


Southern Africa: A Time for Hope

The Political Report
of the Anti-Apartheid Movement



October 1993



Cover picture: Nelson Mandela addresses the people of Glasgow at a rally in George Square, 9 October 1993.

Photographer: David Pratt

Contents

Introduction	1
South Africa – A year of struggle for peace and democracy	2
South Africa – The way ahead	7
The tragedy in Angola	9
Peace and national reconciliation in Mozambique	11
New prospects for regional security and co-operation	12
British and international policy	13
Towards a new agenda for international solidarity	15
The Anti-Apartheid Movement – The priorities ahead	17
Conclusion	18

Anti-Apartheid Movement Political Report

Southern Africa: A Time for Hope

Introduction

THIS YEAR has seen the most important and significant breakthrough in the negotiating process in South Africa since the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990. This was the agreement reached at the multi-party negotiations on 2 July 1993 that the country's first ever one-person one-vote elections are to take place on 27 April 1994.

These elections should provide the first opportunity for all South Africans, black and white, to enjoy the most fundamental democratic right – the right to vote. They will be of profound importance since they will decide the composition of both the Constituent Assembly, which will draw up and adopt a new non-racial democratic constitution and the new government for South Africa – the first-ever with a democratic mandate.

It is these elections which will open the way to a new non-racial future for South Africa as well as a profound change in the relationship between South Africa and the region as a whole. They will, therefore, bring hope to all those who have striven for a genuine end to apartheid and a new vision for Southern Africa.

However an emergent pattern of forces both in South Africa and across the region appears to be threatening this entire process. These forces have been their most destructive in Angola where Unita's action in rejecting the results of the September 1992 elections has led to incalculable death and devastation. A similar scenario could face Mozambique, where Renamo has been blocking the implementation of the Rome Peace Accords. Within South Africa, the very prospect of democratic change is threatened by white ultra-right extremists and the increasingly despotic behaviour of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and other leaders of Inkatha.

All these forces have a common interest in seeking to prevent the democratic transformation of South Africa. For they all have their roots in the policies of apartheid; indeed many are the creation of the apartheid state. Moreover, their continued existence is largely determined both by the support which they continue to enjoy from within the apartheid system and the failure of the De Klerk regime to take decisive action against them. The threat they pose to democratic change is further compounded by the failure of the international community to exert effective pressure on the De Klerk regime and others resisting the democratic transformation of South Africa.

The period ahead, therefore, is of profound importance for the whole of Southern Africa. A tremendous struggle lies ahead to ensure that South Africa's first ever non-

racial elections take place; that they are genuinely free and fair; that they result in a decisive majority committed to a new democratic future for South Africa; and that the results, if verified to be free and fair, are respected by all parties.

South Africa – A year of struggle for peace and democracy

THE SETTING of the election date was the culmination of a year of bitter struggle which witnessed the tragic assassination of Chris Hani, a key leader of the ANC and Secretary-General of the Communist Party, as well as the sad loss of Oliver Tambo, the National Chairperson and former President of the ANC.

Twelve months earlier, negotiations had been suspended following the Boipatong Massacre of 17 June 1992. A period of mass popular action led to the 26 September '*Record of Understanding*' between Nelson Mandela and President de Klerk, in which agreement was reached in principle on the establishment of an Interim Government and an elected Constituent Assembly to draw up a new constitution.

After this, progress towards the re-convening of multi-party negotiations proved difficult. There was a recognition that they had to be more inclusive than the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) which had reached deadlock in May 1992 due to the intransigence of the De Klerk regime. From amongst South Africa's anti-apartheid forces, both the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Azanian Peoples Organisation (Azapo) had declined to participate at Codesa. It had also been boycotted by the ultra-right forces within the white community.

After a series of bi-lateral meetings and discussions, multi-party talks were held on 5 March 1993. They lead to the reconvening of a formal multi-party negotiating process on 1 April at which 26 political organisations were represented including the PAC, the Conservative Party and the smaller breakaway Afrikaner Volksunie which advocates a 'volkstaat'. Azapo continued to boycott the negotiating process.

This new broad based negotiating framework reflected a wider spectrum of South Africa's political forces, but this meant that the process of reaching agreement was more difficult.

The prospect for agreement between the country's two most important political formations, the ANC with its allies and the De Klerk regime, had been greatly enhanced by decisions taken at the ANC National Executive Committee's meeting in February 1993. At this critical meeting the ANC agreed on transitional arrangements for the three periods: 1) up to democratic elections; 2) during the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution; 3) up to the first elections under the new constitution. Its proposals included:

- the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council (including appropriate sub-councils) which would oversee the government of the

country up to the holding of the elections for a Constituent Assembly as well as an Independent Electoral Commission and an Independent Media Commission.

- the formation of a multi-party Interim Government of National Unity which would rule South Africa whilst the Constituent Assembly draws up and adopts a new democratic constitution.
- the establishment of a Government of National Unity and Reconstruction, on the same basis as the Interim Government, to rule from when the constitution is adopted up to the first elections under the new constitution.

The ANC's proposal for the composition of the Executive of this governmental structure would be on the basis of proportional representation of all the parties elected to the Constituent Assembly subject to a minimum threshold of 5% of the seats in the Constituent Assembly. Although a clear rejection of the National Party's proposal for enforced power sharing, this move by the ANC was widely perceived as an imaginative way of minimising the potential threat from forces hostile to the democratic transformation of South Africa and of creating a national consensus for the reconstruction and development of the country and its economy.

The brutal assassination of Chris Hani on 10 April 1993 might well have shattered the prospects for rapid progress at the multi-party negotiations. This cruel act deprived the ANC of one of its most respected and popular leaders. It also dramatically highlighted the fragility of the negotiating process. The anger at the murder of Chris Hani together with the popular frustration at the lack of any visible progress towards the 'new' South Africa created an unprecedented crisis for the negotiating process. The situation was further aggravated by the provocative action of the De Klerk regime which sought to gain political capital from the crisis by lambasting the ANC and threatening a new wave of repression. The activities of certain groups which were critical of the negotiations further exacerbated the situation. For a brief period there was a very real danger that events would take a course which would have destroyed the entire negotiating process.

In fact the massive popular nationwide protests in response to the death of Chris Hani had a different effect. They demonstrated the remarkable political and organisational skills of the national and local leadership of the ANC and its allies in the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the SACP. The ANC established itself at the centre stage of South African political life as never before and it was seen to have much greater moral and political authority than the De Klerk regime. In particular the protests focused attention within South Africa and internationally on the need for rapid progress in the negotiations, especially in relation to the date for elections, the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council and the joint control of the security forces.

As a result, a new impetus was given to the negotiating process and the combined effect of mounting internal and external pressures meant that De Klerk's regime,

with its power and influence rapidly being eroded, had little alternative but to accede to the ANC's insistence that there be rapid progress in the negotiations. The Negotiating Council began sitting from 26 April, the process being streamlined through the establishment of a series of Technical Committees which were mandated to bring back recommendations on a range of matters. These included the Transitional Executive Council, the Independent Electoral Commission, the Independent Media Commission, a Transitional Constitution and the Constitutional Principles which would provide an agreed framework for a new constitution. A separate Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of Regions brought forward recommendations on new regional boundaries to replace the existing provincial and bantustan structures.

However the ambiguous and contradictory actions of President de Klerk during the crisis following Chris Hani's assassination, in particular as a consequence of his inability to unleash a crackdown on the ANC's protests, together with the growing realisation that democratic elections were the inevitable outcome of the negotiating process, led the white ultra-right to go on the offensive. The formation of the so-called Committee of Generals under the leadership of the former head of the SADF, General Viljoen was followed by the launch of the Afrikaner Volksfront which linked together 17 organisations including the neo-fascist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), the Conservative Party, and the Afrikaner Volksunie as well as farmers organisations and white trade union bodies. Strong links with the security forces and a popular following especially amongst white farmers, enabled the Volksfront to develop rapidly into a potent threat to democratic change. Amongst its demands was an immediate halt to the negotiations. Especially alarming were Volksfront appeals to its supporters to join the Commandos, to begin military training and to arm themselves.

This period also saw growing tensions between the De Klerk regime and its traditional allies, the right wing bantustan leaders. Since the release of Nelson Mandela, the Nationalist Party had been nurturing its relations with the bantustan leaders in the hope that it could enter into some form of electoral alliance or pact with some of the political groupings in the bantustans. However at the initiative of Chief Buthelezi, an informal grouping known as the Concerned South Africans Group (Cosag) was formed following the Bisho massacre. This brought together KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei with the Conservative Party and the Afrikaner Volksunie. It represented a distancing of these bantustan leaders from the National Party as they began losing confidence in its ability to protect their interests. With Chief Buthelezi and the IFP at the forefront, they became increasingly vocal in demanding a so-called federal solution for South Africa, which would be little more than the bantustans in a new guise. In their approach to the negotiations they made ever more determined efforts to sabotage any agreement which would amount to genuine democratic change.

Events came to a head in late June and early July 1993. On 25 June during a demonstration organised by the Volksfront outside the World Trade Centre, armed

supporters of the AWB stormed the building and prevented a meeting of the Negotiating Council from taking place at which it was anticipated that key decisions would be taken. A further crisis was precipitated when negotiators reconvened on 2 July. After it was determined that there was sufficient consensus to announce the date for the elections, the IFP, CP, and five other delegations withdrew from the meeting. The IFP, KwaZulu administration and CP subsequently decided to boycott the whole process with leaders of both organisations issuing dire warnings of the prospect of civil war if the elections were to go ahead.

Throughout this period, political violence has continued to threaten the peace process and at the beginning of September 1993 it was estimated that 10,000 people had died since the outbreak of political violence in July 1990.

The crisis following the Boipatong massacre had prompted the first significant international intervention over South Africa since the release of Nelson Mandela. The 17 August 1992 Security Council decision (SCR 772) to deploy a UN Observer Mission in South Africa was followed by the establishment of similar Observer Missions by the OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community during September/October 1992. However both the mandate and size of these Observer Missions – less than 100 observers were deployed in total – meant that they were severely restricted in the role they could play in reducing political violence.

The inter-governmental Observer Missions were officially linked with the National Peace Secretariat and other structures established under the National Peace Accord. They also worked in close co-operation with the Goldstone Commission, with the European Community sending additional personnel to work directly with the Commission.

These official initiatives were complemented, at a non-governmental level, by the WCC and Vatican sponsored Ecumenical Monitoring Programme in South Africa (Empsa). It succeeded in mounting a nationally co-ordinated programme of monitoring throughout this period. There was also a strengthening of local initiatives such as Peace Action, as well as greater co-ordination of such groups at a national level. Despite all these efforts, political violence continued to escalate. A report published by Empsa gave an interesting insight into the violence:

'the background to much of the violence has become so complex and cause and effect so intermingled. Most [Empsa Monitors] have commented on the persistent coincidence of political events to certain killings, and all have referred to a persistent failure of policing. The notable absence of police at key moments, the failure to follow up criminal investigations and make arrests, and, on occasion, the apparent collusion of some of the security forces with groups of attackers, also contribute to a climate of violence in which some culprits operate with impunity, and the way is left for cycles of revenge killings. Police inaction prompts its own interpretations and the intermingling of criminal and political violence also clouds the picture.'

The linkage of violence with key political events was manifest in the period immediately following the decision on 2 July 1993 to agree the date for the elections. There was a horrifying escalation of violence which took the lives of some 700 people in the period from 3 July to early August. Church leaders responded by holding emergency talks when they called for the immediate establishment of a multi-party peace keeping force under international command as a matter of urgency.

The demand by the ANC and other democratic forces for effective joint control of the security forces had become a central issue following the assassination of Chris Hani and had assumed even greater significance when the police failed to prevent the storming of the World Trade Centre on 29 June. An investigation by the Goldstone Commission concluded that 'not to have had an unambiguous strong and visible show of force...can only be regarded as a dereliction of duty'.

A new element during this period was the impact of violence on the white community – a development which attracted extensive publicity in South Africa and internationally. Some of these attacks were attributed to the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA); others appeared to be random attacks. Interestingly no organisation claimed responsibility for the widely-publicised and particularly horrific murder of 11 worshippers at St James's Church, Cape Town on 25 July 1993. These attacks undermined the efforts of the ANC and others to promote non-racialism as well as contributing to a climate of fear and insecurity within the white community which the ultra-right sought to exploit.

The reaction of the De Klerk regime to the escalation of political violence was inconsistent, contradictory, and ineffective. On many occasions it resorted to the traditional methods employed at the height of the anti-apartheid struggle including the lifting of the moratorium on executions, threatening a State of Emergency in response to the protests against the assassination of Chris Hani, and initiating a nationwide crackdown against the PAC leadership and its activists. It also refused to implement many of the key recommendations of the Goldstone Commission as well as agreements reached with the ANC designed to curb political violence.

Above all President de Klerk has proved reluctant to confront the security establishment. For example, even when the Goldstone Commission raided offices of military intelligence in November 1992 and disclosed evidence of a 'dirty tricks' disinformation campaign against the ANC, he was only prepared to sanction an internal military enquiry. This did lead to the early retirement of certain high-ranking military officers. However in August 1993 De Klerk appointed General Meiring – who had led the 'Project Echoes' disinformation campaign – as head of the South African Defence Force.

As a result the De Klerk regime has resisted repeated pressure for the establishment of joint control over the security forces, including the police, as well as other proposals such as a multi-party peace keeping force. Effective action in this area

would open the way to the transformation of the security forces so that they would be capable of serving the community as a whole, which would in itself have a dramatic impact on the level of violence.

However by September 1993 real progress appeared to have been achieved with agreement on four pieces of key legislation at the multi-party negotiations covering the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council, the Independent Electoral Commission, the Independent Media Commission and the Independent Broadcasting Authority. This legislation was due to be approved by the Tri-cameral Parliament in mid-September whilst negotiations continued, both multi-lateral and bi-lateral on a Transitional Constitution.

South Africa – The way ahead

ALTHOUGH BY mid-September 1993, agreement had been reached that 27 April 1994 would be the date for South Africa's first non-racial elections and on the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council and other key structures which will be essential for the conducting of free and fair elections, major obstacles still have to be overcome if they are to take place, be verified as free and fair and for the results to be respected by all parties.

The key constitutional issue still to be resolved is the nature of the future South African state, especially in relation to the devolution of powers to regions. The ANC, which has always advocated a Unitary state, had envisaged that this would be a matter for the Constituent Assembly to decide upon within the framework of a series of Constitutional Principles which would be adopted by consensus at the multi-party negotiations. However the IFP and some other bantustan leaders have made common cause with the white ultra-right in insisting on a so-called federal constitution and that the multi-party negotiators – and not an elected body – should decide this matter. Because of the intransigent positions that these forces adopted, it was agreed that the Constitutional Principles should cover the extent to which authority would rest at a national level and how much power should be devolved to regions, whilst still leaving final details about the constitutional arrangements to the Constituent Assembly.

Although there is no final outcome to these deliberations, the ANC has already indicated that it is prepared to accept proposals for the creation of nine regions with a wide measure of autonomy. In approaching this issue the ANC has faced a serious dilemma. Most importantly, it could find itself in power but faced with a new constitutional order under which the country could be fragmented by secession and which could prevent it from addressing the legacies of apartheid and embarking on an effective programme of reconstruction and development. It is also essential that the ANC maintains the support of its own constituency in the positions it adopts.

At the same time, the ANC is determined to avoid further delays and wants to reach agreement as rapidly as possible so that the elections can take place and South Africa can embark on the road to a new united, non-racial and democratic future. In doing so the ANC faces the National Party's resistance to a new unitary non-racial state, which it perceives as threatening its position of power and privilege, as well as that of the ultra-right and certain bantustan leaders. Moreover President de Klerk has made clear that he is not prepared to confront Chief Buthelezi over this matter and he has given him an undertaking that his regime will not agree to the process moving forward without the IFP's agreement. Thus Chief Buthelezi has an effective veto.

There are other crucial issues relating to the transition period which still have to be resolved, in particular the powers of the Transitional Executive Council, including joint control over the security forces. These will be of vital importance in ensuring that an electoral process can be established which is genuinely free and fair. Again it seems that the ANC is willing to make concessions in these areas in order to secure agreement. In particular it has agreed that all 26 organisations participating in the multi-party negotiations will be represented in the Transitional Executive Council and that its powers will be to monitor the functioning of government rather than to be proactive in promoting policies.

Amongst the conditions which will need to be established for the process to be genuinely free and fair are the following:

- a democratic electoral process;
- free political activity;
- impartial behaviour of all state and other official organs;
- easy formalities in order to be entitled to vote;
- effective programmes of voter education;
- impartiality by the printed and electronic media;
- prohibition of covert funding of political organisations by the state;
- equitable financial resources to all political organisations contesting the elections;
- an election process which is free of manipulation, fraud and ballot rigging, with a secret vote and unimpeded and easy access to the polling booth.

The United Nations, together with other international bodies such as the OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community will have to establish a major international presence in South Africa to monitor, supervise and verify the electoral process. Their presence could also be an important factor in ensuring that the election results, provided they are verified to be free and fair, are respected by all parties.

During the period ahead South Africa will also have to grapple with the growing crises which are affecting nearly all sectors of society. The economy continues to spiral downwards with the South African Reserve Bank estimating in August 1993

that unemployment had reached 46% of the economically active population. The crises in the education system, housing and local government are especially acute and assume even greater significance given the level of political and criminal violence.

A key role is already being played in addressing these crises by South Africa's main trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). It has played an active role in the establishment of a series of forums, such as the National Economic Forum, the National Manpower Commission, as well as forums covering local government, housing, education, electricity and water, in which the democratic movement is beginning to engage with the regime, business and others in seeking to tackle current crises as well as preparing new democratic structures to replace apartheid institutions. Looking to the future, Cosatu has also drawn up a Programme for Economic Reconstruction and Development which it hopes will provide the cornerstone for the social and economic policies of a democratic government.

These problems will become even more acute following the elections and the adoption of a new constitution. Although it is envisaged that there would then be a Government of National Unity and Reconstruction, deep differences exist between the major parties over which policies to pursue in order to stimulate economic revival and tackle the legacies of apartheid. Without agreement on these vital issues there is the real danger of policy paralysis with grave implications for the future of South Africa.

Despite all the challenges ahead, however, it is now possible to envisage that free and fair elections could take place on 27 April 1994, resulting in a decisive majority committed to a new democratic future and with a process of national reconciliation and reconstruction underway. Such a result would also open the way to new forms of international solidarity with the people of South Africa and the region as a whole.

The tragedy in Angola

THE PEOPLE of Angola had the same hope for the future, as South Africans now have, when they went to the polls on 29/30 September 1992. The results, which were deemed to be 'generally free and fair' by the United Nations, produced a clear majority for the MPLA in the legislative assembly elections whilst President dos Santos only failed by 0.44% to reach the 50% required for election as President on the first ballot.

However the main opposition force, Unita, and especially its leader Jonas Savimbi, rejected the results of the elections, initially by claiming fraud and then, when this was disproved, by launching an armed insurrection. Unita was able to exploit the fact that in breach of the Bicesse Peace Accords its military forces had only been

partially disbanded, whereas the Government had fully implemented its commitments under the Accords. Unita's position was further strengthened by its action in withdrawing its forces from the newly formed national army (FAA). Moreover under the so-called Triple-Zero option under the Bicesse Accords the Angolan government was subject to an international arms embargo. As a result Unita's military forces could largely act unimpeded in many areas of the country.

Unita, which for many years had been little more than a surrogate of the South African Defence Force, and more recently had been armed, trained and financed by the Reagan and Bush administrations, thus embarked on a war of death and destruction which has had the most devastating consequences for the people of Angola. Unita forces succeeded in occupying some 70% of the country and as a consequence some 3 million people fled these areas and are now designated 'displaced people'. The direct and indirect effect of the war is now resulting, according to UN estimates, in a death rate of 1,000 a day with the lives of some 2.3 million more Angolans at risk.

All the evidence points to a concerted international effort particularly involving South Africa, Zaire, and possibly western intelligence services to provide military equipment and other support to Unita in the period immediately following Savimbi's declaration of war. This appears to have been a panic reaction in response to Unita's electoral defeat since the prevailing wisdom in South Africa and western circles had been that Unita would easily defeat the MPLA at the polls.

Repeated overflights of neighbouring territories by South African aircraft, apparently bringing in military and other supplies to Unita, prompted protests by the Frontline States who convened an emergency summit in December 1992 to warn Pretoria against embarking on a renewed policy of aggression in the region.

At a diplomatic level the immediate response of the UN, the three Bicesse Observers (Portugal, Russian Federation, and the USA) and others in the international community was highly disturbing.

Instead of offering their full support to the Angolan government and condemning Unita, they adopted an even-handed approach by urging both parties to negotiate. They even sought to encourage Unita to abandon its military offensive by pressuring the Angolan government to make concessions. At one point, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha intervened, apparently with western support, and proposed a power sharing model – similar to that which they were then advocating in South Africa – which would have overturned the results of the elections.

The Angolan government demonstrated remarkable tolerance in its efforts to promote national reconciliation. Despite Unita's declaration of war, it still sought a political settlement. This was demonstrated by the establishment of a Government of National Unity which included representatives of many of the smaller parties which had contested the elections as well as providing Unita with key portfolios. At

the same time it encouraged all parties to participate in the legislative assembly; 10 out of the 70 Unita deputies who had been elected in September 1992 took up their places in defiance of Savimbi's leadership.

Gradually there began to be a shift in international policy. Whilst continuing to advocate UN brokered talks between the Government and Unita there was a gradual abandonment of the even handed position adopted immediately following the elections and a recognition that Unita had to be confronted. By the end of 1992, the European Community at the Edinburgh Summit, had explicitly criticised Unita. This process continued during 1993 and was further encouraged by a major reversal of US policy towards Angola in May when the new Clinton administration, following extensive lobbying, decided to establish diplomatic relations with Angola.

Following Unita's refusal to support the Abidjan Declaration which was the result of long drawn out negotiations in May 1993, the position of the UN became much stronger. In July the Bicesse Observers met in Moscow and drew up possible measures, aimed at isolating Unita, for adoption by the Security Council. Later that month, on 15 July, following a high level intervention by African foreign ministers, the Security Council adopted Resolution 851, which set a deadline of 15 September 1993 for a ceasefire to be agreed, or the Security Council would consider the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo and other measures against Unita. In a further encouraging move Britain announced that it was lifting its arms embargo against Angola on 9 August.

With Unita still opting for a military solution, the Angolan people continue to suffer from its destructive policies. However the international tide appears to be turning which gives grounds for hope for the future. Meanwhile the Angolan experience raises profound questions as to the role of the UN, its failure to confront Unita's defiance of the Bicesse Accords and above all its capacity to ensure that agreements which it monitors are respected by all parties. There are important lessons arising from this experience which need to be learnt if internationally monitored elections in Mozambique and South Africa are to be genuinely free and fair.

Peace and national reconciliation in Mozambique

THE General Peace Agreement signed in Rome in October 1992 by the government of Mozambique and Renamo opened the way to a process of peace and national reconciliation. The ceasefire was put into effect and Zimbabwean and Malawian troops were withdrawn as agreed. However, there were repeated delays in the implementation of other aspects of the Agreement due to the intransigence of Renamo and the slow response by the UN. This led to the postponement of the date for multi-party elections from October 1993 to October 1994.

The devastating consequences of the war were highlighted by the UN's estimates that 5.5 million Mozambicans would need to be re-settled under the Agreement

including 4 million internally displaced persons, 1.5 million refugees and 370,000 demobilised soldiers and their dependents.

Although there was a full deployment of the United Operation in Mozambique (Onumoz) by July 1993, the establishment of the National Elections Commission and the Commission of State Administration were still pending. There was also little progress in other key commissions including the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambique Defence Force. At a meeting of the Security Council in July 1993 authority was given to Onumoz to chair this Joint Commission.

In a pattern similar to Angola, Renamo has found repeated excuses to prevaricate and delay implementation including refusing to allow Frelimo members to conduct political, social or economic activities in Renamo held territory. In a move to encourage Renamo's participation a Trust Fund was established for receiving voluntary contributions and channelling funds to Renamo, to which the Italian government donated US\$ 6 million.

However a meeting between Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo leader Alfonso Dhlakama at the end of August 1993 in Maputo resulted in some progress being made and the prospect that the new timetable leading to elections in October 1994 would be adhered to.

New prospects for regional security and co-operation

THE DECISION taken at its Windhoek Summit in August 1992 that the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) would transform itself into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) represented a significant development in regional policy.

SADCC had been founded in 1980 with the objective of 'forging links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration', especially given the context of apartheid South Africa's repeated efforts to exert its economic dominance over the region. Coinciding with Zimbabwe's independence, the prospects were encouraging. However the war of aggression and destabilisation which Pretoria waged through most of the 1980s meant that many of SADCC's initiatives could not be realised to the full.

The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is envisaged as a more advanced form of co-operation which will be capable of serving as a vehicle for the development and integration of the region. Its Treaty, which was adopted at the Windhoek Summit and is in the process of being ratified by its ten member states, identifies areas in which co-operation towards integration would be pursued including food security, infrastructure, industry, human resource development, environment, social welfare, peace and security.

In addition, SADC is engaged in contingency planning for the possible entry of a democratic South Africa into SADC. A new democratic South Africa will open up the prospect for profoundly different economic relations between itself and the rest of the region – relations which hopefully will seek to promote equitable and balanced regional development. Such developments will also enhance the possibilities for the creation of a framework for common regional security and the general reduction of conflict and tension throughout Southern Africa.

However this process will not be simple. Given the history of conflict in the region, the tremendous imbalances in relations between states and the acute economic and social differences which exist within states, massive efforts will be required if a new vision for Southern Africa is to become a reality.

An encouraging signal as to the impact a new democratic South Africa will have on the region was the decision by the parties at the multi-party negotiations in August 1993 that South Africa would agree to the re-incorporation of Walvis Bay into Namibia.

British and international policy

AS ALREADY reported, the crisis following the Boipatong massacre prompted the first major international intervention in South Africa since the release of Nelson Mandela. The mission to South Africa by Cyrus Vance as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in July 1992 was followed by the EC Troika Mission led by Douglas Hurd in September 1992. The subsequent deployment of Observer Missions by the UN, the OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community appeared to reflect an understanding by the international community that it had to be actively engaged in supporting the peace process in South Africa.

However, there has been little evidence of such active engagement. The Observer Missions have played a useful but limited role, and the question of South Africa has largely disappeared from the international agenda. Even the admission by South Africa that it had developed nuclear weapons failed to provoke any significant reaction by the international community.

South Africa's international relationships remained largely unchanged during this period. The crisis following the Boipatong massacre and the lack of tangible progress in the negotiating process – other than the setting of the date for elections – meant that there were no significant moves towards the relaxation of remaining sanctions measures. In February 1993, at a major International Solidarity Conference convened by the ANC in Johannesburg, the ANC leadership set out a more flexible position on economic sanctions which envisaged the possibility that they could be lifted before elections and the installation of an Interim Government. A resolution adopted by the ANC's National Executive Committee was presented to the Conference which suggested that economic and diplomatic sanctions, under

certain conditions, could be lifted. These would be when the Transitional Executive Council is established, a date is fixed for elections, and legislation for the transition is enacted. Military and other strategic sanctions, however, would remain until a democratic government is installed.

This position was welcomed by the Conference participants and appears to be respected by those countries and organisations which have not already lifted sanctions. The Anti-Apartheid Movement published a policy statement in April 1993 entitled '*The role of sanctions in promoting democratic change*' which broadly reflected the ANC's policy in order to try and popularise these positions in Britain and internationally.

The ANC's more flexible position on sanctions was largely influenced by the continuing deterioration of the country's economy and the need for inflows of capital and new trading relations if this downward movement was to be reversed. South Africa's debt position continued to be of crucial importance given that the current re-scheduling agreement expires at the end of 1993. In March/April 1993, the South African Reserve Bank initiated discussions with the main international banks involved. However they signalled that any agreement should also have the support of the ANC and that it would be preferable if any final decisions awaited the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council.

British policy continued to be a major focus of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. By 1993 it appeared to have abandoned the active engagement it had shown during the early period of the UK's presidency of the European Council of Ministers, especially at the time of the Troika Mission to South Africa. Officially it adopted a 'hands off' attitude to the negotiations, but by word and deed appeared to be more supportive of the negotiating stance of Chief Buthelezi than that of the ANC and even that of the De Klerk regime.

In response to the assassination of Chris Hani a major campaign was launched by the AAM on the theme '*Peace, Freedom and the Vote*' with the aim of persuading the British government to press for the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council, agreement on the date for elections, and joint control of the security forces. At a meeting with the Foreign Office Minister of State, Baroness Chalker, in May 1993, the case was presented by the Anti-Apartheid Movement for a fundamental shift of British policy and detailed proposals were outlined to which the Government was urged to give consideration.

A growing appreciation of the potential threat to the negotiating process posed both by the ultra-right and Inkatha, together with the impact of Chris Hani's assassination, appears to have resulted in a re-evaluation of British policy. In a significant move it welcomed the setting of the date for the elections, thus explicitly distancing Britain from Inkatha. It also seems that Britain has begun to press much more actively for rapid progress on other fronts in the negotiations.

European Community policy has also evolved during this period. Again South

Africa had disappeared off the agenda of the Council of Ministers once the Observer Mission was installed in South Africa. However in May 1993, prompted apparently both by the crisis in South Africa but also the potential for progress in the negotiations, the current President, Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen, led an EC mission to South Africa. The subsequent Council of Ministers meeting on 8 June agreed upon a package of initiatives to come into effect once the Transitional Executive Council is established.

Whilst most of these corresponded with ANC positions, others such as the lifting of the bans on military attaches and security co-operation as well as terminating reporting under the EC Code of Conduct are matters of grave concern.

There was little evidence of any fundamental shift in US policy in relation to South Africa as a result of the change in the US administration. However it had a significant impact at regional level especially with the reversal of US policy towards Angola. Another encouraging development was the official visit of the Namibian Head of State, President Sam Nujoma, to Washington in June 1993.

The most positive development internationally has been the growing recognition that the international community will have a major role to play in the supervision, monitoring and verification of the electoral process. All four inter-governmental bodies, the UN, the OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community, are giving the matter active consideration. The OAU Summit in Cairo in June 1993 agreed that there should be a high-level African intervention at the UN Security Council in order to ensure an effective UN presence.

However, given the many demands being made on the UN elsewhere in Africa and the world as a whole and its current financial crisis, there will need to be extensive international pressure on the UN Security Council if the UN is to provide the size of operation which will be required in South Africa. Likewise given the recent experience of UN operations in Angola and elsewhere, effective scrutiny by Anti-Apartheid Movements and NGOs will be required of any such international presence.

Moreover, the international community also needs to recognise that it may have an even more crucial role to play should forces opposed to democratic change seek to disrupt the electoral process. This will require a major international response including the possibility of a UN peacekeeping presence in order to ensure that the electoral proceeds.

Towards a new agenda for international solidarity

AS DISCUSSED above, South Africa's first non-racial elections will open the way to profound changes both in South Africa and throughout Southern Africa which will in turn require new forms of international solidarity.

The need to prepare for this new stage has been the subject of growing debate both in Southern Africa and internationally. It was given in depth consideration at the ANC's International Solidarity Conference in Johannesburg in February 1993 when participants examined the different forms of solidarity which will be required in the future for different sectors of South African society.

A further initiative was taken in June 1993 when Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and Archbishop Huddleston jointly convened an International Conference on the theme '*Southern Africa: Making Hope a Reality*' which had as one of its twin objectives 'addressing the need for a new agenda of international solidarity with the people of Southern Africa.' A draft Strategy Document entitled '*Southern Africa: Towards a New Agenda for International Solidarity*' was presented to the meeting.

Amongst the items which have been identified for a New Agenda for International Solidarity are the following:

- ensuring that Southern Africa remains a major priority for the international community;
- mobilising support for the governments and peoples of Southern Africa in their efforts to promote a new era of reconstruction and development throughout the region, including pressing for major programmes of international aid;
- encouraging sustainable and balanced development within a framework of common security and peace in the region;
- campaigning so that trade, investment and aid relationships are such that they are beneficial to the region as a whole and do not reinforce existing inequalities;
- developing a capacity to help shape and monitor the policies of governments, institutions like the European Community, the IMF, and the World Bank; as well as banks and transnational corporations, so that they are supportive of the vision of a new Southern Africa;
- ensuring that the public are educated and informed about developments in Southern Africa, including the promotion and encouragement of sympathetic coverage of the region in the world's press and media;
- encouraging and promoting genuine people-to-people solidarity.

This International Conference also recognised the need for the world-wide solidarity movement against apartheid to begin the process of transforming itself into a new movement of solidarity which can unite all those committed to economic and social justice throughout Southern Africa.

Intensive debate will be needed to identify the future role of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and how it can best contribute towards making this new agenda for international solidarity a reality.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement – The priorities ahead

IN THE period since the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC, it has not always been very clear what the role of the international solidarity movement should be, and in particular what should be the priorities for the Anti-Apartheid Movement. The ANC's International Solidarity Conference made a major contribution towards clarifying that role. Now that the date for South Africa's first ever non-racial elections has been agreed, the most important priority for our Movement in the immediate period ahead must be to do all in our power to ensure that:

- the elections take place as agreed;
- they are genuinely free and fair;
- they result in a decisive majority committed to a new democratic future for South Africa;
- the results of the election, provided that they are verified to be free and fair, are respected by all parties.

This will require an extensive programme of campaigning activities of which the most crucial elements will be:

- mobilising all round support, including financial and material assistance, for the African National Congress and South Africa's democratic forces as a whole, especially so that they can contest the elections on an equitable basis;
- active participation in the *International Campaign for Free and Fair Elections*, especially in support of the call for an effective international presence in South Africa under the auspices of the UN and other inter-governmental bodies, to provide for international supervision, monitoring and verification of the election process;
- ongoing campaigns against violence and repression, especially to ensure a climate for democratic change;
- sustaining international pressure on the De Klerk regime and others resisting democratic change, including the maintenance of sanctions and other boycotts as envisaged by the ANC;
- pressing for further changes in British and European Community policy so that they make a decisive contribution towards the creation of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa;
- seeking responsible and accurate media coverage in Britain and internationally of the transition process and the elections in particular.

These campaigning initiatives, whilst representing the major priority for the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the immediate period ahead, need to be set in the context of a growing recognition of the need for campaigning with a regional perspective so that we can prepare for a new role as envisaged in the *'New Agenda for International Solidarity'*. In particular this will require us:

- to intensify our solidarity with the government and people of Angola in their efforts to defend peace and democracy;

- to step up solidarity with the Front Line States and the Southern Africa Development Community and to press for major programmes of development aid by Britain and the EC for the reconstruction of the region and to monitor investment decision and trade agreements so that they bring about maximum benefit for the all the people of Southern Africa.

Finally, we need to maintain an international perspective to our solidarity through effective co-operation with other Anti-Apartheid Movements and anti-racist movements within the European Community, the Commonwealth and the UN, as well as making our own distinct contribution to anti-racist struggles in Britain and Europe.

Conclusion

NOW IS the time for hope. South Africa's first non-racial elections should usher in a new era in the country's history, leading to the genuine end to apartheid and the creation of a new united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. A democratic South Africa also opens up the vision of a new future for Southern Africa; indeed a new era of reconstruction and development for the region as a whole.

The task facing the Anti-Apartheid Movement is to develop imaginative and effective means to inspire the public into action. We must mobilise all our potential human and financial resources for the crucial role we have to play in the immediate period ahead. This will require us to address how we maximise participation in campaigning and fundraising by our members and supporters, as well as our local and regional structures and other affiliates. Also how we can ensure our message gets across more effectively in the press and media. We will also need to explore how we can reach out to new sections of the population who will be attracted by the prospect of a new agenda for international solidarity.

We must stand firm and loyal to our principles and campaign for them. We must not relax until peace, democracy and justice triumph in Southern Africa and the scourge of racism is finally defeated.

This report was adopted unanimously by the National Committee of the Anti-Apartheid Movement at its meeting on Saturday 11 September 1993.



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