldn't stop the committee because they didn't have a majority. But we knew that the United States was very much against us – they paid for the budget and so on. Before that there was no condemnation of our activities by any government.

HT: They opposed you supporting the NGOs by giving them possibilities to meet?

ESR: Nobody opposed it. The only kind of opposition was if a country was attacked. For instance, Abdul Minty made a statement in which Germany was attacked for nuclear collaboration with South Africa, we published the statement. But the Germans were very sensitive about nuclear collaboration, so they were furious. They went to other NATO countries to ask them to stop contributing to our publicity fund and so on. In another case we published a statement that Italy was involved in manufacturing aircraft for South Africa, so Italy went to the acting head of the department to put pressure. Once we had a meeting of the committee and we put up British Anti-Apartheid Movement posters, so the British demanded an explanation. So there were a lot of times when there was pressure on me. But otherwise we were given a very large amount of freedom because most people were against apartheid. I don't think, looking back, that all those condemnations in the resolutions were quite fair, it was not that simple.

HT: What were the most important contacts that you had, at the NGO level and at the state level?

ESR: First of all, the liberation movements, and anti-apartheid movements, particularly in the United States, Britain and the Western European countries and governments, the Nordic countries very much. The Netherlands also came quite forward but we didn't have close relations until later. Sweden was ahead – but it so happened that the Special Committee starting from 1963/64 there was a group of experts and Mrs Myrdal was Chair and I was Secretary and through that I developed contacts with the Swedish government. I had more personal contacts with Sweden. Later I had contacts with Norway – later I became as close to Norway as to Sweden. Then in the committee itself we had to be on the right side with the Soviet Union because they were supporting the liberation movements – and East Germany – and they were members of the committee. So the governments were the Nordic countries, the Communist countries, apart from the major African countries, and the anti-apartheid movements, mainly from Western Europe.

HT: So in the case of Sweden and the Nordic countries it seems as if you had closer contacts on the government level. In the case of Britain it was the other way round.

ESR: I have visited Sweden many times, maybe 20 times. The first time was 1966. Whenever I went to Sweden I would meet the government, the Socialist Party and the trade unions. But for a long time there was no anti-apartheid movement as such that I would go and see – until much later, with the Africa Groups. I would see the IUEF [Inter-University Exchange Fund] but their headquarters were in Geneva. So my visits to Sweden were not so much to meet any committee on anti-apartheid. In Norway much later there was a Council on South Africa, but I don't remember seeing them. After ISAK was formed we had contacts with them. But much of my work was with the government

because we were talking about assistance. There was a very frank discussion like with friends. With the ISAK I explained to them that we should not criticise the government in public, and they briefed me about what they were doing. But with the Anti-Apartheid Movement in London it was a very different thing – it was almost like discussion with the liberation movement.

HT: Could you say a bit more about how you approached Scandinavia as a way of opening up the Western bloc? You said [at a previous meeting] that you could turn to the non-governmental groups to help create pressure on the government so that they would be in favour of some resolutions.

ESR: I realised by '64 when I started working with Mrs Myrdal that it was possible to separate the Nordic countries from the major Western powers, who were the real problem. So we did work with the Nordic countries and slowly other smaller Western countries started joining with the Western countries. The Special Committee every year would have recommendations about acting on the sports boycott, the cultural boycott, ask governments to restrict issuing visas and cut down trade with South Africa. What do we do with this? If we just issue a report in the UN, basically no-one would pay any attention to it. So we sent these reports to the anti-apartheid movements and would issue a statement asking people to agitate for it and so on. We appealed to all NGOs to support these recommendations. To the extent that the UN had any prestige, they could go to public opinion and say 'We are speaking for the UN. Our government is not being loyal to the UN'. And it worked the other way round. Mike Terry once told me that there were moves to weaken the cultural boycott in Britain and that it would be useful if we could pass a strong resolution calling for a cultural boycott in the UN. So we got a resolution on the cultural boycott – and sent it to him. So how much effect did the Special Committee have in strengthening the anti-apartheid movements? I would say not too much in Britain where there was already an established anti-apartheid movement, or in Sweden. But in some of the smaller countries, like Australia, when they had the sports boycott against South Africa, the fact that they were under attack by the government, it was very effective, it gave them prestige. Because the governments were trying to say they were Communists or anarchists, but they could see that there were statements coming from the UN commending them for what they were doing. In Britain it was not so important, but it did help a little.

HT: In the case of England and Sweden, who made the first contact? Did you or did they?

ESR: Soon after we started in 1963 we got a letter from Abdul Minty, he was called S Abdul at that time, it was a pseudonym, saying that they would welcome cooperation with the UN Special Committee. So we completely ignored it – what was this organisation putting themselves as equal to sovereign governments, asking for cooperation? We had several petitions that year, but from Americans, because they were easily available. Bishop Reeves from Britain wanted to appear. We arranged for it,

he appeared before the General Assembly, but he was not at that time Chairman of Anti-Apartheid. Then Oliver Tambo was here for two or three months during the General Assembly and we met many times and became good friends. So in February 1964 I went on a mission to London and Geneva. Oliver Tambo wrote to me to say that a lot of people were very anxious to see me, and he introduced me to Canon Collins and a number of others, and he also felt that it was important that I should see the Anti-Apartheid Movement. He introduced me to the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Later in April the group of experts decided to visit Britain and at that time also I met the Anti-Apartheid Movement, much more when the sanctions conference was held. The sanctions conference was organised by the Anti-Apartheid Movement. I think that was where I met Abdul Minty. And Oliver Tambo told him that he should take care of me, and he told me that the Anti-Apartheid Movement was very important. So the real close contact starts from April 1964. But with Sweden, in terms of non-governmental organisations, much later, because I didn't go to Sweden until '66.

[Untranscribed text about contacts with Sweden]

HT: Is it fair to say that London was the centre of the anti-apartheid struggle outside South Africa – at least in terms of non-governmental activity?

ESR: In terms of non-governmental activity London was the centre for many reasons. Britain being the metropolitan country for South Africa, there was a relationship, and there was much more reporting and concern about South Africa in Britain, both positive and negative. So the Anti-Apartheid Movement was one of the first to be formed and it developed quite rapidly and got strong support – the Boycott Movement and so on. Thirdly, the news from South Africa came to London. When I went to London I could talk to them and I learned a lot more about what was happening in South Africa, the reporting was much better in Britain. Then the liberation movement was there. For a few years Oliver Tambo himself was there, and there was Robert Resha with him and many of the leaders of the liberation movement were there. Even after Oliver Tambo left, there was an ANC [African National Congress] office there and other people like Joe Slovo, Yusuf Dadoo and others, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement was working very closely with the liberation movement. Then, Britain being the main investor in South Africa and having the closest military relations, the work in Britain was much more important than other places. We used to argue sometimes. The British Anti-Apartheid Movement always thought of Britain as the main enemy, the main problem, and thought that the struggle in Britain was the most important. I myself felt that although it was true that Britain had more investments and a military relationship, the key was the United States, because it was a great power, and Britain was not so powerful, and the United States was much more influenced by the Cold War, so that change in the United States would be more important than a change in Britain. But we agreed that both were important.

In that sense Sweden was not important. Sweden had very little trade with South Africa and very little influence in South Africa. But later Sweden became very important

because of the scale of assistance from Sweden, not only for prisoners and scholarships they gave, but they gave to the liberation movement also quite a lot of money. The Soviet Union provided a lot of support, but they had a problem with foreign exchange, so they could not do so much – they gave in kind, scholarships and so on. But Sweden became a very important source of finance for the liberation movement. And when the real crisis came in 1984, when Mozambique signed an agreement with South Africa and things were very uncertain, maybe all the effort we put in was now of use. When I happened to meet Olaf Palme, he said he met Oliver recently – Oliver said things were very bad, but the spirit inside was very good, and Palme said 'We'll support them'. And in fact very soon Sweden started sending a lot of money to the groups inside South Africa to support the UDF [United Democratic Front] and others, and that clearly financed the whole internal struggle. It's not written about very much, Sweden has never publicised it that much, but that was, I think, crucial. Because it was not the armed struggle which made the change, the armed struggle as a supplementary form of struggle was important, but it was the mobilisation inside which forced the change – and sanctions. That mobilisation inside – it's not just money that mobilises, but money is important, and that was provided principally by Sweden and by the Nordic countries, so from 1984 Sweden was very important. The initiative came from Olaf Palme and the Socialist Party. The political support for the struggle inside came from '84. Before, there was some support for the black consciousness movement through the IUEF [Inter University Exchange Fund]. That was a disaster. But this support to the UDF and COSATU at a time after the Nkomati Agreement was crucial. Sweden was doing it already, they didn't need any pressure from us.

HT: I read somewhere in an AAM annual report early in the '60s that one of the purposes of the organisation was to support help to anti-apartheid activities all over the world. Was that a strategy that was formed in cooperation with you?

ESR: No, it was their own.

HT: Would you say that from the Swedish side, sometimes they felt that the British dominated the solidarity? Can you say something about that.

ESR: Britain was a crucial country. There was much more activity in those days, and with a special responsibility in Britain, in a sense. In the early days Britain was a place where you couldn't say all the country was anti-apartheid. Anti-apartheid was there, but also the opposition was there. In Sweden and the Nordic countries, from what I have heard, there was not that vested interest in the opposition, to fight. People from Britain – I think Abdul Minty – went to the Nordic countries to encourage anti-apartheid movements. So the British Anti-Apartheid Movement did play a much more important role internationally than the Swedish anti-apartheid movement. The jealousy was not really between the Nordic anti-apartheid movements and the British, it came up more between the Dutch and the British. What the reasons were for that I don't know, because the Dutch started on the oil embargo and separate international activity. The Anti-

Apartheid Movement was not so enthusiastic and so they [the Dutch] went to other groups in Britain to get support. But I am not aware of any Nordic complaints about the British Anti-Apartheid Movement. Abdul Minty used to travel to the Nordic countries very often, he had quite good relations personally.

HT: Can you reflect on what were the general conflicts and tensions within the anti-apartheid movement. It was an extremely broad movement and there were some areas of consensus, but there were conflicts. What were the most important dividing lines?

ESR: If you look at the anti-apartheid, not only the organisations called anti-apartheid, but in a very broad sense, then to some extent the tension was in relation to the leadership of Communists and their policy. It didn't come up too much. For instance, Romesh Chandra, President of the World Peace Council, made a statement that you cannot be anti-apartheid without being anti-imperialist, so the British Anti-Apartheid Movement was not very happy with the context in which the speech was made. But because the liberation movement was around, these tensions were largely avoided. For example, there were very bad relations between the Anti-Apartheid Committee in Holland and the Holland Committee on Southern Africa. The Anti-Apartheid Committee, I think, had more support from the Communists, and the Holland Committee from the Socialists, so between them they were hardly on speaking terms. But they both were loyal to the liberation movement, so the liberation movement would try, as much as they could, to avoid conflict between the two of them. So ultimately they informally decided a division of labour, the same with other international organisations. But there was another type of problem. For instance the ICFTU [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions] was against apartheid. The WFTU [World Federation of Trade Unions] was also against apartheid. But because of the Cold War between the movements the ICFTU would not sit with WFTU in a joint committee, so it took us three years to organise a trade union conference against apartheid. Finally we found out that it could be organised if we organised it with the ILO [International Labour Organisation] governing body and UN involvement, and we paid the costs and so on. The ILO governing body was totally dominated by the ICFTU, but through that sponsorship the conference took place. Then there were differences of opinion on certain things, for instance when this idea of codes of conduct came, there was the question of whether they should be supported, and whether we should try to make them stronger, or should they be denounced, as ways to justify investment. *Anti-Apartheid News* took a very strong position against these codes of conduct, some of the others didn't. But the Anti-Apartheid Movement itself had differences with some other groups in Britain. Probably they had internal differences of approach, but basically there has been a continuity of leadership in the Anti-Apartheid Movement – Abdul Minty, Vella Pillay and so on, so it didn't become too much of a problem, and of course the liberation movement was there as well. But other groups might come in, like for instance the Anti-Apartheid Movement was totally for withdrawal from South Africa and support for the liberation movement – and for them it was the ANC. Now the black consciousness people came in to Britain and asked for support, so it looked like they would be rivals to the liberation movement. So the Anti-Apartheid

Movement was quite against them. But they had some support and some contact. Then you had the problem with the two liberation movements – the ANC and PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress]. They were both represented on the National Committee of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, but quite often this was a nuisance because basically the Anti-Apartheid Movement was with the ANC. But now and again the PAC would raise objections in public and so on, and this would come up. PAC also had its supporters – a few in Britain, hardly any in other countries – in Holland they had a few. So that problem affected them. The Special Committee was going by the recommendation of the OAU [Organisation of African Unity], so both ANC and PAC were recognised, so the Special Committee organised a conference attended by both. And later, when we started giving money to the anti-apartheid movements to organise conferences, we had to consult about the organisation. The Special Committee used to take a position that both should be invited. So sometimes that created problems and the anti-apartheid movements didn't like the position of the Special Committee. So long as I was there I was able to find formulas to solve the problem, but after I left it became a problem.

HT: So in the United States there seems to have been more support for the black consciousness movement and for the PAC. Was that related to the general climate of anti-Communism in the States or was it related to racial tensions within the struggle?

ESR: Because of the Cold war in the 1960s, when people came out as refugees, the United States, the CIA, thought the ANC was dominated by the Communists, so they had a scholarship programme and brought people from Africa to here [the US]. If anyone was ANC they wouldn't get a scholarship here, they would go to the Soviet Union. So to get scholarships here they claimed to be PAC, but many of them were not really PAC. So it was a government position, not a public position. The main anti-apartheid movement was the American Committee on Africa, and that was close to the ANC.

[Untranscribed text about the USA]

HT: What about the churches? Were there tensions within the churches related to the Cold War and anti-Communism?

ESR: There was a big division at the time when the [World Council of Churches] Programme to Combat Racism was established because it meant giving assistance without any conditions, which might indirectly support violence. Around that time there was pressure on the churches to remove their investments from companies involved in South Africa. The churches also had trustees who also are from big business companies. That debate did not last very long in America because some of the American churchmen were also leaders in the Programme to Combat Racism.

[Untranscribed text about the American churches]

HT: What was the role of the Commonwealth? What were your relations with them?

ESR: We had a very good relationship with the Commonwealth, with the Commonwealth Secretariat we had very good relations. The Commonwealth after all was the first organisation from which South Africa was excluded. Later, the African Asian states, because their numbers were growing, were able to influence the Commonwealth into the right positions. Basically, after Ramphal became Secretary-General he was very much against apartheid, and he was a very close friend, so we used to meet very often. But the Commonwealth as an organisation of different governments, we didn't have so much contact with them in that context. We did not go to meetings because they were closed meetings. Nigeria was a member and Nigeria was our Chairman, so we kept in touch.

HT: And the Socialist International?

ESR: We got in touch with them rather late. We didn't quite realise – we had no contact. Maybe late '60s, early '70s, when Bernt Carlsson was Secretary-General, we got in touch with them. By that time I realised the importance of the Socialist International, that they were taking a position on Southern Africa, so I asked Bernt Carlsson to write a paper for us, which he did. After that I used to meet them often and we kept contact, and it was a very useful contact because they could have influence with the socialist parties and with many governments.

HT: When you organised conferences and meetings for the NGOs was that paid out of the UN Trust Fund?

ESR: No, the UN Trust Fund was purely for prisoners. Any conferences had to come out of the UN budget. At the beginning the committee was not a very important committee, and the Russians were against the budget, and the Russians headed my department, so it was very hard to get any money. After 1967 we started getting a little money for travel, and slowly it increased. So we had to put in the budget that we are going to have a conference and there was so much for travel, so much for interpretation, and then it had to go back to the committee, to the Budgetary Committee. Now the Russians would support anything that went to the Committee on Decolonisation because they started that committee, but it was very little money we got. But in 1978–79 we got the UN to declare an International Anti-Apartheid Year, so we got quite a good budget for that. By that time we had learned the tricks and the situation had changed. Then we found a formula that we make a recommendation that we should be given a lump sum – \$300,000 for this year – for special projects, for conferences, publications and so on. In the beginning there was a lot of resistance to giving it without explanation. But when we overcame that, it became a precedent, so we used to have \$300,000 or \$400,000 a year – that was after about '78 or '79. Then we were able to support the anti-apartheid movements much more.

HT: To conclude this, about the Centre [the UN Centre against Apartheid] as a centre in a sense that it facilitated NGO networking – Denis Herbstein said that when we see

today the NGOs having conferences, or when there is a big UN conference and international civil society is there, that all that started with the Special Committee.

ESR: Well, the NGOs were around. Many of them, I am not saying all of them, were middle-aged women, unemployed, but who wanted to do something, so they came to the UN, to sit at a briefing or something like that. The Public Information Department used to have briefings once a week, so it was sort of almost a meaningless thing. Every year there was a meeting at the Social Council or something of that kind. There would be a number of NGOs. A few of them had the right to speak, so they made a statement. But in general they did not have much practical status. They could put on their letterhead that they had a special status at the UN, but beyond that it didn't mean very much. But on apartheid, we realised that we couldn't make any progress without mobilising all the resources, especially NGOs: the liberation movements were also interested. Then I talked to the people on the Committee on Decolonisation. For instance, I took the Chairman of the Special Committee to London, and then the AAM organised a meeting in the British Parliament. There were around 20 organisations, three or four Members of Parliament and so on – an ambassador coming from a Commonwealth country speaking inside the Parliament of Britain was a great thing. So I could go to the Council for Namibia and talk to their chairman and say 'Look, we are going to London to have a meeting with the parliamentarians'. The World Peace Council used to invite the chairman of the committee and they would treat them because in Eastern Europe they were supported by the governments. They could give them a suite, a car, and treat them very well. The British Anti-Apartheid Movement could not do that, but they could arrange a meeting in Parliament; actually one Special Committee chairman went to London and he got invited to speak in Trafalgar Square. I was very worried, but he did very well. So the NGOs could be a kind of attraction. So we needed the NGOs, we did everything we could to get them involved, get their cooperation and so on. Apartheid was not so controversial, so we could get things through. Recently there was the Beijing conference, with 2,000 NGOs. We didn't have anything on that scale, but we had more intimate events. For instance, Abdul Minty would come to my office from the Anti-Apartheid Movement, I would introduce him to everybody and maybe have a party for him. If he wanted to make a speech he could go to my secretary, and ask her to type it and make photocopies. They were very happy to do it.

HT: We spoke about the principle of sovereignty and how to handle that. Another thing, when global politics is more and more discussed today, is that you would juxtapose international law to the principle of sovereignty. I mean you have the Commission on Global Governance. It made the proposition that there could be an intervention if there is a violation of human rights. Was there ever that kind of discussion? You mentioned that criticising South Africa's claim to sovereignty was more to claim that they are not the authentic representative of the people. But I mean that international law is another sort of strategy.

ESR: No, what we did was to say that they are following a policy of apartheid, which is a crime, so that aspect was also there by the time that apartheid was declared a crime by the General Assembly. Later we had a Convention, so it's a question of whether it has become international law or not. There was also a question of sovereignty of another kind. The UN can have UN meetings in the UN building. It can have meetings in Geneva in the UN building. But outside, if you want to go and have a meeting, you have to have the permission of the host country. We couldn't go and have a meeting in Gothenburg with the Special Committee, because the Swedish government would be mad that they were bypassed. But in the case of Britain we had meetings, for instance in 1968 when we were travelling to Stockholm meeting, we were discussing with the Swedish government, and we had agreements. Then we had to go to London, but we didn't ask the British government for permission, because it would be an embarrassment for them to give it. So there were informal contacts with the British government, not a formal request for permission. Before that, in 1964, we sent a delegation to the sanctions conference. The hearings were organised in Church House in London, without participation of the government. But maybe the British government was informally informed by the chairman. Once we wanted to have a meeting in Atlanta, to pay a tribute to Martin Luther King. I think we wrote a letter, and the American ambassador to the UN then was Andrew Young. In fact we had invited him to participate, so I don't think that there was any formal reply. We couldn't completely ignore the issue of sovereignty in terms of meetings, but when we were meeting organisations like anti-apartheid movements in the democratic countries, there was no problem. And in the other countries, since the anti-apartheid movements were supporters of the governments, we didn't have a problem.

HT: In terms of strategies, when we were discussing this issue of media strategies the other day, you said that you didn't like that concept. But just to put media in the context of a more general discussion about the strategies of the anti-apartheid struggle, in the book that you wrote, you said that there were three objectives that were agreed upon by the UN. The first one was to put pressure on the South African government; the second was to give assistance to the victims of apartheid; and the third the dissemination of information, to focus world public opinion. Then more specifically in relation to the media, you write in your paper on the media – I think it was written in the '80s – that there were three important issues related to media: to obtain news on developments inside South Africa; to reach people inside South Africa; and to show solidarity with the oppressed people and South African journalists. In a paper on the role of the Special Committee, you mention that one important thing is to arouse public opinion in Western countries, which the UN could not do effectively. That is more the role of the NGOs. So my question is what success did you have in these objectives. What came out of this, on the one hand for the committee, and on the other hand for the NGOs?

ESR: When you talk to me about strategy, I was thinking in terms of sitting down and thinking 'How can we influence the *New York Times*?' We said that there are three aspects to the struggle: the international campaign and sanctions; assistance to the

oppressed people; and information, because without information you can't do these things, without public opinion, so informing, educating and mobilising public opinion, so that you can have sanctions and so that you can have assistance to the struggle. So in that sense it was very important. In the UN itself the policy was that the UN did not go into direct information. You could provide press releases and material and so on. It was the responsibility of the individual governments of the member states to provide information about the UN and the activities of the UN. We were faced with a situation where the governments themselves were opposed to us. We accused them of collaborating with South Africa. They were not producing information against apartheid, so we needed to do that. We published things, sent them out, on a very small scale. But the anti-apartheid movements could then take over and see that they were widely distributed. We sent publications to the British AAM. They were grateful – but I found that Mike Terry had a table which had only three legs so one leg was held up by UN documents! All that played a role, but on a limited scale. By information we meant it was a means to educate the people and mobilise the people and so on. So we talked about how to go to the schools. We talked with UNESCO and they put out our publications. Then we started doing radio programmes to South Africa, getting support in the UN for the budget. And we were encouraging governments, for instance, a number of governments were giving facilities for the UN to support it. They also made general recommendations for support for the liberation movements in their international activities. Some of the African governments gave facilities to the liberation movements to broadcast to South Africa. So in a broad sense, we gave importance to information. We had a seminar in East Germany in Berlin about the role of the media in the struggle. But the media people said that they were against any government telling them what to do when we appealed to them to provide more information about the terrible things that happened under apartheid. So the whole thing about media in relation to governments and the UN and so on became highly controversial. So we didn't get anywhere with that.

Things kept changing. South Africa would spend \$15 million a year on propaganda, but one incident in South Africa when apartheid got reported would ruin all their propaganda. So they were not doing very well in spite of all the money they spent. They had some successes but mostly they were washed out. On the other hand, public opinion became more and more against apartheid, as people got to know more about apartheid. Oliver Tambo said that the best propaganda was sanctions. Every household in South Africa would know that there is sanctions, that the world is against apartheid and so on, it is action that is propaganda. Now after 1984, then you did not have to issue publications, it immediately made the TV news, was taken up by the TV news, so then you got into the mass propaganda. The other aspect which you mention was that we were anxious about informing the people, but how do you reach the mass of the people? You don't have control of the media, but there are some ways you can reach the people, through mass organisations like the trade unions. You can approach them and if they try to do their best, and the churches do their best to reach the people, or famous artists, since we supported a committee of world artists to mount an exhibition – it was opened in 1983 in Paris and it travelled in various countries, including Sweden. It got a tremendous

audience and enormous publicity. It was an art exhibition against apartheid. The other was the rock musicians, in the '70s some time, one of the rock musicians did have a benefit concert for the AAM. It didn't succeed, and he went back to AAM and he wanted to organise something big – sorry, we didn't succeed. He got in touch with Mike Terry and finally they got into the campaign on Mandela. So once the rock musicians came in for the release of Mandela we reached millions of people. So we were able to do those things, like the Sun City project, that was supported by the UN, and that also reached millions, so we did do some things.

HT: I have a specific question in relation to the Mandela campaign, because that was really successful and, especially in Britain, it gave the struggle a focus. So many young people identified with Mandela and his image. In some places you read that it was started in 1980 in South Africa. But James Sanders writes that you wrote to Mike Terry in 1978, suggesting ...

ESR: It was even before, in 1976. There was a seminar in Oxford last year about the Mandela campaign so I sent them a paper, and Mike Terry wrote a paper. If you get those you will see the story of the Mandela campaign. But briefly, in 1976 I found out about Mandela's birthday, so privately I wrote to a lot of anti-apartheid movements and it picked up very well. There were 10,000 letters or birthday telegrams and so on. The matter was raised in the British parliament and Security Council and all sorts of places.ⁱ So Mandela became big news. Now the Indian Foreign Minister, who is now the Prime Minister, happened to come to New York for the [UN General] Assembly, and there was a small party. So I went there and I said that we should do something about Mandela to honour him. Maybe we could name a street in Delhi after him, or something of that kind. Makhathini¹ was there so he also talked about it. At the time it was the International Anti-Apartheid Year. He went back and there was an International Anti-Apartheid Year Committee in Delhi, which also wanted [to award] an honour and he suggested that the Nehru Award should be given to Mandela. The government accepted that, because they don't name streets after living people, so the Nehru Award was offered to Mandela. It was a prestigious international award. Winnie Mandela did not get a passport, so it took a year or so, but then Oliver Tambo went to receive it and Indira Gandhi was there. So that was a big international award for Mandela. Before that there were small things in Britain, so it occurred to me, and I talked to Mike Terry, that we should promote the giving of awards to Mandela and other prisoners. He thought it was a very good idea. So I got a UN resolution saying that there should be honours granted to the leaders of the liberation movement and other prisoners and so on. Then Mike Terry went on a campaign in Britain to get university hostels named or some park named after Mandela, and I did what I could in America and other places. So all kinds of awards started to be given to Mandela. Then Glasgow was made Mandela an honorary citizen of Glasgow. So every year we had a day for the solidarity boycott of business in October, and we used to invite a few guests, and we invited the Mayor of Glasgow. Mike Terry called from London and said could I ask him to make an appeal to all the mayors. I just got the call an hour before I was going to meet the Mayor, so I took him for a coffee, talked to him

and he decided to send out an appeal to support the idea, so we got four or five other mayors supporting it. The campaign started developing, and by that time, as I told you, rock musicians came to Mike. So it was called Mandela fever. Now my idea was not only to do something for Mandela but for the other prisoners as well. But I talked to Oliver Tambo and he said 'No, keep to Mandela'. He was a symbol, you see. Some people wanted to honour Oliver Tambo, but he didn't want that, so it became focused on Mandela. Mandela before that was a prominent leader and attracted the imagination of people, but after that he became the symbol of the struggle, it was built up.

HT: I think also it says in the book that you actually discovered the date of Mandela's birthday – those celebrations of his birthday, the 60th and the 70th, became very important.

ESR: I used to organise every now and then some observance of some anniversaries. I still do it. I was on a mission or a conference in Nigeria, and from there I went to Accra. There was a meeting of a committee that involved the ANC and PAC. So I shared a room there with Mac Maharaj and in the middle of the night he asked me if I knew that next year was Mandela's 60th birthday. He said that we should do something about it. I was sleepy so I didn't pay any attention. But when I got back to New York, I thought that maybe we should do something. I called people and wrote to people. I think Mary Benson said to be careful because Mandela cheats on his birthday, so I didn't get a reply for months. Finally I wrote to his wife in South Africa and to the ANC, and eventually I got a telegram from Lusaka. Mandela's birthday was on 18 July – so it took three or four months.

HT: In terms of strategies then to put pressure on the South African government, and it seems as if these, I mean the information strategies and sanctions, they went together, but in terms of putting pressure on the South African government you have the sanctions, but you also have boycotts, and I mean boycotts and sanctions are two different things, because sanctions goes through governments and boycotts go through individuals, or individuals acting collectively. And I know that, for instance in Sweden there were some very successful boycott campaigns, and in Britain, but they told me that here in the US it was not successful because it's such a big country. If you could reflect on how you discussed the relations of sanctions and boycotts, and if you also could add then something of the history of the boycott, because I know, I think, in 1959 the boycott campaign was initiated actually by South Africans and we have the longer history back to Gandhi, so if you can get that together.

ESR: Well, there was talk of sanctions when India brought up the question of Indians in South Africa already in 1947–48. The South African Indian leaders went to India, they were discussing about a resolution on sanctions, because the first resolution of a type of sanctions was against Franco's Spain in 1936, asking all governments to withdraw their ambassadors from Spain, so they wanted to do something like that. But it was not possible in those days, and India was partitioned – we had a lot of problems in India at

that time. But the ANC didn't talk about sanctions for a very long time. So in 1959 the boycott movement started, and then it was only in 1958 they talked about sanctions, and it might also have been taken up in All-African conferences. So coming to the UN, we were concerned about sanctions, because the UN was the place for sanctions. Boycott was a public thing. The cultural boycott was big in America. It's a big country, but also there were hardly any consumer goods from South Africa here, we didn't have oranges here from South Africa, so there was nothing to boycott. There were one or two places where the [inaudible] was boycotted, but once we kept pressing on sanctions, and Ronald Segal and others said sanctions is the only way, nothing else counts – like people afterwards say the armed struggle is the only thing that really counts. But we couldn't make any progress after the arms sales ban, so I was thinking of everything we can get done, while we still keep talking about sanctions, we still keep denouncing countries that don't have sanctions. So about 1965–66 I developed this idea – what do we need for the struggle? Put yourself in the place of the liberation movement – you need scholarships, you need money for the refugees, you need money for help to prisoners and their families and so on. You need somebody for publicity, you need some political support, you need money to go to conferences. Let us try to get what we can get – while we keep on saying that sanctions is the main thing and that's the only way to solve the problem, also you can make progress on this in the [UN] General Assembly, you don't have [inaudible], whereas sanctions needs the Security Council, so we were proceeding on this. At that time the sports boycott came up, and I tried to avoid getting into the sports boycott because I thought that South Africa would say 'Governments are interfering in sports' and all that sort of thing. We denounced the discrimination in sport, we reported on the people who were boycotting and so on, but we went to London in 1968, when SANROC [South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee] and others said that we should support the sports boycott. Then we started supporting it, not only supporting them, promoting the sports boycott, calling for the sports boycott. So while there was a deadlock on sanctions, we were trying to promote a boycott as a supplement of the sanctions, and also this would create the climate for sanctions to be imposed, hopefully. But at least it is also a supplement, because certain things can be done by the public – we don't need the government for a sports boycott. Later, the British AAM developed the idea for a concept of a people's boycott, but that's nothing new, it's just a new word to be used, it is useful. But we had already proceeded on that line, the sports boycott, we were talking about cultural boycott, we supported all the boycotts – boycott South Africa in conferences, boycott the racist organisations and so on.

HT: In terms of boycott, and this relates not so much to the anti-apartheid struggle but to the history of the boycott, because I mean that was one of the important strategies advocated by Gandhi, and I am interested, it hasn't been written about so much. I mean, what was the place of the boycott in Gandhian ideology? Was it something that he – where did he learn about that? I know that there have been boycotts against slavery, way back in the 18th century and so on, but ...

ESR: You are asking a question that makes me think. You see the concept of non-cooperation with evil is quite central to Gandhi – that started a long time ago. Then isolating the traitors in a sense, the concept of registration of people in South Africa, Indians, almost like a pass law, and Gandhi and others, the majority, wanted to resist it, that some people are secretly registered. So the community boycott, that happened in India a long time ago – it's a traditional thing that happened in the communities. But non-cooperation with the evil, that you do not cooperate with the government which is doing evil, that's a kind of a boycott in a sense, but the boycott roots were happening already in India in the early century. There was a big movement when the British wanted to partition Bengal, and then there was a boycott of British goods and so on, especially cloth, and bonfires. So that was there when Gandhi was in South Africa, that was there in the Indian struggle before Gandhi. Gandhi wanted to develop a constructive political programme, to employ the people, make them self-sufficient and so on. The biggest problem was the tremendous unemployment in India, under-employment, unemployment, because the British had destroyed small industry in India, cottage industry, mainly the textile industry, which made millions of people unemployed. So the farmers might, the agricultural labourers might have work for six months, but if they could sit down and start spinning and weaving, then the poverty would be reduced, there would be employment. So it became one of the major things in Gandhi's programme, to develop spinning and weaving. Then this tradition of boycott, so in a sense it got related, to boycott the British-made cloth, because the British were taking away cotton from India and then selling India the manufactured goods at very high prices, and this was causing the poverty. It was our cotton, we should be able to use it, and also later developing into promoting handicraft industry, rather than the mills, in India itself. So that is how the boycott of British cloth started, and that created quite a bit of unemployment in Lancashire and in other places. So when Gandhi went to England in 1931, he made it a point to go to Lancashire, to see the workers – actually they acted in a very friendly way.

HT: It's an interesting relation between the boycott as a strategy and on the other hand the strike as a strategy, because both are related to production. But of course this has historical reasons, that the Indians chose the boycott, as you point out now. I was thinking, are you aware of any strikes or discussions about initiating strikes outside of South Africa in the context of the anti-apartheid struggle?

ESR: Well boycotts, yes, like the dockworkers boycotts. There was a dockworkers boycott on the west coast here, and in Denmark there was one in 1963 or '64 I think, and then [inaudible] in Sweden. So the seamen were quite active, with small left-wing unions affiliated with the WFTU, and later they had a conference, the Danish and the British seamen organised a conference on [inaudible]. So the trade union action boycotting South African ships – that was very much a call from the liberation movement, but it was not easy to get it very far because of the legal problems.

HT: It might have been possible to – I don't know if there would have been support for it – but theoretically it might have been possible to initiate strikes against those corporations that refused to withdraw from South Africa. I mean production strikes.

ESR: It is very difficult to organise because the workers will lose their salaries – that is an enormous sacrifice for the workers. But there were strikes, for instance in support of the sports boycott. The South African sports team was boycotted by the hotel workers and others, so they had great difficulty getting transport to hotels and getting services and so on – I think it was also there in Ireland. But to strike against a company was something else; there was a moment, I don't think there was a strike as such, when they started importing coal from South Africa in the south of the US – then the coal miners here developed an action against importing coal that was affecting employment here. But I am not sure if they got into strikes.

HT: In terms of defining what the struggle is about, there have been some tensions in Sweden, for example, between defining it as an anti-racist or an anti-imperialist struggle. It could be defined as both, of course, and I wonder if you could say something about that. I think also when I asked Mike Terry about this, he said that this was not an issue in England, they had such a broad coalition, so they did not use the language of anti-imperialism. But he also said that there was a change in the ANC language, taking place around 1975 or something, from a more Marxist language, perhaps to a less Marxist language or...

ESR: We did not use 'anti-imperialist'. When we started the Special Committee, I think Hungary suggested that we should use the Declaration against Colonialism. But we wanted to deal with it as a racist problem, and South Africa was not a colony. We wanted to deal with it that way. In the OAU, they set up a liberation front, and most of the money they were giving to the colonial countries' liberation struggles. And the ANC and others were not having very much money, and many of the countries like Tanzania, Zambia and others were talking about South Africa as a country we can't deal with in the same way. So the ANC got very upset, and some of the people in the ANC started talking about South Africa as a colonial problem, because of this financial aspect of support in the OAU; and also that if it is not a colonial problem, they will talk to people of reforms and not revolution and so on. [Name inaudible] wrote a document for the OAU, set up a committee to look at this matter. I went and talked to Oliver Tambo in 1965 – it was at a conference we had in Paris, a seminar – so I told Oliver that talking about this as a colonial problem would confuse people, we have so much support for anti-apartheid. Because I was afraid also, my main concern in fact at that time was that if we talk about it in colonial terms, then people in various governments will think that our objective was to throw the whites out of South Africa, and immediately countries like Netherlands and other Western countries would react very badly. We had their support now, but we would lose their support immediately if we would take that position, so Tambo said, 'Yes, we don't want to lose what we have gained – making people hate apartheid'. And then I told him, and he said, 'You know, South Africa was declared as a

self-government, but we are excluded from the rights of our country, and we have been excluded all the time. What we want is that we should be in it, that is, the majority of the people'. So I said, 'Oliver, what about declaring that we recognise the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa for self-determination by all the people of the country?' He said 'Fine'. So from then on we used the term 'self-determination'. So that was quite satisfactory to me – we didn't use the term 'colonialism'. Now the ANC rhetoric was there, but much of that rhetoric was never Oliver's. For instance, the Morogoro conference in '69 – I think it had nothing to do with his status and his way of thinking. It was written by a Communist, I have a suspicion that Joe Matthews might have written it, but I am not sure, because it starts like the Stalin speeches. So that rhetoric was there, but to some extent some people want to sound more radical, usually people who are less radical want to sound radical, and then they go to hug the radical language. So Makhathini was not a communist, but he went to a conference in Havana in 1979, and he got a resolution there, that – something like – imperialist countries like Britain and the US and Belgium, Canada, Holland. It was terrible for us – we were trying to get support from all of these Western countries. Canada was furious at being called imperialist, so we had to find ways to get out of it, and we managed to get out of it. So did I answer?

HT: Yes, absolutely. OK, I have a final question, which is of a different character, so I would like to ask you to define the concept of solidarity, from your own point of view. I mean in the context of your experience in the struggle.

ESR: Again, I haven't thought about it, but solidarity is a very basic matter of human feeling. In fact, I think probably in some animals also, but we have gone through so much in history that people feel solidarity only with other people like them. Solidarity can of course sometimes go crooked, like the Crusades, but solidarity in terms of people of one's own kind, one's own language, one's own village and all that sort of thing has been there for a long time. It has been quite wide also, like Arab solidarity, so the Arabs support other people who were fighting for their freedom or for their rights. But when it came to anti-apartheid, it became a solidarity very largely across the colour line, solidarity with somebody who, because of the colonial relationship, was treated as subhuman. Now what we tried to do – as I tried to say, it was easy for an Indian, because Indians faced discrimination in South Africa, so we identified with the Indians in South Africa, and since the Indians decided to fight with the Africans in the struggle, solidarity with the oppressed people in South Africa. It's not that simple, but if you think carefully, what the South Africans were doing was to lead the whole country to disaster. I sensed that they were leading the whites to suicide. Now what is the duty of somebody from Holland – his kith and kin are in South Africa – if they are going to commit suicide, is to stop them. Now India is also a country, a country of origin of people in South Africa, so what India is doing is not for Indians alone but for all the people in South Africa. So the British and Germans and others should think in that way, but that maybe did not appeal to them at all. But some other people in all these countries, during the colonial struggle and so on, they did understand that their country was doing injustice to others, and tried to show sympathy and support for the people who were oppressed. We had

many people in the case of India, and the Indian national movement started promoting, trying to get support in Britain, and there was a very powerful movement, the India League, and some prominent members of parliament. So that was the big parallel for the South African liberation movement also. In fact India did help very much in the beginning of the solidarity movement on South Africa. So you feel that people are basically good, they should be informed and if they come to know about these things, they react. It might be personal, it might be religious – church people have a great influence, church people were very much involved in solidarity movements in relation to India and in relation to South Africa later. But the other type of thing was that they would be promoting solidarity out of self-interest; people tried to say that was good for the working people in Britain if they came to show solidarity with people in South Africa. In some places there was action, like that in the Musicians Union and others, because they were against segregation; people were against segregation here, the Musicians Union, actors union, they would not play for segregated audiences in South Africa, they were blacklisted. We talked about strikes before – a different type of thing was an artist goes to South Africa to perform and then comes back to London, and is boycotted here, a demonstration is here, there is again a manifestation of solidarity. So whatever it is, the fact that public opinion in so much of the world joined the anti-apartheid movement, supported the anti-apartheid movement, is a very healthy sign or proof that human beings are being basically good, they are not always into the value of their stocks and so on.

HT: So do you think that the demonstrations in Seattle in December last year were a continuation of the solidarity movements of the post-war era?

ESR: Yes, the difference is – not only in the post-war era, there were movements before. There are two types of things – take the British AAM or the Swedish AAM, their solidarity with people in South Africa, they were making sacrifices, they were not gaining anything, it was not in self-interest. They were giving money, they were giving their time to show solidarity with people in South Africa. Now I suppose you could say the same thing about Vietnam demonstrations in Sweden, but when you talk of Vietnam demonstrations in Seattle, they had a self-interest, there were young boys who were being drafted, so it was affecting them, the war. Now in Seattle maybe it is a combination of both – if I go and demonstrate in Seattle, if all the Indians go and demonstrate in Seattle, it is affecting our economy, so it is not only out of selfless support for somebody else that we are in it. So again the solidarity is of two kinds.

HT: OK. Thank you very much.

¹ Johnstone Makhathini, Head of the ANC's Department of International Affairs

ⁱ In 1978.